Board of Educ. of Town of Ridgefield v. Freedom of Information Com'n, No. 13966

• Decision Date: 22 January 1991
• Docket Number: No. 13966
• Citation: 585 A.2d 82,217 Conn. 153
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 66 Ed. Law Rep. 343 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF RIDGEFIELD v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

Page 82

585 A.2d 82

217 Conn. 153, 66 Ed. Law Rep. 343

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF RIDGEFIELD v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

No. 13966.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 30, 1990.

Decided Jan. 22, 1991.

Susan P. Liemer, Commission Counsel, New Britain, for appellant (named defendant).

Robert B. Mitchell, with whom was Steven J. Sibner, Bridgeport, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS and SANTANIELLO, JJ.

SANTANIELLO, Justice.

This is an appeal by the defendant freedom of information commission (defendant) from a judgment of the trial court sustaining an appeal by the plaintiff, the Ridgefield board of education (board), from a decision of the defendant. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The pertinent facts are essentially undisputed. At all times relevant to this matter, the board sponsored a high school literary magazine entitled Lodestar. The magazine published submissions from students, faculty and alumni. The June, 1987 edition of Lodestar contained a controversial alumni contribution. In reaction to the ensuing controversy, the superintendent of schools for the town of Ridgefield, Dr. David Larson, decided to exclude alumni submissions from future editions of Lodestar. ¹ Robert Cox, a faculty advisor to Lodestar, and members of the magazine's editorial board opposed the decision and retained legal counsel, Attorney William Laviano. After two discussions with Larson and a third discussion with the board's counsel, John Sabanosh, Laviano submitted a letter to Larson dated April 13, 1988, analyzing the existing confrontation and its legal implications, and demanding that the board rescind its decision by April 26, 1988, in order to avoid legal action. ²

On April 25, 1988, the board held a regular public meeting during which it convened in a closed door, executive session together with Sabanosh and Larson. The publicly stated purpose for the executive session was, among others, to receive advice from counsel on the Lodestar matter. During the course of the executive session, the April 13 letter from Laviano was discussed and a proposed resolution was finalized for presentation and action in regular session. Upon reconvening the regular session, the board adopted a resolution ratifying the superintendent's decision to restrict materials appearing in Lodestar to items submitted by members of the students and faculty of Ridgefield High School.

On April 28, 1988, Laviano, on behalf of Cox, submitted a letter of complaint to the defendant alleging that the board had met in executive session for an impermissible purpose. After a full hearing, Commissioner Joan M. Fitch found "that the respondent [board] did not meet in executive session for a purpose permitted by either §§ 1-18a(e)(2) or 1-18a(e)(5), G.S.," and concluded, therefore, that, "the respondent violated §§ 1-18a(e), 1-21(a) [sic] and 1-21g(h) [sic], G.S., by convening in executive session for an impermissible purpose."

On January 25, 1989, the defendant adopted the findings of Commissioner Fitch and made certain specific findings. ³ Subsequent thereto, on March 17, 1989, the board appealed the defendant's decision to the Superior Court. The trial court sustained the appeal of the board, finding that the defendant's decision was in "derogation of the law, an abuse of discretion, [and] not based on [the] facts...."

From that decision, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court on March 14, 1990, and the case was subsequently transferred to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.

The defendant claims that the trial court: (1) exceeded its authority by substituting its judgment for that of the defendant; (2) incorrectly ruled that the demand of the student editors and Cox, as set out in Laviano's letter, constituted a pending claim that the board could discuss in executive session; and (3) incorrectly interpreted General Statutes § 1-18a(e)(5) in finding that the discussion of a draft resolution was protected from public disclosure.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court exceeded the permissible scope of its review in determining that Laviano's letter constituted a pending claim. The defendant argues that the trial court should be reversed for failing to defer to the defendant's determination of this issue. A brief overview of the statutory background of this claim is necessary.

General Statutes § 1-21(a) ⁴ provides that public agencies may adjourn from a public hearing into executive session in only a few narrowly defined circumstances, one of which is to discuss "strategy and negotiations with respect to pending claims and litigation to which the public agency ... is a party...." General Statutes § 1-18a(e)(2). ⁵ The defendant therefore had to determine whether Laviano's letter constituted a "pending claim" and whether the board's discussion in executive session was properly devoted to "strategy and negotiations" concerning that claim.

