Blanck v. Ind. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 22 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. 52S02-0409-CV-405.,52S02-0409-CV-405.
• Citation: 829 N.E.2d 505
• Parties: Dean E. BLANCK, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. IND. DEP'T OF CORR., Appellee (Defendant below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

829 N.E.2d 505

Dean E. BLANCK, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. IND. DEP'T OF CORR., Appellee (Defendant below).

No. 52S02-0409-CV-405.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

June 22, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Dean E. Blanck, Pro se.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Joby Jerrells, Deputy Attorney General, for Appellee.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

Dean E. Blanck, an inmate whose complaints against Indiana's prison system are a regular topic of our federal cousins' prose,¹ was disciplined for misconduct in prison and appealed to one of our state courts. Following long-standing precedent precluding judicial review of prison disciplinary decisions, the trial court dismissed his complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that several provisions of the Indiana Constitution and Indiana Code entitled Blanck to judicial review of his discipline. We hold that the complaint should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; none of the provisions relied upon by the Court of Appeals confer subject matter jurisdiction over claims challenging judicial review of prison disciplinary decisions.

Background

The papers submitted to us in this case suggest the following. While incarcerated at Miami Correctional Facility, a state prison, Dean Blanck was convicted pursuant to prison disciplinary procedures of violating prison rules. As punishment for his misconduct, Blanck was removed from the general prison population and placed into a segregation unit. The Department of Correction ("DOC") did not conduct periodic reviews of his segregation. Blanck challenged his discipline, alleging that certain statutory rights to periodic review of his segregation placement had been violated and that he was entitled to judicial review under the Open Courts Clause of Article I, Section 12, of the Indiana Constitution.

The trial court concluded that Blanck was "inviting judicial review of prison disciplinary actions, prohibited by Hasty v. Broglin, 531 N.E.2d 200 (Ind.1988)," and sua sponte dismissed Blanck's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under Indiana Trial Rule 12(b)(6). Miami Circuit Court Order, No. 52C01-03-08-CT-397 (Aug. 11, 2003). The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling. Blanck v. Ind. Dep't of Corr., 806 N.E.2d 788, 789 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). We granted transfer, 822 N.E.2d 975 (Ind.2004), and now affirm the trial court.

Discussion

I

For a quarter-century, our Court has held that DOC inmates have no common law, statutory, or federal constitutional right to review in state court DOC disciplinary decisions. This was the holding of Justice DeBruler's opinion for a unanimous court in Riner v. Raines, 274 Ind. 113, 409 N.E.2d 575 (1980). We reaffirmed the holding of Riner in Justice Prentice's opinion in Adams v. Duckworth, 274 Ind. 503, 412 N.E.2d 789 (1980); in Chief Justice Shepard's opinion in Hasty in 1988; and, most recently, in Justice Dickson's opinion in Zimmerman v. State, 750 N.E.2d 337 (Ind.2001).

In a separate opinion in Zimmerman, Justice Boehm wrote that in his view, a future state court challenge by an inmate to prison discipline might not be subject to dismissal despite the Riner-Adams-Hasty-Zimmerman line of cases because those cases left "open" the following questions:

[D]oes Indiana Code Section 11-11-5-4, which prohibits the Department of Corrections from imposing certain disciplinary actions, create a statutory right? If so, does Article I, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution guarantee inmates a right to judicial review of disciplinary proceedings allegedly in violation of that statute?

Zimmerman, 750 N.E.2d at 338-39 (Boehm, J., concurring in result). Blanck presented Justice Boehm's questions to the Court of Appeals and our colleagues there answered them in the affirmative. The Court of Appeals held that Blanck had properly raised these two "issues of first impression" and that the trial court had been wrong to dismiss his complaint. "[H]e is entitled," the Court of Appeals said, "to his day in court to have those issues decided on the merits." Blanck, 806 N.E.2d at 791.

