Gates v. State

• Decision Date: 24 October 1979
• Docket Number: No. 35053,35053
• Citation: 261 S.E.2d 349,244 Ga. 587
• Parties: GATES v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 349

261 S.E.2d 349

244 Ga. 587

GATES v. The STATE.

No. 35053.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Argued July 10, 1979.

Decided Oct. 24, 1979.

Sprouse, Tucker & Ford, William L. Tucker, Columbus, for appellant.

William J. Smith, Dist. Atty., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., for appellee.

HILL, Justice.

This is a death case. Defendant Johnny Lee Gates was convicted by jury of the rape, armed robbery, and murder of a young woman in Columbus. The jury found three statutory aggravating circumstances and imposed the death penalty. The trial court sentenced defendant to death for the crime of murder, and to 20 years consecutively for the crimes of armed robbery and rape.

There was evidence from which the jury was authorized to find the following: Prior to being assigned to Fort Benning, the victim's husband had been stationed in Germany where he met and married the 19-year-old victim. On November 30, 1976, the couple had been in the United States about a month and had been in their apartment in Columbus about ten days. The husband left for work at the Fort about 6 a. m. on that date. Shortly after noon, the defendant knocked on the door of the apartment Once inside, defendant was given a can of oil and shown to the heater in a closet. After beginning to oil a fan, defendant walked to the bathroom where the victim was and told her of his intent to rob her. He then raped her and forced her at gunpoint to give him $300 hidden under her mattress in the bedroom, and $180 hidden in a tape player in the living room. Before leaving, the defendant took the victim back into the bedroom, where he gagged her and blindfolded her with her husband's army ties and tied her hands behind her back with the belt to her bathrobe. He then shot her in her right temple, causing her death.

posing as a gas company employee. The victim allowed him to enter, apparently thinking he had been sent in response to her request that the gas heater be repaired.

After his arrest on January 31, 1977, on unrelated crimes defendant was questioned by police concerning the above crimes of murder, armed robbery and rape. Defendant confessed to the crimes of murder and armed robbery, but stated that the victim had voluntarily engaged in sexual intercourse with him. Subsequently, the defendant's fingerprint was found on the heater. A neighbor of the victim identified the defendant as having knocked on his door about noon on the date in question, saying he was from the gas company.

Defendant enumerates one error in the guilt/innocence phase of his trial and six errors in the sentencing phase, which alleged errors we will consider in connection with our death sentence review.

1. Defendant enumerates error in the guilt/innocence phase of his trial in the admission into evidence of his written and videotaped confessions on the grounds that they were not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. Although this is the first videotaped confession to be considered by this court, the standards by which confessions are reviewed are well known. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Code Ann. §§ 38-411, 38-417. (Regarding tape recorded confessions, see Harris v. State, 237 Ga. 718(5), 230 S.E.2d 1 (1976) ).

Accordingly, prior to submitting defendant's written and videotaped confessions to the jury in the instant case, the trial court conducted a Jackson v. Denno hearing. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). Defendant's interrogators testified at the hearing that they explained his constitutional rights to him, listened to him read aloud the statement of rights and waiver of rights form which they had explained, further explained the pronunciation and meaning of the word "coercion" over which defendant had stumbled in reading, and witnessed defendant sign the waiver before hearing and writing out his subsequent confession. ¹ The officers further testified that they were aware at the time that defendant was twenty-one years old and had completed the sixth grade in school.

One of the officers also testified that defendant voluntarily went with him to the then vacant apartment. A video tape recording was made which shows defendant again being advised of his rights and again waiving them. The video tape recording does not depict a literal re-enactment of the crimes. Instead, defendant showed where and stated how he had committed the crimes and where furniture had been located at the time.

