Blake v. Hometown Am. Cmtys., Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 November 2020
• Docket Number: SJC-12902
• Citation: 158 N.E.3d 18,486 Mass. 268
• Parties: Maureen BLAKE & others v. HOMETOWN AMERICA COMMUNITIES, INC., & another.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

486 Mass. 268

158 N.E.3d 18

Maureen BLAKE & others¹

v.HOMETOWN AMERICA COMMUNITIES, INC., & another.²

SJC-12902

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol..

Argued September 9, 2020.

Decided November 24, 2020.

Robert Kraus for the defendants.

Peter V. Tekippe, Attleboro, for the plaintiffs.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Brian J. O'Donnell & Ethan R. Horowitz for Manufactured Home Federation of Massachusetts, Inc., & others.

Patrick T. Voke, Shanna M. Boughton, & Justin L. Amos, Boston, for Manufactured Housing Institute.

Jeffrey w. Hallahan, II, for Massachusetts Manufactured Housing Association, Inc.

Daniel A. Less, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General.

Present: Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.

KAFKER, J.

Under § 32L (2) of the Manufactured Housing Act, G. L. c. 140, §§ 32A - 32S (act), "[a]ny rule or change in rent which does not apply uniformly to all manufactured home residents of a similar class shall create a rebuttable presumption that such rule or change in rent is unfair." In the instant case, the defendants, the new owners of a manufactured home community, charged those who had rented their lots after the defendants purchased the community ninety-six dollars per month more for lot rent than those who had rented their lots before the change in ownership, even though the lots were essentially if not exactly the same. A group of ten people who were paying the additional lot rent brought suit, and a class was certified without opposition.

A judge in the Housing Court determined that the additional rent for essentially the same lot was a violation of § 32L (2). We affirm, as we reject the owners' argument that time of entry into a lot rental agreement renders the renters dissimilar under the statute. If this were the case, every time a new lot lease were entered into, a higher rent could be charged. Such a reading of the statute would defeat its purpose, which is to provide relatively uniform, stable, long-term lease and community cost-sharing arrangements for those renting manufactured housing lots.

We do, however, reverse and remand the case to the Housing Court to reconsider a different judge's class certification decisions.

Although there was no opposition to the certification of the class, and we conclude that a class was properly certified, the judge erred in requiring class members to opt in. "Opt-in" classes are contrary to the purpose of class action suits and our consumer protection statute, and they are not permitted under Mass. R. Civ. P. 23, as amended, 471 Mass. 1491 (2015), or G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (2).

The subclassifications for damages calculations also require reconsideration, as the judge who conducted a trial on damages considered improper factors. In the instant case, the owners of the manufactured housing community increased the rent on lots whose only distinguishing characteristic was that the lease began after the change in ownership. Therefore, the judge should have certified a class defined by the time of entry into rental agreements -- that is, post-ownership versus preownership -- to address this statutory violation. Moreover, the judge should have awarded damages for class members on the basis of who paid the ninety-six dollars more per month in rent, in whole or part, for a lot that was essentially the same as a lot renting for ninety-six dollars less.³

1. Background and procedural history. The defendants operate a manufactured housing community in Attleboro. After acquiring the property on which the community rests in January of 2006, the defendants uniformly increased lot rent on new lot rental agreements by ninety-six dollars. That meant that those who entered into lot rental agreements after the change in ownership paid ninety-six dollars per month more to rent a lot than those who entered into such agreements before the change in ownership, even though the lots rented were of similar sizes and had similar amenities.

In September 2012, ten named plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking relief under § 32L (2) and G. L. c. 93A. The plaintiffs were described in the complaint as "residents" and "tenants" of the defendants in the community, as such terms are defined in 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.01 (1996). The regulations define a "[r]esident" as "any person who normally resides in a manufactured home in a manufactured housing community, regardless of whether or not he or she has an occupancy agreement with the operator," and a "[t]enant" as "a person who has an occupancy agreement or oral tenancy agreement with an operator for the use and occupancy of a manufactured home site, common areas, facilities, and other appurtenant rights." Id. The act also refers to both tenants and residents, providing protections for both. See, e.g., G. L. c. 140, § 32J (prohibiting no-cause evictions and requiring extensive procedural protections for residents prior to actual eviction); G. L. c. 140, § 32P (requiring bona fide, good faith offers of five-year leases to tenants).

