Williams v. South Carolina State Hospital

• Decision Date: 25 February 1965
• Docket Number: No. 18311,18311
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Sarah C. WILLIAMS, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE HOSPITAL and State Workmen's Compensation Fund, Appellants.

Page 601

140 S.E.2d 601

245 S.C. 377

Sarah C. WILLIAMS, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE HOSPITAL and State Workmen's Compensation Fund, Appellants.

No. 18311.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Feb. 25, 1965.

Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., David Aiken, Asst. Atty. Gen., Whaley & McCutchen, by Thomas B. Whaley, and D. Reece Williams, III, Columbia, for appellants.

H. V. Sandifer, Albert J. Dooley, Lexington, for respondent.

LEWIS, Justice.

This is an appeal by the South Carolina State Hospital from an order of the circuit court affirming an award of the Industrial Commission for Workmen's Compensation benefits to Sarah C. Williams, an employee of the hospital. The award was for injuries sustained by the employee when she slipped and fell while walking from the building where she worked to an automobile parking area located on the hospital premises. The issue made by the hospital in this appeal is that the circuit court erred in sustaining the conclusion of the Industrial Commission that the employee's injury arose out of and in the course of her employment.

The material facts are not in dispute. The claimant, Sarah C. Williams, was employed as a nurse's aide at the South Carolina State Hospital in Columbia, and worked in a ward in what is known as the Center Building during the hours from 7:00 a. m. to 3:30 p. m., each day. In going to work, she drove her car through the main entrance gate to the hospital premises, and along a street or drive maintained by the hospital to a parking area near the Center Building where she parked her car for the day. The place where she parked was on the side of the street, adjacent to the curb, and was maintained and designated by the hospital as a nurse's parking area. From this parking area, she walked a short distance, partly over a brick sidewalk, to the building where she worked. This sidewalk was on the most direct route from the car to the building.

Claimant's injuries were sustained on January 26, 1963, while walking from the building to her car. She had completed her duties in the ward and was in the act of leaving the premises for the day. It had been raining and mud had accumulated in one area on the sidewalk. This mud adhered to her shoes and, just before she reached her car, her foot slipped off the curb, causing her to fall and sustain injury to her back.

Therefore, the issue in this case involves a determination of whether the injury sustained by the employee immediately after completing the day's work, and while walking over the employer's premises to reach her car which was parked in the employer maintained parking area, arose out of and in the course of her employment. The general legal principles which govern the decision are well settled.

To sustain an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act, it must appear that the injury resulted from an accident which both 'arose out of' and 'in the course of' the employment. Section 72-14, 1962 Code of Laws.

The term 'arose out of' refers to the origin of the cause of the accident, while the term 'in the course of' refers to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident occurred. Eargle v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., et al., 205 S.C. 423, 32 S.E.2d 240.

We have held, as a general rule, subject to certain exceptions recently stated in Sola v. Sunny Slope Farms, 244 S.C. 6, 135 S.E.2d 321, that an injury sustained by an employee while on his way to or from work, and away from the premises of the employer, does not arise out of and in the course of the employment. Gallman v. Springs Mills, 201 S.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 715. These cases, however, have no application here, since the claimant sustained her injury while on the premises controlled by her employer.

Applicable to the present situation is the following from the case of Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S.Ct. 221, 222, 72 L.Ed. 507, 66 A.L.R. 1402 (quoted with approval in Eargle v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., et al., supra, 205 S.C. 423, 32 S.E.2d 240 and Lamb v. Pacolet Mfg. Co., 210 S.C. 490, 43 S.E.2d 353):

'And employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable...