Godbout v. Cousens

• Decision Date: 19 November 1985
• Citation: 396 Mass. 254,485 N.E.2d 940
• Parties: Joyce GODBOUT v. Emma COUSENS et al. 1
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 940

485 N.E.2d 940

396 Mass. 254

Joyce GODBOUT v. Emma COUSENS et al. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Norfolk.

Argued Sept. 10, 1985.

Decided Nov. 19, 1985.

Deborah K. Berk, Boston, for plaintiff.

Henry P. Sorett, Boston, for Juliette Trudeau.

Deirdre H. Harris, Boston, for Emma Cousens.

James N. Wittorff, Milford, for Marjorie Lavelle.

Anthony T. Petrocca, Millis, and, Susan B. Persky, Brookline, for Harold Jones, submitted a brief.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and LIACOS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

The issue raised by these appeals is the correctness of rulings by two Superior Court judges granting summary judgments in favor of four defendants on the plaintiff's claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. ² The plaintiff appeals. The defendant Jones appeals from a ruling granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on his counterclaim.

1. The parties. The plaintiff, Joyce Godbout, was appointed to the council on aging (COA) by the board of selectmen of Bellingham (board) in 1976. Subsequently she was elected president by the members of the COA. Sometime in the spring of 1982, the board began receiving complaints concerning the plaintiff's conduct and job performance. As a result, in May, 1982, the board commenced an investigation. Each of the four defendants before us took part in the investigation.

At that time the defendant Cousens was a member of the board of health of Bellingham. Cousens had assisted her own elderly mother in dealings with the COA. The defendant Jones is a self-employed machinist. The plaintiff provided services to Jones's elderly mother. She discussed conditions at Jones's mother's home with the board of health. The defendant Trudeau had an elderly aunt and uncle living in Bellingham. The plaintiff worked on problems relating to Trudeau's aunt and uncle. The defendant Lavelle is a resident of Florida. Her mother is an elderly resident of Bellingham, who had used COA services.

2. The complaint. We summarize the allegations and undisputed factual circumstances giving rise to the complaint. Prior to May, 1982, members of the board received complaints concerning the plaintiff. Those complaints indicated that the plaintiff was harassing elderly persons and using improper influence in her position on the COA. On May 11, 1982, the board sent the plaintiff a letter informing her that the board would hold an executive session pursuant to the Open Meeting Law, G.L. c. 39, § 23B (1984 ed.), ³ to consider the complaints against her and possible disciplinary action. On May 17, the board held an executive session attended by the plaintiff. The board asked Cousens and Jones to appear to discuss their experiences with the plaintiff and the COA. At the meeting Cousens and Jones made statements to the board which the plaintiff claims are defamatory.

On May 20, 1982, the board sent the plaintiff a written list of the allegations against her. ⁴ The plaintiff denied the charges in writing. The plaintiff requested that the board conduct its investigation at an open meeting pursuant to G.L. c. 39, § 23B. The board continued its investigation in open meetings held during June and July.

In a letter dated June 13, 1982, the defendant Trudeau wrote to the board and described her aunt's and uncle's experiences with the plaintiff. The essence of the letter was that the plaintiff had mistreated Trudeau's aunt and uncle and had taken advantage of them. In the letter Trudeau asked the board to remove the plaintiff from her job.

In a letter dated June 30, 1982, the defendant Lavelle wrote to the board complaining about the treatment her mother had received from the plaintiff and the COA. The letter accused the plaintiff of intimidating the elderly and of billing Medicaid for charges not incurred by Lavelle's mother. As a result of its investigation, the board on July 12, 1982, voted to rescind the plaintiff's appointment to the COA.