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' creation and maintenance of two separate classes of rent violated § 32L (2) by creating a "change in rent which does not apply uniformly to all manufactured home residents of a similar class," and that, pursuant to G. L. c. 140, § 32L (7), they were due damages under G. L. c. 93A. A judge in the Housing Court (class certification judge), without opposition, certified a class consisting of "individual unit owners who reside within Hometown America Communities Oak Hill Park and who acquired the units after February 1, 2006." The class certification judge also ordered that a letter be sent to potential class members, giving them a sixty-day period to opt in or out of the class.

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment in December 2014. A second Housing Court judge granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, while denying the defendants' motion. In October 2015, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, presenting expert affidavits and requesting the opportunity to rebut the statutory presumption that "[a]ny rule or change in rent which does not uniformly apply to all manufactured home residents of a similar class ... is unfair." G. L. c. 140, § 32L (2). The judge denied this motion.

In December 2016, the second judge conducted a trial that focused primarily on evidence regarding damages. In July 2017, the court issued a judgment granting damages to the plaintiffs and dividing the class members into five different subclasses.⁴ At the end of trial, the judge also had granted the defendants' request for a directed finding in their favor as to the plaintiffs' allegation that the defendants' violation of G. L. c. 93A was willful and knowing.⁵

The plaintiffs requested $104,850.30 in attorney's fees and costs. The defendants opposed this motion, objecting to specific requests for certain itemized fees. In December 2017, the second judge awarded $87,800.30 in attorney's fees and costs to the plaintiffs, reducing the amount of attorney's fees and costs originally requested in response to the defendants' motion.

The defendants appealed to the Appeals Court from the ruling granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denying the defendants' motion for reconsideration. The plaintiffs cross-appealed from the determination of damages with regard to certain individuals in the class and the second judge's decision at trial not to allow the admission of certain evidence.

2. Discussion. a. Summary judgment. "We review a grant of summary judgment de novo to determine ‘whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ " DeWolfe v. Hingham Centre, Ltd., 464 Mass. 795, 799, 985 N.E.2d 1187 (2013), quoting Juliano v. Simpson, 461 Mass. 527, 529–530, 962 N.E.2d 175 (2012). When reviewing a decision on cross motions for summary judgment, the evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the unsuccessful party, here, the defendants. Rawan v. Continental Cas. Co., 483 Mass. 654, 655, 136 N.E.3d 327 (2019). The court must determine whether, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants, the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 662, 136 N.E.3d 327.

The defendants contend that, under G. L. c. 140, § 32L (2), the plaintiffs may be charged more in rent because they entered into a lot rental agreement at a later time. The defendants argue that the timing of entry into lot rental agreements renders the plaintiffs not in a "similar class" under the statute, even if the lots rented are essentially the same with the same amenities. This contention is incorrect.

"[T]he duty of statutory interpretation rests ultimately with the courts" (citation omitted).

Souza v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 462 Mass. 227, 230, 967 N.E.2d 1095 (2012), and cases cited. We interpret a statute based on the intent of the Legislature, ascertained from "all the statute's words, ‘construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language’ and ‘considered in connection with the cause of its enactment ... and the main object to be accomplished’ " (citation omitted). Meyer v. Veolia Energy N. Am., 482 Mass. 208, 211, 121 N.E.3d 1221 (2019). "Our principal objective is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature in a way that is consonant with ‘common sense and sound reason’ " (citation omitted). Id. at 212, 121 N.E.3d 1221. The Attorney General is authorized to interpret § 32L (2), and therefore, "her interpretation is entitled to substantial deference, unless it is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute." Boelter v. Selectmen of Wayland, 479 Mass. 233, 242, 93 N.E.3d 1163 (2018), citing Smith v. Winter Place LLC, 447 Mass. 363, 367-368, 851 N.E.2d 417 (2006). See G. L. c. 140, § 32S (granting power to implement interpretative regulations to Attorney...