II

Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) subjects to dismissal complaints that "fail[ ] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." As noted above, it was on this basis that the trial court dismissed Blanck's complaint. As our opinions in Riner, Hasty, and Zimmerman make clear, however, the threshold inquiry in these prison discipline cases is whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, a complaint is subject to dismissal under Trial Rule 12(B)(1). Resolution of the subject matter jurisdiction issue involves determining whether the claim advanced falls within the general scope of authority conferred upon the court by constitution or statute. State ex rel. Camden v. Gibson Circuit Court, 640 N.E.2d 696, 697 (Ind.1994); Williams v. Williams, 555 N.E.2d 142, 144-45 (Ind.1990); State ex rel. Young v. Noble Circuit Court, 263 Ind. 353, 356, 332 N.E.2d 99, 101 (1975). We are constrained to observe that neither Blanck nor the Court of Appeals gives any explanation as to how the provisions of the Indiana Constitution and Indiana Code on which they rely create subject matter jurisdiction over claims seeking judicial review of judicial discipline decisions.

III

In this case, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had been wrong to dismiss Blanck's complaint because he was entitled to a ruling on the merits of his claim that:

he has a state created statutory right by the provisions of Ind.Codes § 11-11-5-4, § 11-11-5-5, § 11-11-5-6, § 11-11-5-7 and § 11-10-1-7 protected by the State Constitution, and that Article [I], Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution "Open Courts Clause" is a guaranteed right to judicial review of state laws where prison officials have imposed arbitrary forms of disciplinary punishments in direct violation of these statutes [i.e.] I.C. 11-11-5-4.

Blanck, 806 N.E.2d at 791 (quotations omitted).

A

Blanck contends that five provisions of the Indiana Code provide him with a right to judicial review of determinations made by the DOC:

Indiana Code Section 11-10-1-7, which requires periodic review of the reasons for segregation of an offender where the DOC has found that "segregation is necessary for the offender's own physical safety or the physical safety of others."² Ind.Code § 11-10-1-7(a) (2004).

Indiana Code Section 11-11-5-4, which prohibits the DOC from using various forms of discipline, e.g., corporal punishment; a substantial change in heating, lighting, or ventilation; restrictions on medical and dental care.

Indiana Code Section 11-11-5-5, which prohibits the DOC from imposing any discipline before affording the person charged with misconduct a hearing to determine his or her guilt or innocence and, if guilty, the appropriate action. This section also sets forth a detailed set of procedural requirements for such hearings.

Indiana Code Section 11-11-5-6, which requires periodic review of the reasons for segregation of an offender charged (but not yet found guilty of) misconduct.

Indiana Code Section 11-11-5-7, which requires periodic review of the reasons for segregation of an offender found guilty of misconduct.

While each of these statutes imposes certain duties on the DOC and, we assume, confers substantive rights on inmates, none of them contains any provision suggesting that inmates have a right to enforce any such rights in court. So if there is subject matter jurisdiction over claims to enforce any such rights, it must either be because the Legislature intended it to be inferred from these statutes or because it is provided elsewhere in law.

Sometimes the Legislature will be quite explicit in providing that persons with appropriate standing are entitled to go to court and ask for enforcement of a statute's provisions. These provisions are often referred to as "private rights of action" or "private causes of action." (We recently identified some statutes that provide for private rights of action in State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Town of St. John, 751 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Ind.2001) (listing statutes that provide a private right of action for recovery of attorney's fees).) And where a legislative body does not explicitly provide a private right of action to enforce the provisions of a particular statute, courts are frequently asked to find that the Legislature intended that a private right of action be implied. (One notable example is litigation in which courts have been asked to find an implied private right of action against those who aid or abet violations of federal securities statutes.) See Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 169, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994) (noting that "the first and leading case to impose the liability was Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F.Supp. 673 (N.D.Ind.1966)" (Eschbach, J.)).

Courts have developed certain rules for attempting to divine legislative intent in these circumstances. A broad formulation of these rules is that a private cause of action generally will be inferred where a statute imposes a duty for a particular individual's benefit but will not be where the Legislature imposes a duty for the public's benefit. Americanos v. State, 728 N.E.2d 895 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), transfer denied, 741 N.E.2d 1254. But this formulation barely crosses the starting line before a series of interpretative questions arise. How do we know when a duty is imposed for a particular individual's benefit? For the public's benefit? What happens when it seems as if the duty is imposed for both?

We are able to sidestep these types of questions here. While an argument can be made that the duties imposed on the DOC in these prison discipline statutes are for the public's benefit, the stronger argument seems to us to be that these duties are imposed for the benefit of the inmates, and, in any event, we assu...