The defendant testified at the Jackson-Denno hearing that he had asked for a lawyer prior to confessing, that he was told it would take several days and he didn't need one, and that thereafter he had been afraid to ask again. He further testified that the detectives told him that if he confessed they would make sure that his most severe punishment would not exceed a life sentence. Defendant also said that he had At the close of the hearing, the trial court made a finding that any statements made by defendant including oral and written confessions ". . . were made freely and voluntarily . . ., without the remotest fear of injury, without any promise or hope of benefit or reward, and after having his constitutional rights explained to him, that he had the right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him in a court of law, that he had the right to have an attorney to confer with and confer with an attorney prior to making any statement and during the making of the statement, and that if he could not afford an attorney that one would be furnished to him by the state free of charge, that he understood these constitutional rights that were explained to him and that he voluntarily, intelligently and intelligently waived them. He understood them and he waived them . . ."

                not understood at the time the significance of the waiver he had signed, even after reading it aloud, and that after he had signed it he thought he had no choice but to confess on video tape at the scene of the crime.  2 One of the officers was recalled and refuted the statements the defendant made as to him and the other officer
                

The test for admissibility of custodial confessions was established in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The standard for determining the admissibility of confessions is the preponderance of the evidence. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); High v. State, 233 Ga. 153, 210 S.E.2d 673 (1974); Hurt v. State, 239 Ga. 665, 669, 238 S.E.2d 542 (1977). ³ To determine whether the state has proven that a confession was made voluntarily, the trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967); Pierce v. State, 238 Ga. 126, 231 S.E.2d 744 (1977).

Defendant asserts that in deciding to admit the confessions the trial court failed to consider the age and educational level of defendant, that he failed to consider the fact that the police had prior knowledge of defendant's age and educational level, and that he failed to consider that those factors made it impossible for the defendant knowingly to understand the drastic impact a televised confession at the scene of the crime would have on a jury. The gist of this argument simply is that giving a videotaped confession at the scene of the murder was an unwise decision and hence was not an intelligent thing to do. The mere fact that the defendant was twenty-one years old with a sixth grade education does not lead to the conclusion that he was incapable of knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waiving his constitutional rights. See Goodwin v. State, 236 Ga. 339(1), 223 S.E.2d 703 (1976); Hurt v. State, supra, 239 Ga. at 669, 238 S.E.2d 542; Miller v. State, 240 Ga. 110, 111, 239 S.E.2d 524 (1977).

Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court's findings as to factual determinations and credibility relating to the admissibility of a confession will be upheld on appeal. United States v. Watson, 469 F.2d 362, 365 (5th Cir. 1972); Johnson v. State, 233 Ga. 58, 209 S.E.2d 629 (1974); High v. State, supra; Hurt v. State, supra. Moreover, we find in this case that, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant's confessions admissible by a preponderance of the evidence. The decision of the trial court was supported by the evidence in accordance with the standards expressed above. Beecher v. Alabama, 408 U.S. 234, 92 S.Ct. 2282, 33 L.Ed.2d 317 (1972), cited by defendant Defendant asserts that the admission of the video tape recording was harmful error in that it was unnecessary, served as an extra witness against him, and by its nature made a forceful impression on the minds of the jury, overshadowing all other evidence in the case. Defendant did not raise objections on these grounds at the trial. Nevertheless, this being a death case, we will address this argument on its merits, both as it relates to the admissibility of the video tape recording at the trial-in-chief and later as to its possible prejudicial effect on the jury during the sentencing phase of the trial.

is a case involving gross coercion and does not apply to these facts. We find that the trial court did not err in finding the confessions to be admissible.

The Court of Appeals has held that posed movies which are substantially different from the facts of a case, and which because of the differences might be prejudicial and misleading to a jury, should not be used at trial. Eiland v. State, 130 Ga.App. 428, 203 S.E.2d 619 (1973). However, in this case we view the video tape recording as a pictorial confession rather than a posed reenactment of the crimes. Viewed as such, the requirement that the reenactment not be substantially different from the facts of the case is lessened considerably. The videotaped confession in this case showed the defendant waiving his constitutional rights and...