Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C.

• Decision Date: 21 February 2020
• Docket Number: NO. 18-0595,18-0595
• Citation: 595 S.W.3d 651
• Parties: Cherlyn BETHEL, Individually and as the Representative of the Estate of Ronald J. Bethel, Deceased, Petitioner, v. QUILLING, SELANDER, LOWNDS, WINSLETT & MOSER, P.C., and James H. Moody, III, Respondents
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

595 S.W.3d 651

Cherlyn BETHEL, Individually and as the Representative of the Estate of Ronald J. Bethel, Deceased, Petitioner,

v.QUILLING, SELANDER, LOWNDS, WINSLETT & MOSER, P.C., and James H. Moody, III, Respondents

NO. 18-0595

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued November 7, 2019

OPINION DELIVERED: February 21, 2020

Bill Davis, Office of the Attorney General, Assistant Solicitor General, Kyle D. Hawkins, Office of the Attorney General, Solicitor General, P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059), Jeffrey C. Mateer, Texas Attorney General's Office, First Asst. Attorney General, P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station, Kyle Highful, Office of the Attorney General, PO Box 12548, Warren Kenneth Paxton, Office of Attorney General, 209 W. 14th St., Austin TX, for Amicus Curiae.

Andrew G. Counts, Stewart D. Matthews, E. Todd Tracy, The Tracy Firm, 4701 Bengal Street, Frederick Leighton Durham III, Kelly, Durham & Pittard LLP, Jessica A. Foster, Thad D. Spalding, Durham, Pittard & Spalding, L.L.P., P.O. Box 224626, Morgan A. McPheeters, McPheeters Law, PLLC, 4447 N. Central Expy., Suite 101, Box #158, Dallas TX, for Petitioner.

Marcie L. Schout, Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., 2001 Bryan Street, Suite 1800, Dallas TX 75201, for Respondent.

Justice Devine delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents two issues: first, whether an affirmative defense may be the basis of a Rule 91a motion to dismiss; and second, whether the alleged destruction of evidence is an action "taken in connection with representing a client in litigation," thus entitling the respondent attorneys to attorney immunity. We join the court of appeals in concluding that Rule 91a permits dismissal based on an affirmative defense. See 581 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018). We also agree with the court of appeals that, on the facts of this case, the respondent attorneys are entitled to attorney immunity. See id. at 311-13. Accordingly, we affirm.

I

Petitioner Cherlyn Bethel's husband, Ronald, tragically died in a car accident while towing a trailer. Bethel sued the trailer's manufacturer, alleging that the trailer's faulty brakes caused the accident. Law firm Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, as well as attorney James "Hamp" Moody (collectively, Quilling), represented the manufacturer in the lawsuit. Bethel alleges that Quilling intentionally destroyed key evidence in the case by disassembling and testing the trailer's brakes before Bethel had the opportunity to either examine them or document their original condition.

Bethel sued Quilling for, among other things, fraud, trespass to chattel, and conversion.¹ Quilling moved to dismiss the case under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, arguing that it was entitled to attorney immunity as to all of Bethel's claims. The trial court granted Quilling's motion and dismissed the case. Bethel appealed, arguing that (1) affirmative defenses, such as attorney immunity, cannot be the basis of a Rule 91a dismissal, and (2) attorney immunity did not protect Quilling's conduct.

The court of appeals affirmed. 581 S.W.3d 306. First, the court of appeals concluded that attorney immunity could be the basis of a Rule 91a motion because the allegations in Bethel's pleadings established Quilling's entitlement to the defense. Id. at 309–10. Second, the court of appeals reasoned that Quilling's actions, while possibly wrongful, were the "kinds of actions" that are part of an attorney's duties in representing a client in litigation. Id. at 311–13. Thus, the court of appeals held that attorney immunity barred all of Bethel's claims.²

II

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a provides that a party "may move to dismiss a cause of action on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact." TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. "A cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought." Id. "A cause of action has no basis in fact if no reasonable person could believe the facts pleaded." Id. In ruling on a Rule 91a motion, a court "may not consider evidence ... and must decide the motion based solely on the pleading of the cause of action." TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6. We review the merits of a Rule 91a motion de novo. City of Dallas v. Sanchez , 494 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam).

