Berry v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co.

• Decision Date: 12 April 1948
• Docket Number: 40346
• Parties: Margaret E. Berry v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Company, a Corporation, Earl Gibson and John R. Gore, Co-Partners, Doing Business as Gibson Transfer Company, and Edward Bailey, Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

211 S.W.2d 35

357 Mo. 808

Margaret E. Berry v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Company, a Corporation, Earl Gibson and John R. Gore, Co-Partners, Doing Business as Gibson Transfer Company, and Edward Bailey, Appellants

No. 40346

Supreme Court of Missouri

April 12, 1948

Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Banc Overruled May 10, 1948.

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court; Hon. Brown Harris Judge.

Affirmed (subject to remittitur).

Ruth Austin Hall, Clay C. Rogers and Mosman, Rogers, Bell & Field for appellant Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Company.

(1) The light post, when attached to the public sidewalk upon City property, became a fixture attached to the land, hence appellant had no right or duty to remove it. Hunt v. Mo Pac. Ry. Co., 76 Mo. 115; Mo. Pacific Ry. Co. v Bradbury, 106 Mo.App. 450; Griffith v Happersberger, 86 Cal. 605, 25 P. 137; Yokohama Specie Bank v. Unasuke Higashi, 133 P.2d 487; 36 C.J.S., pp. 892, 962; 22 Am. Jur. 715. (2) The City, by ordinance, prohibited the removal of the post. Sec. 20-3 of Chap. 20 Revised Ordinances of Kansas City (406); Riley v. Woolf Bros., 236 Mo.App. 661, 159 S.W.2d 324; Tower v. St. Louis, 148 S.W.2d 100. (3) It was the duty of the City to keep the sidewalks and appurtenances in repair. That duty was not upon the abutting property owner. Callaway v. Newman Merc. Co., 321 Mo. 766, 12 S.W.2d 491; Breen v. Johnson Bros., 297 Mo. 176, 248 S.W. 970; Wright v. Hines, 235 S.W. 831; Sheridan v. St. Joseph, 232 Mo.App. 615, 110 S.W.2d 371; Baustian v. Young, 152 Mo. 317, 53 S.W. 921; Shaw v. Railroad, 223 Mo.App. 1008, 9 S.W.2d 835; Stewart v. Sheidley, 223 Mo.App. 574, 16 S.W.2d 607. (4) The City, by charter and ordinance assumed exclusive control of the lights. Subsec. 16, Sec. 1 of City Charter; Sec. 20-3, Revised Ordinances; Sec. 20, Art. 5 of Administrative Code; Sec. 59-2, Chap. 59, Revised Ordinances. (5) The street lamps had been dedicated to public use. Sheridan v. St. Joseph, 232 Mo.App. 615, 110 S.W.2d 371; Callaway v. Newman Merc. Co., 321 Mo. 766, 12 S.W.2d 491; Edmondson v. Kansas City, 227 Mo.App. 817, 57 S.W.2d 690; Benton v. St. Louis, 217 Mo. 687; Gray v. Hannibal, 29 S.W.2d 710; Smith v. Ry. Co., 275 S.W. 53; Stewart v. Sheidley, 223 Mo.App. 574, 16 S.W.2d 607. (6) The old crack in the light post was but a condition and not a proximate contributing cause of plaintiff's injuries. It was not negligence to locate the pole upon the sidewalk. Clinkenbeard v. St. Joseph, 10 S.W.2d 54; Southern Bell Tel, Co. v. Edwards, 253 Ky. 727, 70 S.W.2d 1; Fiechter v. City of Corbin, 71 S.W.2d 423; Greenland v. Des Moines, 206 Iowa 1298, 221 N.W. 953. (7) Proximate cause not shown. Fiechter v. City of Corbin, 71 S.W.2d 423; Smith v. Mabrey, 348 Mo. 644, 154 S.W.2d 770; Schaller v. Lusk, 184 S.W. 1179; Bootman v. Lusk, 190 S.W. 414; State ex rel. v. Cox, 310 Mo. 367, 276 S.W. 869; Indiana Service Corp. v. Johnston, 34 N.E.2d 157; Woody v. S.C. Power Co., 24 S.E.2d 121. (8) The court erred in admitting the alleged statements of Wallace, the superintendent of defendant's store, to the effect that the post had been cracked or broken prior to the time in question. State ex rel. v. Shain, 340 Mo. 145, 101 S.W.2d 14. (9) The court erred in refusing to admit in evidence the charter and ordinance provisions of Kansas City offered by appellant. Such evidence was admissible on the question of defendant's alleged negligence. State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 279 Mo. 493, 214 S.W. 369; White v. Hasburg, 124 S.W.2d 560; McPherson v. Premier Service Co., 38 S.W.2d 277; St. Mary's Co. v. Ill. Oil Co., 254 S.W. 735; Nall v. Brennan, 324 Mo. 565, 23 S.W.2d 1043. (10) The verdict is grossly excessive and exorbitant. Johnson v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 334 Mo. 22, 64 S.W.2d 674; Cole v. Railway Co., 332 Mo. 999, 61 S.W.2d 344; Willis v. Ry. Co., 352 Mo. 490, 178 S.W.2d 341.

