Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co..

Decision Date10 February 2011
Docket NumberNo. 09–P–189.,09–P–189.
Citation78 Mass.App.Ct. 438,939 N.E.2d 793
PartiesElla BOAZOVAv.SAFETY INSURANCE COMPANY.
CourtAppeals Court of Massachusetts

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Daniel F. McCarthy, Melrose, for the plaintiff.Richard M. Moynihan, Boston, for the defendant.Present: RAPOZA, C.J., DUFFLY, BERRY, GRAINGER, & WOLOHOJIAN, JJ. 1WOLOHOJIAN, J.

Ella Boazova appeals from the judgment entered against her on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. At issue is whether the motion judge erred when he concluded, as a matter of law, that the damage to Boazova's house was not covered by her homeowner's insurance policy. We affirm.

The pertinent facts are undisputed. In June, 2001, Boazova bought a house in Arlington for which she purchased homeowner's insurance from the defendant, Safety Insurance Company (Safety). The policy remained in force, modified from time to time, at all times thereafter. In August, 2005, while renovating her kitchen, Boazova discovered that moisture had gotten into the wood sill on top of the foundation at the back of the house, and that the moisture had caused the sill and adjoining floor joists and wall studs to rot.

According to Boazova's own expert, [t]he cause of the rotted sill plate, wall studs, and floor joists is the concrete patio that was poured directly against the house. This permitted moisture to migrate to the top of the foundation, rotting the clapboard siding, the 1x exterior, and eventually the sill plate, floor joists, and wall studs.” He further opined that [t]he current situation is the result of rot and deterioration over an extended period of time,” and that the rot and deterioration were hidden.2 He concluded that [w]ere it not for the water, the structure would still be intact.”

Safety's expert's views are consistent, and Boazova does not contest them. Safety's expert, too, points to the concrete patio, which was installed at a higher grade than the foundation, about one foot above the wood sill, and “tipped towards the rear wall of the house.” In Safety's expert's opinion, “rotting of the wooden sill and other wooden framing elements of the rear wall of the Insured Property was the result of a moist or wet condition caused by surface water in the form of rain or snow falling onto the concrete patio at the rear of the house, running along the surface of the concrete patio to the rear wall of the house, and then running down into gaps and joints in the patio onto the wood framing of the rear wall which was below the grade of the concrete patio.”

The concrete patio was built before Boazova purchased the house, as was a concrete cant installed along the edge of the patio, which was designed to direct water away from the house. There is no suggestion that Boazova knew about the damage to the sill, joists, or studs before its discovery in 2005. She submitted a claim to Safety promptly thereafter, and filed this suit alleging breach of contract and violation of G.L. c. 93A after Safety denied her claim.

1. Discussion. The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law for the trial judge, subject to our de novo review. See Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Quane, 442 Mass. 704, 707, 816 N.E.2d 521 (2004); Commerce Ins. Co. v. Theodore, 65 Mass.App.Ct. 471, 472–473, 841 N.E.2d 281 (2006). The policy's terms are to be interpreted according to the “fair meaning of the language used, as applied to the subject matter.” Davis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 434 Mass. 174, 179, 747 N.E.2d 141 (2001), quoting from Bilodeau v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 392 Mass. 537, 541, 467 N.E.2d 137 (1984). We construe the language in an insurance policy according to its plain meaning if it is unambiguous. See Money Store/Mass., Inc. v. Hingham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 430 Mass. 298, 300, 718 N.E.2d 840 (1999). “This is consistent with our long-standing policy that the rules governing the interpretation of insurance contracts are the same as those governing the interpretation of any other contract.” Ibid., quoting from Cardin v. Royal Ins. Co., 394 Mass. 450, 453, 476 N.E.2d 200 (1985). The insured bears the burden of establishing coverage. Tumblin v. American Ins. Co., 344 Mass. 318, 320, 182 N.E.2d 306 (1962).

