Blank v. Town of Lake Clarke Shores

• Decision Date: 28 February 1964
• Docket Number: No. 3727,3727
• Citation: 161 So.2d 683
• Parties: Ralph J. BLANK, Jr., Merry Blank, his wife, Ralph J. Blank, Sr., and Stella Blank, his wife, Appellants, v. TOWN OF LAKE CLARKE SHORES, Floirda, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 683

161 So.2d 683

Ralph J. BLANK, Jr., Merry Blank, his wife, Ralph J. Blank, Sr., and Stella Blank, his wife, Appellants, v. TOWN OF LAKE CLARKE SHORES, Floirda, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee.

No. 3727.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Feb. 28, 1964.

Rehearing Denied March 27, 1964.

John R. Williams, Ralph J. Blank, Jr., and Kirk Sullivan, West Palm Beach, for appellants.

B. F. Paty, Jr., of Paty, Downey & Lewis, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

SHANNON, Judge.

This action for declaratory decree and injunctive relief was brought by the appellants herein in an attack on a zoning ordinance of the defendant municipality. From an adverse final decree, they have perfected this appeal. The complaint below consisted of two counts, one attacking the validity of the ordinance as applied to all properties within the municipality, and the other attacking the zoning ordinance as applied to a particular portion of the property owned by the appellants. In their complaint they allege, among other things, that they are the fee simple owners of certain real estate lying and being within the corporate limits of Lake Clarke Shores, Florida, and more particularly described as: Lots 2 and 3, Block 6, Addition No. 1, Fla-Mango Grovelets, according to the Plat thereof on file in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida; they further allege that the municipal corporation was organized on April 16, 1956; that the territory prior to April 16, 1956, was a part of the unincorporated area of the county; that on that date, i. e., April 16, 1956, the territory was incorporated and existed as a municipal corporation known as the Town of Lake Clarke Shores; that under the terms of Chapter 57-1478, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1957, it was provided that the Town of Lake Clarke Shores, Florida, be organized and established, providing further that the ordinances of the former Town of Lake Clarke Shores should remain the ordinances of the new town; that on November 12, 1956, pursuant to 'Ordinance No. 8,' the land was limited and restricted within the town's corporate limits to the following:

'(a) Dwelling for occupancy by one family only having a minimum floor area of not less than twelve hundred (1200') square feet to be determined by outside dimensions, but excluding carportes, garages, unenclosed porches and utility rooms.

'(b) Public buildings, including only libraries, Town Hall, fire and police stations and underground storage tanks with connecting pump and accessories for a public water service.

'(c) Churches.

'(d) Publicly owned and operated parks and play grounds.

'(e) Accessory buildings and uses customarily incident to the above uses, but not involving the conduct of a business.'

Plaintiff Ralph J. Blank, Jr., first became interested in the property involved herein during the years 1953 or 1954, but the plaintiffs' did not contract for the purchase thereof until May 21, 1956. Plaintiffs' apparent purpose in purchasing the same was for ultimate business or commercial uses. Prior to the adoption of the ordinance the town council had appointed a five-member zoning commission to study and make recommendations as to the zoning of the town. After several meetings the zoning commission made its recommendations to the town council, which recommendations were included in Ordinance No. 8 after a hearing was held by the town council. At one of the public hearings held by the town council there were in the neighborhood of 100 persons present, at which time a straw vote was taken which indicated that the great majority of those present approved the proposed zoning. At that time the town had approximately 150 residents, and according to the 1960 census, there were 1,297 residents in the town. A considerable amount of testimony was taken below, which totaled almost 300 pages, and the parties had various witnesses, some experts, on both sides. At the conclusion of these hearings the chancellor entered his final decree finding for the defendant municipality. In this extensive final decree (much of which we incorporate herein) the chancellor made findings of fact and conclusions of law which the plaintiffs attack, urging the reversal under nine different grounds. However, no reversible error is made to appear, and we affirm. The chancellor's order states in part:

'The municipality is approximately three miles long in a north-south direction and one-half mile wide in an eastwest direction. The west boundary of the municipality is Fla-Mango Road. Forest Hill Boulevard bisects the Town in an east-west direction and extends westerly into unincorporated areas and easterly through the municipality into the City of West Palm Beach, Florida. Plaintiffs' property described in Court Two is located on the northeast corner of the intersection of Forest Hill Boulevard and Fla-Mango Road. Property fronting on Forest Hill Boulevard west of the municipality is zoned for commercial uses by Palm Beach County, * * *.'

It is apparent from the record and the final decree that the plaintiffs' property is of considerable more value for commercial purposes than for residential purposes. However, there is no evidence showing the unadaptability to lack of market value of plaintiffs' property as restricted by the ordinance. The record further shows that ample commercial facilities located outside of the municipality are conveniently and readily accessible to its inhabitants, and that there is no demonstrable public need for the same in the town itself. However, if plaintiffs' property were put to a commercial use, the market value of the adjoining properties as presently zoned would indubitably be adversely affected. Our Supreme Court has often recognized that if the subject property be rezoned into a business district, the other property in the subdivision would also have to be rezoned,

The issues herein are not unfamiliar to our courts. This is made clear by the chancellor in his final decree, as follows:

'The Florida appellate courts have...