Boggs v. State, A03A0341.

Decision Date02 May 2003
Docket NumberNo. A03A0341.,A03A0341.
Citation261 Ga. App. 104,581 S.E.2d 722
PartiesBOGGS v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Carl P. Greenberg, for appellant.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., Dist. Atty., Anne E. Green, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

MIKELL, Judge.

After a jury trial, Robert Boggs was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to serve ten years in confinement and five on probation. On appeal, Boggs argues that his conviction must be reversed because the trial court refused to give one of his written requests to charge. For reasons provided below, we affirm.

On the eve of trial, Boggs's counsel filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Boggs was immune from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, which provides that "[a] person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16-3-23 or 16-3-24 shall be immune from criminal prosecution therefor unless any deadly force used by such person utilizes a weapon the carrying or possession of which is unlawful by such person under Part 2 or 3 of Article 4 of Chapter 11 of this title." OCGA § 16-3-23 governs the use of force in defense of habitation, and OCGA § 16-3-24 governs its use in defense of real property other than a habitation or personal property. In his motion, Boggs claimed that the victim attacked him in a violent and tumultuous manner as he was attempting to drive away from his home and that he used such force that he reasonably believed was necessary to prevent the car jacking or assault against him. On the following day during pretrial, counsel agreed that the trial judge would decide Boggs's motion to dismiss based upon the discovery package, which included Boggs's statements, witness interviews, and police summaries, and arguments from counsel.

In Boggs's statement, he admitted that he exited his car and stabbed the victim. He explained that because of his previous encounters with the victim, he was scared and "was just trying to defend myself and trying to get him off of me. I keep the knife in my front seat because I use it to open my trunk. I'm 37 years old, and who wants to fight a 15-year-old boy? I tried to avoid him as much as possible. I was in fear that [the victim] was trying to hurt me.... I was in fear for myself and Donna and the kids, too." The witnesses who were interviewed stated that the victim and Boggs had been arguing most of that day. The victim opened Boggs's car door, and Boggs exited the car and stabbed him.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that Boggs was acting in self-defense, not in defense of his car in accordance with OCGA § 16-3-23. The court also found that based upon the witness statements, the victim was trying to get away when the stabbing occurred and stated that "arguably the record shows that as a matter of law, the immunity statute would not be triggered, even if a prima facie was made." Boggs did not appeal the trial court's ruling.

The trial proceeded and the court charged the jury on justification, self-defense, use of force in defense of habitation, and excessive force but refused to give Boggs's requested charge on the immunity statute. Boggs now argues that the failure to charge the immunity statute as an affirmative defense was erroneous.

In pertinent part, OCGA § 16-3-24.2 provides that "[a] person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16-3-23 or 16-3-24 shall be immune from criminal prosecution therefor." When we construe a statute, "our goal is to determine its legislative purpose. In this regard, a court must first focus on the statute's text."1 "If the plain language of the statute is susceptible of only one meaning, courts must follow that meaning unless to do so would produce contradiction or absurdity."2...

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13 cases
  • Fair v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 14 Julio 2008
    ...of OCGA § 16-3-24.2 is an issue of first impression in this Court. However, the defendants cite and rely upon Boggs v. State, 261 Ga.App. 104, 106, 581 S.E.2d 722 (2003). There, the Court of Appeals focused on the plain language of the statute, see Sizemore v. State, 262 Ga. 214, 216, 416 S......
  • Fair v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 22 Noviembre 2010
    ...must be determined by the trial court [as a matter of law] before the trial of that person commences' ") (quoting Boggs v. State, 261 Ga.App. 104, 106, 581 S.E.2d 722 (2003)). After the return of jurisdiction from this Court, the trial court ruled on the defendants'motions.1 In doing so, th......
  • State v. Evans, 112,000.
    • United States
    • Kansas Court of Appeals
    • 23 Octubre 2015
    ...before trial, as a matter of law.See Fair v. State,284 Ga. 165, 166, 664 S.E.2d 227 (2008)(citing with approval Boggs v. State,261 Ga.App. 104, 106, 581 S.E.2d 722 [2003]); see also People v. Hartwick,498 Mich. 192, 198–202, 870 N.W.2d 37 (2015)(immunity from prosecution is a question of la......
  • Lightning v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 26 Marzo 2009
    ...a trial court must rule on a motion for immunity before trial. In doing so, the court approved our decision in Boggs v. State, 261 Ga.App. 104, 106, 581 S.E.2d 722 (2003), stating that "the decision as to whether a person is immune under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 must be determined by the trial cour......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • Criminal Law - Franklin J. Hogue
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 61-1, September 2009
    • Invalid date
    ...65. See id. 66. 284 Ga. 165, 664 S.E.2d 227 (2008). 67. Id. at 165, 664 S.E.2d at 229-30. 68. Id. at 165-66, 664 S.E.2d at 230. 69. 261 Ga. App. 104, 581 S.E.2d 722 (2003). 70. Fair, 284 Ga. at 166, 664 S.E.2d at 230. 71. See Boggs, 261 Ga. App. at 104-05, 581 S.E.2d at 722-23. 72. Black's ......
  • Death Penalty Law - Therese Michelle Day
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 61-1, September 2009
    • Invalid date
    ...(2007) (authorizing the use of force in defense of property other than habitation). 9. Fair, 284 Ga. at 165, 664 S.E.2d at 230. 10. 261 Ga. App. 104, 581 S.E.2d 722 (2003). 11. Fair, 284 Ga. at 166, 664 S.E.2d at 230. 12. Boggs, 261 Ga. App. at 106, 581 S.E.2d at 723; see also supra note 8.......
  • Vigilant or Vigilante? Procedure and Rationale for Immunity in Defense of Habitation and Defense of Property Under the Official Code of Georgia Annotated Sections 16-3-23, -24, -24.1, and -24.2 - Robert Christian Rutledge
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 59-2, January 2008
    • Invalid date
    ...(2004) (holding that statute prohibiting convicted felon from possessing firearm negates immunity under O.C.G.A. section 16-3-24.2). 23. 261 Ga. App. 104, 581 S.E.2d 722 (2003). 24. Id. at 105, 581 S.E.2d at 723. 25. Benham v. State, 277 Ga. 516, 518, 591 S.E.2d 824, 826-27 (2004). 26. 277 ......
  • Cops or Robbers? How Georgia's Defense of Habitation Statute Applies to No-knock Raids by Police
    • United States
    • Georgia State University College of Law Georgia State Law Reviews No. 26-2, December 2009
    • Invalid date
    ...see infra Part II.A.3. 64. Ga. Code Ann. § 16-3-24.2 (2007); Fair v. State, 664 S.E.2d 227,230 (Ga. 2008) (citing Boggs v. State, 581 S.E.2d 722, 723 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)) (holding that immunity is determined as a matter of law before the start of the trial). Section 16-3-24.2 provides: 594 ......

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