Blosser v. Carter
Citation | 67 Ohio App.3d 215,586 N.E.2d 253 |
Decision Date | 04 April 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 89-CA-01,89-CA-01 |
Parties | BLOSSER, Appellee, v. CARTER, Appellant. |
Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
Edwin C. Johnston, Logan, for appellee.
Lantz, Lantz & Lipp Co., L.P.A., and James M. Linehan, Lancaster, for appellant.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Small Claims Division of the Hocking County Municipal Court, following a bench trial, awarding monetary damages to Nancy C. Blosser, plaintiff below and appellee herein, against Nick Carter, defendant below and appellant herein. Appellant assigns the following errors:
The facts pertinent to this appeal are as follows. On June 8, 1988, appellee and her husband paid appellant the sum of $1,187 in consideration for appellant's promise to "till, topsoil, seed and straw new lawn" on appellee's premises. Subsequent to appellant completing his work on the lawn, appellee became dissatisfied with the result.
On October 28, 1988, appellee commenced suit in the Small Claims Division of the Hocking County Municipal Court alleging, in substance, that appellant had breached their agreement for the lawn work. Appellee prayed for compensatory damages in the amount of $800.
On December 8, 1988, a trial was held in this matter and appellee presented evidence, including photographs, that despite appellant's labor, her lawn showed only "rye, weeds and bare spots." In rebuttal, appellant testified that he had properly performed under their agreement and that any defect which arose with respect to appellee's lawn was caused by the drought which occurred that summer. At the conclusion of trial, the court entered judgment for appellee in the amount of $946.76.
In his first assignment, appellant argues that the court below erred in awarding damages in excess of the $800 damages specified in appellee's complaint. In her brief, appellee agrees and concedes that the court erred in this regard. We also agree.
The portion of Civ.R. 54(C), pertinent to this action, states as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
However, in the cause sub judice, the rule is qualified by an exception in Civ.R. 1(C), which declares, in part, as follows:
"These rules, to the extent that they would by their nature be clearly inapplicable, shall not apply to procedure * * * (4) in small claims matters under Chapter 1925, Revised Code * * *."
Accordingly, Civ.R. 54(C) will apply to a small claims matter unless, by its nature, it would be clearly inapplicable. Though we can find no decisions which have considered this issue, we hold, for the following reasons, that Civ.R. 54(C) is not "clearly inapplicable" to a small claims matter and, therefore, a small claims judgment is limited to the amount, or amended amount, demanded in the small claims complaint.
Application of the Rules of Civil Procedure to small claims actions is specifically sanctioned by R.C. 1925.16, which states as follows:
"Except as inconsistent procedures are provided in this chapter or in rules of court adopted in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter, all proceedings in the small claims division of a municipal court are subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure, and Chapter 1901. and sections 2307.06 and 2307.07 of the Revised Code, and all proceedings in the small claims division of a county court are subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure, Chapter 1907., and sections 2307.06 and 2307.07 of the Revised Code."
There is no provision in R.C. Chapter 1925 which is contrary to the general rule of Civ.R. 54(C) that a judgment cannot be in excess of the amount, or amended amount, demanded by the claimant. To the contrary, while other portions of Civ.R. 54(C) have been statutorily altered in R.C. Chapter 1925, the legislature has presumably seen fit to leave the money damages limitation intact.
Civ.R. 54(C) allows for an amendment of a claim no later than seven days before a trial commences. However, R.C. 1925.09 permits amendment of a claim at any time before judgment, or vacation of judgment. Thus, under R.C. 1925.16, set forth above, the seven-day amendment limitation set forth in Civ.R. 54(C) will not apply to a small claims proceeding because it is inconsistent with the statute. However, as stated previously, there is no alternate procedure in that chapter to allow a court to award damages in excess of that amount demanded by a claimant.
