Blair v. Texas Dept. of Human Services
| Decision Date | 24 June 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-91-299-CV,3-91-299-CV |
| Citation | 837 S.W.2d 670 |
| Parties | Cassie BLAIR, Appellant, v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Fred Fuchs, Legal Aid Soc. of Cent. Texas, Austin, for appellant.
Dan Morales, Atty. Gen., Edwin N. Horne, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, for appellees.
Before CARROLL, C.J., and ABOUSSIE and BEA ANN SMITH, JJ.
This cause involves the jurisdiction of the Texas courts to review decisions of the Texas Department of Human Services (DHS) regarding eligibility for Medicaid nursing-home benefits. Because we conclude that the DHS eligibility-review procedures
provide Medicaid applicants with due process of law, we will affirm the trial court judgment dismissing this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Cassie Blair applied to DHS for Medicaid nursing-home benefits in November 1989. DHS found that Blair was ineligible to receive benefits for December 1989 and January 1990 because her assets exceeded the benefit-eligibility limits, but determined that she was eligible for benefits beginning February 1990. Blair appealed the eligibility determination and DHS upheld its decision following a so-called "fair hearing" review within the agency.
Blair then filed suit in Travis County Court at Law, asserting that the Department and the hearing officer had erroneously denied her Medicaid benefits for the two months at issue. Specifically, Blair contended that DHS incorrectly calculated her assets because DHS (1) failed to classify a savings account as a burial account, and (2) failed to treat a transfer of a certificate of deposit to her son as an uncompensated transfer. On DHS's special exceptions, the trial court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. Blair now challenges that dismissal.
In a single point of error, Blair argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her suit because the courts have an inherent right to review DHS decisions denying public benefits.
Blair and DHS agree that the Texas Legislature has specifically precluded judicial review of agency administrative decisions involving the granting or denying of welfare benefits. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-13a, § 21(b) (Supp.1992). Blair argues that she nonetheless has an inherent right to judicial review in this cause because Medicaid benefits are a vested property right and Texas courts may exercise judicial review where an agency action adversely affects a vested property right. She concedes that she was afforded adequate procedural due process within the administrative agency.
DHS defines Blair's right as a constitutional right to the protection of procedural due process and urges this Court to focus on whether DHS's hearing process is constitutionally sufficient, absent judicial review, to satisfy this right. According to DHS, this Court need not determine whether welfare benefits constitute a vested property right because, however the courts characterize these benefits, the DHS appeals process provides due process to welfare applicants and recipients. We agree.
The Texas Constitution states that "[n]o citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disenfranchised, except by due course of the law of the land." Tex. Const. art. I, § 19. 1 A person has a constitutionally protected interest in a benefit if he has a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Armstrong v. Harris County, 669 S.W.2d 323, 327 (Tex.App.1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The process afforded does not depend upon whether the applicant or recipient's property interest is "vested." We believe that distinction is of no legal consequence if the administrative hearing process affords adequate due process.
Due process does not require judicial review of an administrative decision. Crawford v. City of Houston, 600 S.W.2d 891, 894-95 (Tex.Civ.App.1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A person may receive due process of law although the tribunal exercising jurisdiction over rights or privileges protected Federal law supports our decision to focus on the due process afforded by the DHS fair-hearing procedure. Under federal cases analyzing entitlement to benefits, once a person shows that he has a legitimate claim of entitlement sufficient to create a property interest, the court must next determine what process will protect that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1017-18, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Johnston v. Shaw, 556 F.Supp. 406, 413 (N.D.Tex.1982).
by the due process clause is an administrative one. See Francisco v. Board of Dental Examiners, 149 S.W.2d 619, 622 (Tex.Civ.App.1941, writ ref'd). Thus, we agree with appellee that this Court should focus on whether the DHS fair hearing process afforded Blair her right to procedural due process under the Constitution.
A Medicaid applicant who seeks review of a DHS eligibility decision may do so by requesting a "fair hearing." See Tex. Dep't of Human Services, 40 Tex.Admin.Code § 79.1102(A)(i) (West 1989 & Supp.1992). DHS contends that its fair-hearing procedure provided Blair with all of the due process that is constitutionally required. We agree.
The Administrative Code states that DHS must inform all benefit applicants aggrieved by a DHS decision of their right to a fair hearing. Id. § 79.1202(a). In addition to informing the applicant of the right to appeal, the DHS worker must explain the appeal procedure and the right to representation, and must also inform the applicant about legal services available in the community. Id. The applicant then has ninety days from the date of the decision to file an appeal. Id. § 179.1207(a). During the fair-hearing proceeding, the applicant has a right to: examine documents, records, and any other evidence to be used at the fair hearing procedure; present the case personally or with the aid of...
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