Boddie v. State
Decision Date | 10 June 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 2001-CT-00304-SCT.,2001-CT-00304-SCT. |
Citation | 875 So.2d 180 |
Parties | Franklin Rashad BODDIE v. STATE of Mississippi. |
Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
J. Ronald Parrish, attorney for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Charles W. Maris, Jr., attorney for appellee.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
¶ 1. On August 16, 1999, Franklin Rashad Boddie pled guilty to the crime of transfer of cocaine. On March 22, 2000, Boddie filed in the Pike County Circuit Court a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) seeking vacation of the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed pursuant to his guilty plea. After a hearing was conducted on December 4, 2000, the circuit court, the Hon. Keith Starrett, presiding, denied Boddie's PCR motion. Feeling aggrieved, Boddie appealed that ruling arguing that his plea to that charge was void due to language used by the trial court which Boddie argued, in essence, dismissed the charge of transfer of cocaine. He also argued that there was no factual basis for the plea. A unanimous Court of Appeals affirmed, Boddie v. State, 850 So.2d 1205 (Miss.Ct.App.2002), and we granted certiorari. We affirm because (1) the trial court did not dismiss the charge of transfer of cocaine, but merely made a ruling on the evidence, and (2) the record as a whole established an adequate factual basis for the plea.
¶ 2. Boddie was indicted for the crimes of transfer of cocaine and aggravated assault. Boddie filed a motion to quash the indictment, alleging that the grand jury did not have sufficient evidence to indict him. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order stating that it was "necessary and proper that this [c]ourt make an adjudication on evidentiary matters in order to resolve pending disputes herein." (emphasis added). Therefore, the trial court specifically stated that the order which was being entered was a ruling on the admissibility of the evidence.
¶ 3. The State informed the court that in order to prove that Boddie transferred cocaine, the prosecution intended to introduce the alleged expert testimony of the drug addict to whom the cocaine was delivered. The trial court held that the "opinion of a drug user that the substance is cocaine is not sufficient." The trial court further stated that The trial court also ruled that the statement made by the defendant that he did in fact transfer the cocaine could be used against him to prove motive under the aggravated assault indictment. This order did not quash the indictment.
¶ 4. After the entry of the trial court's order, plea negotiations continued between the State and the defendant. On August 16, 1999, Boddie entered a plea of guilty to the transfer charge, in return for the State's agreeing to recommend a sentence of twenty years with ten years suspended and served on post-release supervision1 and a fine of $2,000. The State also agreed not to prosecute the aggravated assault and armed robbery charge. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court made sure everyone was in agreement that the previous order entered was a ruling on evidentiary matters and the indictment had not been dismissed. All parties, including the defendant, stated that they agreed that the indictment was outstanding as to the transfer of cocaine charge. The trial court made sure Boddie was aware of his right to a trial by jury and the right to appeal any conviction pursuant to a jury verdict. The trial court also ascertained that Boddie was aware that a plea of guilty waived those rights. Boddie informed the trial court that he was pleading guilty to the charge of transfer of cocaine because he was in fact guilty of the offense. He also stated that he was "satisfied the State [could] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he was] guilty of the offense charged, unlawful transfer of cocaine." Boddie's mother was also present at this sentencing hearing. She stated that after having been present during the discussions between Boddie and his attorney, she was satisfied that Boddie was aware of consequences of his guilty plea. After finding that Boddie was competent and that he voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his rights and entered a plea of guilty, the trial court accepted Boddie's guilty plea.
¶ 5. On April 8, 1999, Boddie, through new counsel, filed this petition for post-conviction relief. In his petition, Boddie argued that he should not have been allowed to plead guilty to the charge of transfer of cocaine because the trial court's ruling effectively dismissed the charge against him. On December 4, 2001, after hearing arguments from both parties, the trial court again stated that the indictment against Boddie was not quashed. The trial judge held that he:
basically was giving an opinion that with that evidence I didn't think the State would prevail, because if they didn't have the substance then the case law was against it, and even armed with that ruling the defendant chose to plead guilty to the offense of transfer of cocaine. So, it would just be [an] injustice to allow that to happen. It would defy reason and logic, and the defendant was very well aware of the circumstances, as was his attorney and his Mother who signed off on the Know Your Rights Form.
The trial court thus denied Boddie's PCR motion.
¶ 6. Our standard of review of the trial court's denial of a PCR motion is clear. We will not reverse the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. Brown v. State, 731 So.2d 595, 598(¶ 6) (Miss.1999). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.
¶ 8. As to Boddie's argument that there was no factual basis for his guilty plea, this Court is not limited to the transcript of Boddie's guilty plea hearing, but we are allowed to review the record as a whole. Gaskin v. State, 618 So.2d 103, 106 (Miss.1993). See Corley v. State, 585 So.2d 765, 767-68 (Miss.1991)
. While the transcript of the guilty plea hearing contains no specific reference to a factual basis for the charge of transfer of cocaine, Boddie made a statement, which the trial court ruled to be admissible, in which he admitted to the crime alleged in the indictment. Boddie also acknowledged at his guilty plea hearing that he was satisfied that the State could prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was guilty of the crime of transfer of cocaine. Thus, based on the totality of the evidence, there existed a factual basis for Boddie's plea of guilty to transfer of cocaine.
¶ 9. An evidentiary hearing was held before the trial judge where he ruled that the opinion of a drug user was not sufficient to prove transfer of a controlled substance. Although he incorrectly made a statement about a directed verdict, the trial judge later corrected his misstatement before Boddie pled guilty to the charge, informing all parties that the indictment had not been quashed, merely a ruling on the evidence had been made. Knowing this fact and with the consent of his attorney, Boddie consciously and knowingly entered a plea of guilty to the charge of transfer of cocaine. Had he not pled guilty, this case would have proceeded to trial because the indictment was never quashed. Finally, based on the totality of the record, there existed a factual basis for the guilty plea.
¶ 10. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the Pike County Circuit Court.
¶ 11. AFFIRMED.
¶ 12. Franklin Rashad Boddie was indicted for sale of cocaine and aggravated assault for giving two rocks of crack cocaine to...
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