Blakely v. Johnson, s. 22743-44

• Decision Date: 04 February 1965
• Docket Number: Nos. 22743-44,s. 22743-44
• Citation: 140 S.E.2d 857,220 Ga. 572
• Parties: James BLAKELY v. S. Kelly JOHNSON et al. GULF OIL CORPORATION v. S. Kelly JOHNSON et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 857

140 S.E.2d 857

220 Ga. 572

James BLAKELY v. S. Kelly JOHNSON et al.

GULF OIL CORPORATION v. S. Kelly JOHNSON et al.

Nos. 22743-44.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 4, 1965.

Syllabus by the Court

The alleged acts of negligence charged against the defendants Blakely and Gulf Oil Corporation had no direct causal connection with the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, and the nature of the criminal acts of the other defendant causing the damage to the plaintiff was of such that they should have been foreseen by these defendants.

Martin H. Rubin, Poole, Pearce & Cooper, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error in No. 22743.

Gambrell, Harlan Russell & Moye, Charles A. Moye, J., Harold N. Hill, Jr., Sidney F. Wheeler, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error in No. 22744.

Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Frank Love, Jr., Gregg Loomis, James E. Hardy, Atlanta, for defendants in error in Nos. 22743 and 22744.

HEAD, Presiding Justice.

S. Kelly Johnson brought an action for damages for injuries received when the automobile of Preston L. Holland collided into the rear of her automobile. The defendants named were Preston L. Holland, Gulf Oil Corporation and James Blakely. The general and special demurrers of Gulf Oil Corporation were sustained by the trial judge, and the motion to dismiss of James Blakely was sustained. On appeal the Court of Appeals held that the trial judge erred in these judgments. Johnson v. Blakely, 110 Ga.App. 355, 138, S.E.2d 614. Separate applications for certiorari were made by Gulf Oil Corporation and Blakely, and this court granted certiorari to review the questions made. Since the two applications arise from the same pleadings, the cases will be considered together.

The automobile collision occurred at an intersection in the City of Atlanta. The plaintiff had been proceeding in a north-westerly direction and was stopped at a traffic signal behind another vehicle. She alleged a number of acts of negligence on the part of the defendant Preston L. Holland which resulted in his driving into the rear of her automobile. It was alleged with reference to the other two defendants that: Gulf Oil Corporation and James Blakely had a Gulf Service Station located 100 feet south of the intersection. 'That at said time and place, the agents, servants and employees of defendant Gulf Oil Corporation and James Blakely, and the agents, servants and employees of James Blakely blew whistles and shouted and otherwise made loud noises for the purpose of attracting attention and customers into said Gulf Service Station * * * and this loud whistle and noise attracted the attention of defendant Preston L. Holland, while still driving forward, looked away from the direction in which he was driving and in the direction of said loud noise and whistle blowing' and Holland drove his automobile forward into the rear of the automobile driven by the plaintiff. 'That at said time and place, defendants Gulf Oil Corporation and James Blakely knew that the loud noises and whistle blowing would attract the attention of drivers of vehicles and that their attention would be attracted away from the street and the direction of travel and towards said Gulf Service Station.' The negligence charged was: 'In blowing whistles in a service station located within 100 feet of the intersection of Sylvan Road and Perkerson Road and making loud noises to attract drivers of motor vehicle traveling along said Sylvan Road and Perkerson Road.'

Where a plaintiff seeks to recover damages, our statutory law is controlling in all cases of alleged wrongful acts by the defendant. 'Direct damages are such as follow immediately upon the act done. Consequential damages are such as are the necessary and connected effect of the tortious act, though to some extent depending upon other circumstances.' Code § 105-2007. 'If the damages are only the imaginary or possible result of the tortious act, or other and contingent circumstances preponderate largely in causing the injurious effect, such damages are too remote to be the basis of recovery against the wrongdoer.' Code § 105-2008. 'Damages which are the legal and natural result of the act done, though contingent to some extent, are not too remote to be recovered; but damages traceable to the act, but not its legal or natural consequence, are too remote and contingent. [Italics ours.]' Code § $105-2009. These statutory rules, properly construed, preclude any liability to the plaintiff for the alleged acts of these defendants.

'While the general rule is that if, subsequently to an original wrongful or negligent act, a new cause has intervened, of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the misfortune, the former must be considered as too remote, still if the character fo the intervening act claimed to break the connection between the original wrongful act and the subsequent injury was such that its probable or natural consequences could reasonably have been anticipated, apprehended, or foreseen by the original wrongdoer, the causal connection is not broken, and the original wrongdoer is responsible for all of the consequences resulting from the intervening act.' Southern Railway Co. v. Webb, 116 Ga. 152, 42 S.E. 395, 59 L.R.A. 109.

In the present case there was no direct relation between the acts done by the agents of the service station owner and operator and the injuries to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals in its opinion held: 'While there is no express allegation as to foreseeability of injury to others on the part of the defendants, it is our opinion that an inference of such foreseeability is demanded from the allegations made. If one can foresee that his acts will attract the attention of motorists away from the roadway and from the direction in which they are traveling when such motorists are upon a muchly traveled highway and approaching an intersection with a signal light, such situation not only authorizes but demands the inference that such persons knew, or should have known, that their...