Board of Com'rs of Pitkin County v. Aspen Mining & Smelting Co.

• Decision Date: 27 March 1893
• Parties: BOARD OF COM'RS OF PITKIN COUNTY v. ASPEN MINING & SMELTING CO.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

32 P. 717

3 Colo.App. 223

BOARD OF COM'RS OF PITKIN COUNTY v. ASPEN MINING & SMELTING CO.

Court of Appeals of Colorado

March 27, 1893

Error to Pitkin county court.

Action by the board of county commissioners of Pitkin county against the Aspen Mining & Smelting Company to recover a statutory penalty. There was a judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

The other facts fully appear in the following statement by REED J.:

The action was brought by the plaintiff in error (plaintiff) against the defendant to recover $100, a penalty prescribed by section 29, c. 95, of General Statutes, as amended by an act of April 2, 1887, entitled "An act to amend section 29 of chapter 95 of the General Statutes of the State of Colorado, entitled 'Roads and Highways,' and to repeal sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 thereof, and for other purposes." By such amendatory act a new section was substituted in the place of section 29 of the original act, and sections 30-33 were repealed, and a new section (3 of the amendatory act) was enacted and interpolated in the General Statutes, as follows: "Sec. 3. All persons corporations, companies, and individuals are hereby required on application of the road overseer of his, her, or their road district, to furnish to said road overseer the names of persons in his, her, or their employment, when employing ten or more of such, who are or may be liable to the payment of a road tax under the provisions of this chapter; and, in the event of a willful refusal, failure, or neglect so to do within ten days after such application, shall forfeit and pay to the county the sum of one hundred dollars for each refusal, failure, or neglect so to do, such sum to be recovered by said county as in other civil actions brought and maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction, and when collected such moneys shall be paid into the said special fund, to be used in the same manner as moneys collected in said judgments for tax." Under the provisions of this section, in the year 1888, the road overseer made a demand upon the general manager of the defendant to furnish a list of employes as required. The demand was refused, and this action was brought to recover the prescribed penalty. The suit was originally brought before a justice of the peace. There were no written pleadings. On appeal it was tried to the court without a jury, a judgment for the defendant, to which this writ of error was taken.

Wilson & Stimson, for plaintiff in error.

W.W. Cooley, for defendant in error.

REED J., (after stating the facts.)

It is contended that section 3 of the amendatory act is not germane, not embraced in the title, and void under section 24, art. 5, of the state constitution. ^[1] The act is entitled "An act to amend section 29, *** and to repeal sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 thereof, and for other purposes." The last clause, "and for other purposes," may first be disposed of. It is, in such connection, meaningless, of no legal significance, conveys no idea of any legislative intention whatever. It is said by Judge Cooley in his excellent work on Constitutional Limitations, (5th Ed. p. 175:) "The words, 'and for other purposes,' must be laid out of consideration. They express nothing, and amount to nothing as a compliance with this constitutional requirement. Nothing which the act could not embrace without them can be brought in by their aid." See Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269: Town of Fishkill v. Plank-Road Co., 22 Barb. 634; St. Louis v Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578. It will be observed that in the title the specific changes are designated,--the amendment of section 29, and the repeal of the four enumerated sections. Had the act been entitled, generally, as an act to amend chapter 95, any amendment germane and pertinent might have been made, but, being specifically limited to the sections designated, the interpolation of a new and different section was not permissible. Any further changes than those designated were precluded by the specific enumeration of those named. See Woodson v. Murdock, 22 Wall. 351; State v. Bowers, 14 Ind. 195. In Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th Ed.) 179, it is said: "As the legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as they please, it is obvious that they may sometimes so frame it as to preclude many matters being included in the act which might with entire propriety have been embraced in one enactment with the matters indicated by the title, but which must now be excluded because the title has been made unnecessarily restrictive. The courts cannot enlarge the scope of the title. They are vested with no dispensing power. The constitution has made the title the conclusive index to the legislative intent as to what shall have operation. It is no answer to say that the title might have been made more comprehensive, if in fact the legislature have not seen fit to make it so." See Mewherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 199; State v. Young, 47...