Clyde J. Linde and Seth S. Lacy for appellants Earl Gibson and John R. Gore, doing business as Gibson Transfer Company; Langworthy, Matz & Linde of counsel.

(1) The court below erred in refusing to sustain the joint separate motion of defendants Earl Gibson and John R. Gore, co-partners, doing business as Gibson Transfer Company, for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence because the undisputed evidence conclusively showed that the departure of Edward Bailey, the driver and operator of the truck mentioned in evidence, from the business of Gibson and Gore was of a marked and decided character, requiring the court to declare as a matter of law that Edward Bailey was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time and place of the casualty. Pesot v. Yanda, 126 S.W.2d 240, 344 Mo. 338; Klotsch v. P. F. Collier & Son Corp., 159 S.W.2d 589, 349 Mo. 40; Humphrey v. Hogan, 104 S.W.2d 767; Anderson v. Nagel, 259 S.W. 858, 214 Mo.App. 134; Guthrie v. Holmes, 198 S.W. 854, 272 Mo. 215; State ex rel. Waters v. Hostetter, 126 S.W.2d 1164, 344 Mo. 443; Sowers v. Howard, 139 S.W.2d 897, 346 Mo. 10. (2) The court below erred, to the prejudice of these appellants, in giving Instructions 3, 5 and C. Pesot v. Yanda, 126 S.W.2d 240, 344 Mo. 338; Humphrey v. Hogan, 104 S.W.2d 767; Vert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 117 S.W.2d 252, 342 Mo. 629. (3) The verdict is grossly excessive. Johnson v. Chicago & E.I. Ry. Co., 64 S.W.2d 674, 334 Mo. 22; Cole v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 61 S.W.2d 344, 332 Mo. 999; Willis v. A., T.S.F. Ry. Co., 178 S.W.2d 341, 352 Mo. 490; Petty v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 191 S.W.2d 653, 354 Mo. 823.

Lathrop, Crane, Sawyer, Woodson & Righter and Winston H. Woodson for appellant Edward Bailey.

The court erred in overruling defendant Bailey's motion for a new trial because the verdict of the jury is excessive and so grossly excessive as to show passion and prejudice of the jury. Frese v. Wells, 40 S.W.2d 652; Dorman v. East St. Louis Ry. Co., 335 Mo. 1082, 75 S.W.2d 854; Cason v. Kansas City Term. Ry. Co., 123 S.W.2d 133; Pitcher v. Schock, 345 Mo. 1184, 139 S.W.2d 463; O'Brien v. Vandalia Bus Lines, Inc., 351 Mo. 500, 173 S.W.2d 76; Goslin v. Kurn, 351 Mo. 395, 173 S.W.2d 79; Taylor v. Lumaghi Coal Co., 352 Mo. 1212, 181 S.W.2d 536; Turner v. Central Hardware Co., 353 Mo. 1182, 186 S.W.2d 603; Bowman v. Standard Oil Co., 169 S.W.2d 384; Johnson v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 334 Mo. 22, 64 S.W.2d 674; Cole v. Ry. Co., 332 Mo. 999, 61 S.W.2d 344; Willis v. Ry. Co., 352 Mo. 490, 178 S.W.2d 341; Petty v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 191 S.W.2d 653.