The interpretation of statutes presents a question of law. Connecticut Hospital Assn. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 200 Conn. 133, 139-40, 509 A.2d 1050 (1986). The disposition of the present case hinges on whether Laviano's letter constituted a "pending claim" within the meaning of the statute. This issue in turn is dependent on the interpretation of the statutory term "pending claim." The defendant's finding that the letter did not constitute a pending claim was therefore a determination of law. ⁶

General Statutes § 1-21i(d) provides that appeals from the defendant are taken pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes §§ 4-166 through 4-189. Under the UAPA, a trial court may reverse the decision of an administrative agency if that decision evinces an "error of law." General Statutes § 4-183(j)(4). The trial court need not defer to an incorrect decision of law by the agency. Connecticut Hospital Assn. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, supra, 140, 509 A.2d 1050. " 'Although the factual and discretionary determinations of administrative agencies are to be given considerable weight by the courts ... it is for the courts, and not for administrative agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law.' " Id. The defendant's claim to the contrary is without merit.

II

We next turn to the merits of the defendant's claim that Laviano's letter did not constitute a "pending claim" within the meaning of General Statutes § 1-18a(e)(2). The defendant argues that although the letter threatened legal action, it cannot be considered a pending claim because it was not a claim formally submitted to an adjudicatory body and was therefore not "pending."

The defendant contends that the phrase "pending claims and litigation" must be construed narrowly because, as used in § 1-18a(e)(2), it establishes an exception to the basic openness requirement of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This basic proposition, that exceptions to the FOIA's open hearings requirement are to be construed narrowly, is firmly established in our law. See New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, 205 Conn. 767, 775, 535 A.2d 1297 (1988). Even when construing statutory language narrowly, however, we cannot ignore the plain meaning of the words of the statute. Lamb v. Burns, 202 Conn. 158, 168, 520 A.2d 190 (1987). The defendant's reading of the statute loses sight of this principle.

We note at the outset that "pending claims and litigation" must refer to a wider class of claims than those already filed in court. To hold otherwise would render the term "pending claims" superfluous. See e.g., DeFonce Construction Corporation v. State, 198 Conn. 185, 187, 501 A.2d 745 (1985) (no part of legislative enactment is to be treated as insignificant or unnecessary). We decline the defendant's invitation to construe "pending claims and litigation" to encompass only those claims presently in litigation or pending before some other adjudicatory body.

In an earlier case we wrote that the term " '[c]laim' in its primary meaning is used to indicate the assertion of an existing right." Beach's Appeal, 76 Conn. 118, 125, 55 A. 596 (1903). Today, "claim" is commonly defined as "[a] demand for something as one's rightful due ... [a] basis for demanding something; title or right"; American Heritage Dictionary (2d College Ed.1985); and "[d]emand for money or property." Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.1979). These definitions, read in the context of § 1-18a(e)(2), suggest that "claim," as used in the statute, should be understood to mean the assertion of a positive legal right, which a court, administrative agency or other public agency could implement. "Pending" has been defined as "[b]egun, but not yet completed; before the conclusion of"; Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.1979); and "[not] yet decided or settled; awaiting conclusion or confirmation." American Heritage Dictionary (2d College Ed.1985). From these definitions it may reasonably be inferred that a pending claim is one already in existence and in progress. The defendant further contends, however, that only claims formally submitted to some adjudicatory forum may be deemed to be in progress. We do not discern in the applicable definitions a requirement that a claim, to be "pending," must be formally under adjudication. Such a requirement, moreover, has no basis in reality, for it would deprive public agencies of the ability to formulate in private a response to the threat of imminent legal action until that action has commenced in court, thereby placing public agencies at a serious disadvantage. Such a rule would make it extremely difficult, for instance, for a public agency ever to settle a legal demand against it prior to the institution of suit. The defendant's interpretation of "pending" thus renders litigation a tool of first, rather than last, resort for public agencies and those seeking to deal with them, a result wasteful of scarce...