We now consider whether each of the defendants, in moving for summary judgment, met the initial burden to "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [they are] entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). We look to the affidavits, which "shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence." Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(e), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). See Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 719, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (1985). We do not consider the credibility of the evidence. We examine separately the record before the court on each defendant's motion. The substantive law of defamation determines which facts are material to the claims.

a. The standard for defamation. The plaintiff admits that for purposes of her defamation action, she is a "public figure" ⁵ and must therefore prove that the defendants acted with actual malice in publishing the defamatory statements. ⁶ New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975). "Actual malice is not necessarily proved in terms of ill will or hatred, but is proved rather by a showing that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge that it was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false." Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., supra at 867, 330 N.E.2d 161. To prove "reckless disregard" there must be "sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." Id., quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968).

While we favor the use of summary judgment procedures in defamation cases, New England Tractor-Trailer Training of Conn., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 395 Mass. 471, 480, 480 N.E.2d 1005 (1985), the defendants must still meet the usual burden under rule 56 of demonstrating by evidence "considered with an indulgence in the plaintiff's favor," the absence of disputed issues of material fact and their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Central Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass. 220, 231, 396 N.E.2d 996 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935, 100 S.Ct. 2152, 64 L.Ed.2d 788 (1980). Because the issue of actual malice involves a determination of state of mind, summary judgment will frequently be inappropriate in defamation cases, Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 2680 n. 9, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979). However, the issue of actual malice "is not automatically a jury question." Aarco, Inc. v. Baynes, 391 Mass. 560, 564, 462 N.E.2d 1107 (1984). The plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial if there is some indication before the motion judge from which an inference of actual malice--knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth--could be drawn. Id. Central Broadcasting Corp., supra. See Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 244, 252, 208 Cal.Rptr. 137, 690 P.2d 610 (1984), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Synanon Church v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 53 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1985) (No. 84-1304); Note, The Role of Summary Judgment in Political Libel Cases, 52 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1783, 1820-1821 (1979).

b. The statements. The defendants Cousens and Jones each made statements at the closed executive session of the board on May 17. Cousens repeated a remark she had heard from a clerk at the COA office: "The person in the [COA] office said that the busses used to be bad--they were dirty and the restrooms weren't very clean. She then said that the busses now are good, 'but what is a few bucks under the table when the comfort and safety of the seniors are concerned.' " According to the plaintiff, Cousens' statement defames her by suggesting that the plaintiff bribed someone. ⁷ In her affidavit, Cousens avers, "I did not make any statement at any time stating, implying, or suggesting that Mrs. Godbout was passing money 'under the table.' I had told one of the selectmen privately, before the meeting held in executive session on May 17, 1982, that I had overheard a remark by a COA clerk concerning passing money under the table to obtain bus service for the COA. I repeated at the meeting that the comment had been made by the clerk."

Jones told the board, "On [December 23, 1981], 11:15 PM, Joyce called me and said that she and the Board of Health were up there [at my mother's house] that day and want my mother moved the following day." The plaintiff's complaint alleges that Jones's statement was intended to mean and was understood to mean that the plaintiff was harassing Jones's mother. Jones submitted an affidavit in which he asserted the truth of his statement at the meeting and his lack of intent to hold the plaintiff up to public scorn or ridicule.

Trudeau's allegedly defamatory statements were made in a letter she wrote to the board on June 13, 1982, in which she described the experiences of her elderly aunt and uncle with the plaintiff. ⁸ In her affidavit, Trudeau states that at the time she wrote the letter, she believed that everything she said was true, that she still reasonably believes everything to be true, that her sole reason for writing was to protect the welfare of her aunt and uncle, and that she did not intend to harm the plaintiff.

Lavelle's allegedly defamatory statements were made in her letter of June 30 to the board. In her complaint, the plaintiff singles out the following comments as defamatory: "Joyce entered my mother's apartment and forcibly took my mother from her bed to attend a Selectmen's meeting in regard to Joyce"; "Joyce billed my mother's medicaid for bills not [incurred] by my mother"; "[i]t is a sad state of affairs that she [the plaintiff] is allowed to intimidate the elderly"; and "[Lavelle's mother] is having problems with her health because of the tense situation created by this Joyce." In her affidavit, Lavelle states that her letter was written...