E. E. Thompson, Alfred H. Osborne and Popham, Thompson, Popham, Mandell & Trusty for respondent.

(1) Defendant Dry Goods Company having assumed the duty of maintaining the light pole and having continued to maintain it up to and including date of the casualty, the question of its negligence in so doing was properly a question for the jury irrespective of every other fact or circumstance in the case. Willis v. A., T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 352 Mo. 490 178 S.W.2d 341; Bartlett v. Taylor, 351 Mo. 1060, 174 S.W.2d 844; Holman v. Terminal Railroad Assn. of St. Louis, 125 S.W.2d 527; Barber v. Kellogg, 123 S.W.2d 100; Bachman v. Quincy, O. & K.C.R., 310 Mo. 48, 274 S.W. 764; Ebert v. A.J. Casper Co., 71 S.W.2d 859, 228 Mo.App. 589; Robertson v. Wall, 195 S.W.2d 894. (2) The placing of the light pole in the sidewalk constituted extraordinary use of the sidewalk and for purposes other than as a sidewalk, and the law imposed the duty upon said defendant to exercise due care in maintaining the light pole. State ex rel. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Hostetter, 348 Mo. 841, 156 S.W.2d 673; Callaway v. Newman-Merc. Co., 321 Mo. 766, 12 S.W.2d 491; Cool v. Rohrbach, 21 S.W.2d 919; Reedy v. St. Louis Brewing Assn., 161 Mo. 523, 61 S.W. 859; Wright v. Hines, 235 S.W. 831; St. Gemme v. Osterhaus, 294 S.W. 1022, 220 Mo.App. 863; Boyle v. Neisner Bros., 87 S.W.2d 227, 230 Mo.App. 90; Stith v. J.J. Newberry Co., 336 Mo. 467, 79 S.W.2d 447; Bianchetti v. Luce, 2 S.W.2d 129; Megson v. St. Louis, 264 S.W. 15. (3) The light pole was, at all times, the property of said defendant Dry Goods Company, and Kansas City, Missouri, denied ownership and jurisdiction thereof, and hence there could not have been dedication even if personal property were subject thereto. Jennings v. Van Schaick, 108 N.Y. 530, 15 N.E. 424; 3 Shearman & Redfield on the Law of Negligence (6th Ed.), sec. 703, pp. 1832, 1833; Carruthers v. St. Louis, 341 Mo. 1073, 111 S.W.2d 32; P.M. Bruner Granitoid Co. v. Glencoe Lime & Cement Co., 169 Mo.App. 295, 152 S.W. 601; Anthony v. Kennard Bldg. Co., 188 Mo. 704, 87 S.W. 921. (4) The city ordinance referred to by defendant does not absolve it from liability. Willis v. A., T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 352 Mo. 502, 178 S.W.2d 341. (5) The defective condition of the light pole was one of the proximate causes of plaintiff's injuries and directly contributed thereto. Byars v. St. Louis Public Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 278, 66 S.W.2d 894; Carr v. St. Louis Auto Supply Co., 293 Mo. 562, 239 S.W. 827; Giles v. Moundridge Milling Co., 351 Mo. 568, 173 S.W.2d 745; State ex rel. Hauck Bakery Co. v. Haid, 333 Mo. 76, 62 S.W.2d 400; State ex rel. St. Charles v. Haid, 325 Mo. 107, 28 S.W.2d 97; Hogan v. Fleming, 317 Mo. 524, 297 S.W. 404; Myrazek v. Terminal Railroad Assn. of St. Louis, 341 Mo. 1054, 111 S.W.2d 26; Henry v. First Natl. Bank of Kansas City, 132 Mo.App. 1071, 115 S.W.2d 121; Fawkes v. Natl. Refining Co., 341 Mo. 630, 108 S.W.2d 7; McWhorter v. Dahl Chevrolet Co., 229 Mo.App. 1090, 88 S.W.2d 240; Sisk v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 67 S.W.2d 830; Lloyd v. Alton R. Co., 348 Mo. 1222, 159 S.W.2d 267. (6) The court properly admitted statements of said defendant's superintendent showing defendant's actual knowledge of the defective condition of the pole. Garnett v. S.S. Kresge Co., 85 S.W.2d 157; State ex rel. S.S. Kresge Co. v. Shain,...