Bierman v. Shookster

• Decision Date: 01 May 1991
• Docket Number: No. 89-591-A,89-591-A
• Citation: 590 A.2d 402
• Parties: Richard L. BIERMAN v. Linda SHOOKSTER v. CITY OF PROVIDENCE et al. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 402

590 A.2d 402

Richard L. BIERMAN v. Linda SHOOKSTER v. CITY OF PROVIDENCE et al.

No. 89-591-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 1, 1991.

Edward L. Gnys, Jr., Gunning, LaFazia & Gnys, Inc., Providence, for plaintiff.

John A. Baglini, Higgins & Slattery, Linda E. Buffardi and James Ruggieri, Higgins, Cavanagh & Cooney, and David Curtin, Providence, for defendants.

OPINION

FAY, Chief Justice.

This matter is before the Supreme Court on appeal by the plaintiffs, Linda Shookster (Shookster) and Richard L. Bierman (Bierman), from a motion to dismiss entered in the Superior Court in favor of the defendant Stephen Napolitano (Napolitano) as treasurer of the city of Providence (city). ¹ The facts of the case relevant to this appeal are as follows.

On January 31, 1983, Shookster and Bierman were involved in an automobile collision. Prior to the accident, Bierman was traveling on Friendship Street in the city of Providence. Because the traffic light controlling the Friendship Street access to the intersection of Friendship and Dyer Streets was green, Bierman continued on Friendship Street through the intersection. There were two traffic-control signals governing the Dyer Street traffic. One of the signals was broken and the other was blocked by an illegally parked truck owned by Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. (Ryder), and operated by National Office Supply Co. (National). When Shookster, who was traveling south on Dyer Street, entered the intersection, her vehicle collided with Bierman's vehicle.

On April 21, 1983, Bierman initiated a civil action against Shookster for injuries sustained in the accident. Shookster, who also suffered damages as a result of the collision, then brought suit against Bierman, Ryder, National, and the city. Bierman answered the complaint and filed a cross-claim against the additional parties named in Shookster's complaint. On June 12, 1986, the complaints were consolidated. On May 6, 1987, Shookster filed a third-party action against Ryder, National, and the city. Ryder and National filed a counterclaim against Shookster and a cross-claim against the city.

Relying on the public duty doctrine and the immunity afforded governmental entities set forth in Knudsen v. Hall, 490 A.2d 976 (R.I.1985), the city moved for summary judgment. The trial justice granted summary judgment, and an order was entered by the Superior Court on November 18, 1987, dismissing the claims against the city. The sole issue before this court, therefore, is whether plaintiffs' claims are barred by the public duty doctrine.

The public duty doctrine espoused by this court in Knudsen v. Hall creates governmental immunity for those claims arising out of governmental actions that are discretionary in nature. Id. at 978-79. An individual may, however, be entitled to recover against the government if he or she is able to establish that he or she was a specifically identifiable victim of the government's negligence. Id. In the present case plaintiffs aver that their claims should not be barred by the public duty doctrine because although the placement of an automatic signal light constitutes a discretionary act protected by the public duty doctrine, the maintenance of such a light after installation is not discretionary in nature and thus the public duty doctrine does not apply. Additionally plaintiffs allege that the city's failure to maintain the traffic controls at the intersection created a public nuisance entitling them to recovery.

In Polaski v. O'Reilly, 559 A.2d 646, 647 (R.I.1989), we determined that the placement of traffic signals by a municipality is a discretionary action. The present situation, however, goes beyond the placement of traffic signals in that it concerns the maintenance of traffic signals. The issue before us compels us once again to examine the scope of the public duty doctrine.

The public duty doctrine has evolved throughout the years as a means of encouraging "the effective administration of governmental operations by removing the threat of potential litigation." Catone v. Medberry, 555 A.2d 328, 333 (R.I.1989). The shield of immunity afforded governmental entities, however, has been substantially dismantled in recent years to afford individuals recourse for tortious injuries suffered as a result of governmental actions. We have determined that the government is liable for its tortious actions in those instances in which the plaintiffs establish that they, as individuals rather than as members of the general public, are owed a special duty. Verity v. Danti, 585 A.2d 65 (R.I.1991); Polaski v. O'Reilly, 559 A.2d 646 (R.I.1989); Knudsen v. Hall, 490 A.2d 976 (R.I.1985); Orzechowski v. State, 485 A.2d 545 (R.I.1984); Ryan v. State Department of Transportation, 420 A.2d 841 (R.I.1980). In Catone v. Medberry, 555 A.2d 328 (R.I.1989), and O'Brien v. State, 555 A.2d 334 (R.I.1989), this court recognized additional factors that further limit the immunity created by the public duty doctrine. We determined that the public duty doctrine is only applicable to those situations in which the...