Bergantzel v. Mlynarik

• Decision Date: 16 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-0530.,98-0530.
• Citation: 619 N.W.2d 309
• Parties: Terri BERGANTZEL, Appellee, v. Jan R. MLYNARIK, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

619 N.W.2d 309

Terri BERGANTZEL, Appellee, v. Jan R. MLYNARIK, Appellant.

No. 98-0530.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

November 16, 2000.

Randall J. Shanks of Shanks Law Firm, Council Bluffs, for appellant.

Terri Bergantzel, Council Bluffs, pro se.

Considered en banc.

TERNUS, Justice.

The appellee, Terri Bergantzel, brought a small claims action against the appellant, Jan Mlynarik, to recover a contingent fee based on Bergantzel's assistance in negotiating a settlement of Mlynarik's personal injury claim. We granted discretionary review of the district court's affirmance of the small claims judgment allowing such a fee. Because Bergantzel is not a licensed attorney, we hold that the contingent fee contract is against public policy and may not be enforced. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for dismissal of Bergantzel's action.

I. Scope of Review.

The scope of review of a small claims action depends upon the nature of the case. See Credit Bureau Enters., Inc. v. Pelo, 608 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Iowa 2000)

. The claim in the case before us is for breach of contract, a law action. See Rogers v. Webb, 558 N.W.2d 155, 156 (Iowa 1997). Therefore, our review is for correction of errors of law. See id. The trial court's findings of fact "are binding if supported by substantial evidence." Land O'Lakes, Inc. v. Hanig, 610 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Iowa 2000). In the present appeal, Mlynarik does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact, but rather claims that the court incorrectly applied the law in determining that the contract was enforceable under these circumstances. This court is not bound by the trial court's "legal conclusions and application of legal principles." Id.

II. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The trial court found the following facts. The defendant in this action, Jan Mlynarik, was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident. He entered into a written contract with the plaintiff, Terri Bergantzel, under which Bergantzel was to "assist in the negotiation with the insurance companies and attorney, if necessary, in the settlement of [Mlynarik's] claim" resulting from the accident. In consideration for this assistance, Bergantzel was to receive fifteen percent of the amount recovered after payment of doctors' bills. The contract stated that Bergantzel was not an attorney and that the payment to her was to cover her expenses only. In the event that the services of an attorney were required, the contract provided that Bergantzel would "either pay for the consultation with an attorney or, if the attorney fees exceed the fifteen percent, [would] forfeit all claims to the settlement money."

It is undisputed that, pursuant to this agreement, Bergantzel negotiated a settlement with the tortfeasor's insurance carrier for the limits of the tortfeasor's policy— $100,000. Her work included locating witnesses, preparing affidavits, making long-distance phone calls, obtaining Mlynarik's medical and school records, obtaining a physician's opinion letter, and communicating with the insurance company. For her work, Mlynarik paid Bergantzel slightly over $12,000, which was fifteen percent of the recovery after medical expenses were deducted.

Bergantzel then undertook similar efforts to negotiate a settlement with Mlynarik's underinsured motorist (UIM) carrier. Bergantzel obtained a settlement offer from the insurance company for $35,000. She told Mlynarik that if he wanted a larger recovery, he would need to hire an attorney. Mlynarik decided to consult with an attorney and entered into a contingent fee agreement with attorney Randall Shanks. Shanks successfully negotiated a $65,000 settlement with Mlynarik's UIM carrier and received his contingent fee. Bergantzel was also paid her contingent fee, with the exception of $1,650. Bergantzel brought suit against Mlynarik for this sum.

At trial, Mlynarik urged that Bergantzel engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and, therefore, could not recover under their contract. The trial court rejected this defense, stating:

Bergantzel did not represent Mlynarik in court, nor did she file any pleading on his behalf. The court concludes that her efforts to locate witnesses, prepare affidavits, obtain medical and school records, and talk with insurance companies did not involve "the art of exercising professional judgment" and [did] not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Bergantzel did not give Mlynarik advice about his rights under the law. She encouraged him to consult with an attorney. She did not hold herself out to be an attorney.

Based on these conclusions, the court entered judgment in favor of Bergantzel for $1,650 plus interest and court costs.

Mlynarik filed an appeal to the district court. See Iowa Code § 631.13 (1999). The district court affirmed the decision of the small claims court. Mlynarik then sought discretionary review by this court, which was granted. See id. § 631.16.

III. General Principles Governing Contracts Alleged to be Unenforceable on Public Policy Grounds.

This court recently reviewed the principles governing claims that a contract is unenforceable on the basis of public policy in Mincks Agri Center, Inc. v. Bell Farms, Inc., 611 N.W.2d 270 (Iowa 2000). In Mincks, we adopted the following rule from the Restatement (Second) of Contracts:

If a party is prohibited from doing an act because of his failure to comply with a licensing, registration or similar requirement, a promise in consideration of his doing that act or of his promise to do it is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if

(a) the requirement has a regulatory purpose, and

(b) the interest in the enforcement of the promise is clearly outweighed by the public policy behind the requirement.

611 N.W.2d at 275 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 181, at 21 (1981) [hereinafter "Restatement"] ).

There is no dispute in the case before us that Bergantzel seeks to recover payment under the contract for her services in negotiating a settlement with Mlynarik's UIM carrier. That leaves three issues for our consideration: (1) Was Bergantzel prohibited from negotiating this settlement because she was not a licensed attorney?; (2) If so, does the attorney licensing requirement have a regulatory purpose?; and (3) Is the interest in enforcement of a contingent fee contract for the performance of legal services by a nonlawyer clearly outweighed by the public policy underlying the attorney licensing requirement? We consider each question separately.

IV. Was Bergantzel Prohibited From Negotiating a Settlement of Mlynarik's UIM Claim Because She Was Not a Licensed Attorney?

Iowa Code section 602.10101 states:

The power to admit persons to practice as attorneys and counselors in the courts of this state, or any of them, is vested exclusively in the supreme court which shall adopt and promulgate rules to carry out the intent and purpose of this article.

Pursuant to this authority, the court has adopted rules pertaining to the practice of law, requiring that persons desiring to practice law in Iowa be admitted to the bar. See Iowa Sup.Ct. Rs. 100-114. There is no dispute that Bergantzel was not admitted to practice law in Iowa.

That brings us to the most problematic issue in this case: was Bergantzel's negotiation of a UIM settlement the practice of law? Like many other states, Iowa has found it difficult to articulate an "all-inclusive definition of the practice of law." Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Baker, 492 N.W.2d 695, 701 (Iowa 1992); see also In re Bodkin, 21 Ill.2d 458, 173 N.E.2d 440, 441 (1961)

(stating "it is difficult to state a formula as to what constitutes the practice of law"); State Bar v. Cramer, 399 Mich. 116, 249 N.W.2d 1, 7 (1976) (stating "any attempt to formulate a lasting, all encompassing definition of `practice of law' is doomed to failure `for the reason that under our system of jurisprudence such practice must necessarily change with the everchanging business and social order'") (quoting Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n v. Denkema, 290 Mich. 56, 287 N.W. 377, 380 (1939)); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932, 130 S.W.2d 945, 954 (1939) ("`It would be difficult to give an all-inclusive definition of the practice of law, and we will not attempt to do so.'" (quoting Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d 977, 982 (1937))); In re Opinion No. 26, 139 N.J. 323, 654 A.2d 1344, 1352 (1995) ("`What constitutes the practice of law does not lend itself to precise and all inclusive definition.'" (quoting Auerbacher v. Wood, 142 N.J. Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 863, 864 (1948))); Wash. State Bar Ass'n v. Great W. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 91 Wash.2d 48, 586 P.2d 870, 875 (1978) ("The `practice of law' does not lend itself easily to precise definition.").

We are not without guidance, however, in our endeavor to determine whether a particular activity is the practice of law. See Baker, 492 N.W.2d at 701

(referring to EC 3-5 of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility). Such guidance is provided by Ethical Consideration 3-5 of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility:

[T]he practice of law includes, but is not limited to, representing another before the courts; giving of legal advice and counsel to others relating to their rights and obligations under the law; and preparation or approval of the use of legal instruments by which legal rights of others are either obtained, secured or transferred even if such matters never become the subject of a court proceeding. Functionally, the practice of law relates to the rendition of services for others that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer. The essence of the professional judgment of the lawyer is the educated ability to relate the general body and philosophy of law to a specific legal problem of a client; and thus, the public interest will be better served if only lawyers are permitted to act in matters involving professional judgment. Where this professional judgment is not involved, nonlawyers, such as cou

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