Attorney immunity is an affirmative defense. Youngkin v. Hines , 546 S.W.3d 675, 681 (Tex. 2018). Bethel reasons that affirmative defenses are generally waived unless they are raised in the defendant's pleading. TEX. R. CIV. P. 94. Thus, Bethel contends, a court must look to the defendant's pleading to determine whether an affirmative defense is properly before the court. However, Rule 91a.6 expressly limits the court's consideration to "the pleading of the cause of action," together with a narrow class of exhibits. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6. Because only a plaintiff's pleading is a "pleading of a cause of action," Bethel argues that courts may not consider a defendant's pleading in making a Rule 91a determination. Bethel therefore concludes that an affirmative defense can never be the basis of a Rule 91a motion.

We disagree. We interpret rules of procedure according to our usual principles of statutory interpretation. Ford Motor Co. v. Garcia , 363 S.W.3d 573, 579 (Tex. 2012). We therefore begin with the text of the rule and construe it according to its plain meaning. Id. However, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 1 provides that the rules of procedure "shall be given a liberal construction" to further the rules' objective of "obtain[ing] a just, fair, equitable[,] and impartial adjudication" of parties' rights. TEX. R. CIV. P. 1. We thus apply our general canons of statutory interpretation in light of this specific guiding rule. See, e.g. , In re Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC , 459 S.W.3d 565, 569 (Tex. 2015).

Bethel urges us to focus on the rule's requirement that the court "must decide the motion based solely on the pleading of the cause of action." TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6 (emphasis added). As Bethel sees it, this provision prohibits a court deciding a Rule 91a motion from considering anything other than the plaintiff's pleading. Of course, it is not possible to "decide the motion" without considering the motion itself, in addition to the plaintiff's pleading. Additionally, the rule provides that the court may hold a hearing on the motion. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6. Thus, the rule contemplates that a court may consider at least the substance of the Rule 91a motion and arguments at the hearing, in addition to the plaintiff's pleadings, in deciding the motion. Bethel's proffered interpretation would render these aspects of the rule meaningless, preventing a court from considering even the substance of a Rule 91a motion or a response in deciding whether to dismiss the case. See Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc. , 579 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. 2019) (noting that in interpreting a statute, we avoid "absurd or nonsensical results" (quotations omitted)). Bethel's overly narrow interpretation of one piece of the rule simply does not comport with the text of the rule as a whole. See id. ("The statutory words must be determined considering the context in which they are used, not in isolation.").

Construing the rules of procedure liberally, as Rule 1 requires us to do, we conclude that Rule 91a limits the scope of a court's factual, but not legal, inquiry. We begin with the text of the rule. Ford Motor Co. , 363 S.W.3d at 579. Rule 91a provides that "the court may not consider evidence in ruling on the motion and must decide the motion based solely on the pleading of the cause of action." TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6 (emphasis added). Thus, the rule contrasts "the pleading of the cause of action" with "evidence," not the defendant's pleading. This dichotomy indicates that the limitation is factual, rather than legal, in nature. Further, the rule provides that a court may dismiss a claim as lacking a basis in law "if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought." TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. Again, the rule limits the scope of the court's factual inquiry—the court must take the "allegations" as true—but does not limit the scope of the court's legal inquiry in the same way. Rather, the rule provides that a claim lacks a basis in law if the facts alleged "do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought." Id. The rule does not limit the universe of legal theories by which the movant may show that the claimant is not entitled to relief based on the facts as alleged.

This interpretation accounts for the parts of the rule that allow courts to consider the substance of Rule 91a motions and hearings in addition to the plaintiff's pleadings. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6. Both motions and hearings are avenues by which the movant may present legal theories as to why the claimant is not entitled to relief. Thus, the legal-factual distinction avoids violence to the text of the rule as a whole while preserving the rule's intended limitation on factual inquiries.³ See Silguero , 579 S.W.3d at 59 ("In interpreting statutes, we must look to the plain language, construing the text in light of the statute as a whole.").

Finally, Rule 1 directs us to consider expedition and cost to the parties and the state in construing rules of procedure. TEX. R. CIV. P. 1 ("To the end that this objective may be attained with as great expedition and dispatch and at the least expense both to the litigants and to the state as may be practicable, these rules shall be given a liberal construction."). Our interpretation of Rule 91a serves these objectives by allowing courts to dismiss meritless cases before the parties engage in costly discovery. Forcing parties to conduct discovery when the claimant's allegations conclusively establish the existence of an affirmative defense would be a significant waste of state and private resources.

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