The interpretation of an exclusion in an insurance contract also presents a question of law, see Fuller v. First Fin. Ins. Co., 448 Mass. 1, 5, 858 N.E.2d 288 (2006), but here the burden shifts to the insurer to establish the exclusion's applicability, see Hanover Ins. Co. v. Talhouni, 413 Mass. 781, 785, 604 N.E.2d 689 (1992). “Although an exclusionary clause is construed narrowly, ... [w]e are not free to revise it or change the order of the words.’ Finn v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 452 Mass. 690, 695, 896 N.E.2d 1272 (2008), quoting from Continental Cas. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 391 Mass. 143, 147, 461 N.E.2d 209 (1984). “A policy of insurance whose provisions are plainly and definitely expressed in appropriate language must be enforced in accordance with its terms.” Hyfer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 318 Mass. 175, 179, 61 N.E.2d 3 (1945), quoting from Stankus v. New York Life Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 366, 369, 44 N.E.2d 687 (1942).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the policy at issue in this case. Boazova contends that she is entitled to coverage because her loss was caused by undiscovered water seepage, which is covered by section I(A)(2)(e)(9) of the policy.3 That section of the policy (which for the sake of convenience we refer to as the “hidden seepage provision”) provides:

SECTION I—PERILS INSURED AGAINST

“COVERAGE A—DWELLING and COVERAGE B—OTHER STRUCTURES

We insure against risk of direct loss to property described in coverages A and B only if that loss is a physical loss to property. We do not insure, however, for loss:

“...

“2. Caused by:

“...

(9) Constant or repeated seepage or leakage of water or the presence or condensation of humidity, moisture or vapor, over a period of weeks, months or years unless such seepage or leakage of water or the presence or condensation of humidity, moisture or vapor and the resulting damage is unknown to all ‘insureds' and is hidden within the walls or ceilings or beneath the floors or above the ceilings of a structure.”

Were we to look only at this single provision, disregarding the remainder of the policy, we would agree with Boazova that the policy covers losses caused by undetected water seepage. But such is not our task. J.A. Sullivan Corp. v. Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 789, 795, 494 N.E.2d 374 (1986) (“A contract is to be construed to give reasonable effect to each of its provisions”). The policy clearly states that the hidden seepage provision does not stand in isolation, but provides coverage only to the extent not otherwise excluded or excepted.4 Specifically, the paragraph immediately following the hidden seepage provision states:

“3. Excluded under Section I—Exclusions.

“Under items 1. and 2. [which includes the hidden seepage provision], any ensuing loss to property described in Coverages A and B not excluded or excepted in this policy is covered.”

We turn, therefore, to the Exclusions section of the policy. It provides in relevant part:

SECTION I —EXCLUSIONS

“1. We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.

“...

“c. Water Damage, meaning:

(1) Flood, surface water, waves, tidal water, overflow of a body of water, or spray from any of these, whether or not driven by wind.” 5

(Emphasis added.) The Supreme Judicial Court has construed the precise language emphasized above and has held that it “plainly” forecloses an insured “from invoking the train of events rule.” Jussim v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 415 Mass. 24, 31, 610 N.E.2d 954 (1993). Put another way, if an excluded event occurs anywhere in the chain of causation, then the insured is not entitled to coverage. Thus, if surface water occurred anywhere in the chain of events leading to Boazova's loss, she is not entitled to coverage under the policy. Loss caused, in whole or part, by surface water is excluded “regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.”

Boazova does not dispute Safety's expert's opinion that the water that ultimately seeped into the structure of her house came from snow and rain that landed on the patio and then migrated to the sill.6 See Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 711, 575 N.E.2d 734 (1991), quoting from Godbout v. Cousens, 396 Mass. 254, 261, 485 N.E.2d 940 (1985) (the party opposing summary judgment has a burden “to show with admissible evidence the existence of a dispute as to material facts”). Our law defines surface water as “waters from rain, melting snow, springs, or seepage, or floods that lie or flow on the surface of the earth and naturally spread over the ground but do not form a part of a natural watercourse or lake.” DeSanctis v. Lynn Water & Sewer Commn., 423 Mass. 112, 115 n. 6, 666 N.E.2d 1292 (1996). Applying this definition to the undisputed facts, it is clear that Boazova's loss originated from surface water.7 Like the motion judge, therefore, we conclude that Boazova is not entitled to coverage under the policy.

Ignoring the critical language of the exclusion, and the Supreme Judicial Court's construction of it, Boazova argues that seepage, not surface water, is the “active efficient” cause of her loss. As we have noted above, she is foreclosed “from invoking the train of events rule.” Jussim v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 415 Mass. at 30–31, 610 N.E.2d 954. Even were we inclined (which we are not) to disregard (as she does) the holding of Jussim, Boazova's argument would nonetheless fail because it is based on the mistaken premise that the “active efficient” cause is the one...

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4 cases
  • Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
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    ...including " the fair and reasonable meaning of the words in which the agreement is expressed." Cody, 387 Mass. at 146; Boazova, 78 Mass.App.Ct. at 440. However, that approach is less sound when, as here, the content of a policy is substantially dictated by statute, and the form of the polic......
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    • Full Court Press Business Insurance
    • Invalid date
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