Our holding is further supported by the fact that the damage limitation rule does not contravene the general philosophy behind small claims proceedings which is to present an informal, inexpensive and expedited procedure without the usual delays engendered by responsive pleadings and elaborate discovery. 8 West, Ohio Practice (1970) 140 (Civil Rules Staff Notes); 4 Anderson, Ohio Civil Practice (1987) 51, Section 147.04(C). This court has previously declined to apply a provision of the Civil Rules where such provision is contrary to the goal of expedient resolution of small claims matters. See Schafer v. McNeill Enterprises (Nov. 11, 1984), Ross App. No. 1071, unreported, 1984 WL 5658.
However, limiting a court's power to award damages to that amount demanded by the claimant, under Civ.R. 54(C), does not contravene the goal of expediency. Under R.C. 1925.09, a claimant is free to amend a demand for damages at any time before a judgment. Thus, a claimant who discovers, during trial, that she is entitled to additional damages may freely amend her demand subject only to the jurisdictional limitation of R.C. 1925.02(A)(1). Thus, the damages-limitation rule of Civ.R. 54(C) works no hardship on a small claims litigant, but merely restricts the court as it would in any other civil case.
Accordingly, we hold that the damages-limitation rule of Civ.R. 54(C) is not "clearly inapplicable" to small-claims litigation under R.C. Chapter 1925. Thus, the trial court below erroneously awarded damages in excess of that amount demanded by appellee and, accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is sustained.
In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the judgment of the trial court was an abuse of discretion and against the manifest weight of the evidence. The basis for appellant's argument is that his agreement with appellee obligated him only to perform certain services and that appellee, herself, admitted such services had been performed. Appellant further contends that he neither warranted his services, nor promised, a lawn with grass would be provided and, therefore, he did not breach their agreement. We disagree.
It is a fundamental principle of contract law that "[w]here the language of a contract is of doubtful import, it is proper to ascertain the circumstances which surrounded the parties at the time it was made, the object intended to be accomplished, and the construction which the acts of the parties show they gave to their agreement, in order to give proper construction to the words they have used in the instrument, and to determine its legal effect." (Emphasis added.) Mosier v. Parry (1899), 60 Ohio St. 388, 54 N.E. 364, at paragraph one of the syllabus; Johnson v. American Gas Co. (1917), 8 Ohio App. 124, 134; Coe v. Suburban Light & Power Co. (1929), 32 Ohio App. 158, 163, 167 N.E. 693, 695.
The only writing which directly reflects the agreement between the parties is the receipt given appellee after payment to appellant. Such receipt describes, under "Description Of Material Used," the following: "Till, top soil, seed and straw new lawn." (Emphasis added.) It may, arguably, be unclear as to whether appellant obligated himself to provide a "new lawn" or merely to provide services. However, the following testimony by appellee clearly shows that she intended their agreement to accomplish the final objective of providing her with a "new lawn" which included grass:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Crane Hollow, Inc. v. Marathon Ashland Pipe Line
...parties that demonstrate the construction they gave to their agreement." Id. at 56, 716 N.E.2d at 1208, citing Blosser v. Carter (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 215, 219, 586 N.E.2d 253; see, also, 4 Williston on Contracts (3 Ed.1961) 716-717, Section If a contract is clear and unambiguous, then its......
-
Westbrock v. W. Ohio Health Care Corp.
...evidence. United States Fid., 129 Ohio App.3d at 55-56, 716 [738 NE 2d 315] N.E.2d at 1207-1209, citing Blosser v. Carter (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 215, 219, 586 N.E.2d 253, 255-256. Such extrinsic evidence may include (1) the surrounding circumstances of the parties at the time the contract w......
-
Fouty v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs.
... ... Blosser v. Carter (1990), 67 ... 855 N.E.2d 926 ... Ohio App.3d 215, 219, 586 N.E.2d 253. As a general rule, contracts should be construed against the ... ...
-
City of E. Liverpool v. Owners Ins. Co.
...contract; and (3) any acts by the parties that demonstrate the construction they gave to their agreement. Blosser v. Carter , 67 Ohio App.3d 215, 219, 586 N.E.2d 253 (4th Dist.1990). Ordinarily, courts should not grant summary judgment when an ambiguity exists, however if the extrinsic evid......