Bickley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co.

• Decision Date: 13 November 1972
• Docket Number: No. 19515,19515
• Citation: 259 S.C. 463,192 S.E.2d 866
• Parties: Kaye B. BICKLEY, Administratrix of the Estate of R. Collins Bickley, respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 866

192 S.E.2d 866

259 S.C. 463

Kaye B. BICKLEY, Administratrix of the Estate of R. Collins Bickley, respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY, Appellant.

No. 19515.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Nov. 13, 1972.

Cooper, Gary, Nexsen & Pruet, Columbia, for appellant.

King & Brooks, Columbia, for respondent.

MOSS, Chief Justice.

This case arose under the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, Section 72--1 et seq., Code of 1962. It involves a claim for compensation arising out of the death of R. Collins Bickley who left surviving his dependent widow, Kaye B. Bickley, the respondent herein. She alleges that R. Collins Bickley who was employed by South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, the appellant herein, as an apprentice lineman, lost his life in an automobile accident on November 3, 1969, and such was an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The appellant denied that the death of R. Collins Bickley arose out of and in the course of his employment.

A hearing was held before a single Commissioner on February 9, 1971. This Commissioner, on April 30, 1971, filed his decision holding that the death of the employee did not arise out of and in the course of his employment as the relationship of employer and employee ceased when the employee left the place of employment at the end of work to go home.

The respondent made timely application for a review of this decision to the Full Commission. The Commission, by a three to two majority, affirmed the decision made by the single Commissioner. Thereafter, an appeal was duly taken by the respondent to the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County and such was heard by The Honorable Wade S. Weatherford, Jr., presiding judge, who issued his order reversing the decision of the Commission, holding that the deceased employee was on a special mission for the appellant at the time of his death and was covered by the Compensation Act. Timely appeal to this Court followed.

The exceptions of the appellant raise the question of whether the death of R. Collins Bickley was the result of an accident which arose out of or in the course of his employment.

To sustain an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act, it must appear that the injury or death resulted from an accident which both 'arose out of' and 'in the course of' the employment. Section 72--14, 1962 Code of Laws. The term 'arose out of' refers to the origin of the cause of the accident, while the term 'in the course of' refers to the time, place and circumstances under which it occurred. Williams v. S. C. State Hospital, 245 S.C. 377, 140 S.E.2d 601.

The material facts here are not in dispute. R. Collins Bickley, an apprentice lineman for the appellant, was called out along with members of his crew to repair storm damage to the electrical lines of the appellant in the Charleston area. The deceased departed his home near Columbia at 3:30 a.m., Sunday, November 2, 1969, and reported to the work station of the appellant in Columbia, South Carolina, where he met the other members of his crew. They proceeded to Charleston where they worked until noon, with an hour break for lunch. Thereafter, they continued to work until they stopped for approximately one hour for supper. This crew then went back to work and continued until they reported to the terminal in Charleston at about 11:30 p.m. They were given the option of spending the night in Charleston at the company's expense or returning to Columbia. They elected to return to Columbia.

The decedent drove the truck back to Columbia, arriving at their work station in the early morning hours of November 3, 1969. The crew cleaned their equipment after which they checked off duty at 3:30 a.m. The decedent then got into his car and left for home. While proceeding along highway I--26, he crashed into the rear of a truck which had just pulled on to the highway from an interchange. The collision resulted in the decedent's death.

Bickley's work as a lineman for the appellant was ordinarily performed in the Columbia area and normally he worked forty hours per work week, Monday through Friday. He was subject to being 'called out' for emergency work outside of the regular period of employment. Under the contract existing between the appellant and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, under which the decedent worked, an employee called out to work at other than normal working hours would be credited with a minimum of two hours as 'hours worked' or for the time elapsed between leaving his home and dismissal from emergency duty should this time exceed two hours. The dismissal here occurred when the decedent departed his work station at the completion of his emergency duty and left for home.

We have held, as a general rule, subject to the exceptions hereinafter stated, that in injury sustained by an employee while on his way to or from work and away from the premises of the employer does not arise out of and in the course of employment. The exceptions to this rule are as follows: (1) Where, in going to and returning from work, the means of transportation is provided by the employer, or the time that is consumed is paid for or included in the wages; (2) Where the employee, on his way to or from his work, is still charged with...