Hannah v. State, No. 2004-CT-00725-SCT.

• Decision Date: 19 October 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2004-CT-00725-SCT.
• Citation: 943 So.2d 20
• Parties: Emma HANNAH v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

943 So.2d 20

Emma HANNAH v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 2004-CT-00725-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

October 19, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Emma Hannah, pro se.

Office of the Attorney General by John R. Henry, attorney for appellee.

EN BANC.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

COBB, Presiding Justice, for the court.

¶ 1. The State's motion for rehearing is denied. The previous opinions are withdrawn, and these opinions are substituted therefor.

¶ 2. Emma Hannah pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the Winston County Circuit Court and was sentenced to serve twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. She subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief which the trial court denied. The Court of Appeals subsequently found she waived all claims by pleading guilty and affirmed the trial court. Hannah v. State, 943 So.2d 51, 2005 WL 949240 (Miss.Ct.App.2005). Hannah now seeks relief before this Court through her pro se petition for writ of certiorari, in which she asserts that the trial court, as well as the Court of Appeals, erred by finding that: (1) she failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) she knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily pleaded guilty. We granted her petition to independently review Hannah's two primary issues, which the Court of Appeals did not address.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN TRIAL COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS

¶ 3. On December 11, 2002, the Winston County Circuit Court accepted Hannah's guilty plea to manslaughter in the June 8, 2001, death of her husband Winfred Hannah. Winfred died as a result of complications arising from an incident where boiling water was poured on him. On the day of trial, defense counsel informed the trial court that a plea would be entered by Hannah. After the usual colloquy, the trial judge announced that he would not accept the plea, after Hannah's statement that she "didn't do it." After a jury was seated and the parties announced ready to proceed, the court recessed. Following the break, defense counsel again informed the court that Hannah wanted to change her plea from not guilty of murder to guilty of manslaughter. The trial court then asked Hannah if she remembered all of the questions he had just asked, and when she answered affirmatively he proceeded with a short additional inquiry and accepted her plea. After a thorough sentencing hearing, Hannah was sentenced to the maximum time to serve, twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.

¶ 4. From the time of sentencing, Hannah proceeded pro se. Hannah first filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Winston County Circuit Court which was denied. However, that order was neither entered in the minutes of the court nor filed with the circuit clerk, and it is unclear from the record exactly what transpired with Hannah's motion. The trial court later entered a substitute order denying Hannah's post-conviction relief. She appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court, without addressing the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel or the validity of Hannah's guilty plea.¹ After our independent review of the record, with particular attention to these two issues, we conclude that she has raised meritorious arguments and should be allowed to proceed. We reverse and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ANALYSIS

¶ 5. In reviewing the denial of a petition for post-conviction relief we will reverse the factual findings of the trial court only if they are clearly erroneous; however, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Boddie v. State, 875 So.2d 180, 183 (Miss.2004) (citing Brown v. State, 731 So.2d 595, 598 (Miss.1999)).

I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

¶ 6. Hannah asserts that she received ineffective assistance of counsel, as to the plea as well as other underlying matters. The United States Supreme Court adopted a two-prong standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, the convicted defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Second, the defendant must show there is reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This test applies with equal validity to challenges to guilty pleas. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).

¶ 7. As applied to the plea process, the focus of the first prong remains the same, while the second prong focuses on whether counsel's unprofessional performance affected the outcome. Id. In the present case, Hannah must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, she would not have pleaded guilty, would have insisted on going to trial, and the outcome would have been different. This Court has held that a reasonable probability arises when the ineffectiveness is of such sufficient moment that the integrity of the proceeding or our confidence in the outcome has been shaken. Leatherwood v. State, 539 So.2d 1378, 1385 (Miss.1989).

¶ 8. In Myers v. State, 583 So.2d 174, 178 (Miss.1991), this Court eloquently stated an appropriate backdrop to the current situation:

The relationship of the accused to his lawyer provides a critical factual context here. As he stands before the bar of justice, the indicted defendant often has few friends. The one person in the world, upon whose judgment and advice, skill and experience, loyalty and integrity that defendant must be able to rely, is his lawyer. This is as it should be. Any rational defendant is going to rely heavily upon his lawyer's advice as to how he should respond to the trial judge's questions at the plea hearing. He may also rationally rely on his lawyer's advice what the outcome of the plea hearing will be. Yet it is the defendant, not the lawyer, who enters the plea. It is the defendant, not the lawyer, who is going to serve the time. It is the defendant, not the lawyer, whose constitutional rights are being waived at the plea hearing. It is the defendant's plea and accompanying waiver of rights which under established law must be voluntarily and intelligently given, with full appreciation of the consequences to follow.

Hannah asserts that there were conflicting statements by the victim identifying his attacker as another woman to members of the burn center that treated him for his injuries. In support of this claim, Hannah points this Court to medical reports in the record. Also, Hannah claims that she received injuries earlier that evening which would have limited or defeated her physical capability to perform the acts required to commit the crime. Hannah further asserts that there were other people, including the victim's girlfriend, in the house at various times prior to and at the time of the scalding.

¶ 9. The second prong of Strickland, as it applies to guilty pleas, is whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. The question now is not whether Hannah is precluded from making this argument because she pleaded guilty. The question is whether the evidence and testimony, if properly investigated and presented, would have changed the outcome had the parties gone forward.

¶ 10. Such evidence includes the contradictory statements that the victim's girl-friend poured water on him. This evidence, set forth in the medical records, along with Hannah's testimony that someone else committed this act, is enough to raise a reasonable doubt that Hannah committed the offense. In the alternative, if defense counsel had presented the contradictory statements, delved further into Hannah's claims of prior abuse by the victim and of the abuse she says had taken place immediately prior to the incident, and asserted the intervening circumstances of the victim's death from respiratory failure, it is reasonable to conclude that the outcome of a jury trial may have been different.

II. VOLUNTARINESS OF HANNAH'S GUILTY PLEA

¶ 11. A valid guilty plea must represent a voluntary and intelligent choice by the defendant among the alternative courses of action available. Hill, 474 U.S. at 56, 106 S.Ct. 366 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 164, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)). This Court has long held that there is no per se rule prohibiting a collateral attack on the validity of a guilty plea. Baker v. State, 358 So.2d 401, 403 (Miss.1978). However, we remain mindful of the strong presumption of validity that goes with solemn declarations made in open court and the need for finality. Id. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to prove that her plea was not voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently given. Gardner v. State, 531 So.2d 805, 810 (Miss.1988).

¶ 12. "A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711-12, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). Ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror or other inducements, both subtle and blatant, threaten the constitutionality of a guilty plea. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43, 89 S.Ct. 1709. This Court has crafted a series of warnings to ensure the voluntariness of a defendant's guilty plea. A defendant must be advised concerning the nature of the charge against her and the consequences of her plea including the minimum and maximum sentences that may be imposed. Alexander v. State, 605 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Miss.1992). The defendant must be told that her guilty plea waives several constitutional rights including her right to trial by jury, the right to confront adverse witnesses and the right to protection against self-incrimination. Id. See also Boyk...