Bolton v. Gallatin Ctr. for Rehab. & Healing, LLC

• Decision Date: 21 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. 3:20-cv-00683,3:20-cv-00683
• Citation: 535 F.Supp.3d 709
• Parties: Debbie Ann BOLTON, surviving child of Decedent, Ruth Clara Summers, Plaintiff, v. GALLATIN CENTER FOR REHABILITATION & HEALING, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

535 F.Supp.3d 709

Debbie Ann BOLTON, surviving child of Decedent, Ruth Clara Summers, Plaintiff,

v.GALLATIN CENTER FOR REHABILITATION & HEALING, LLC, Defendant.

No. 3:20-cv-00683

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

Filed April 21, 2021

Clinton L. Kelly, F. Dulin Kelly, The Kelly Firm, Hendersonville, TN, for Plaintiff.

Howard Hayden, Minton P. Mayer, Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A., Nashville, TN, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR., CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Debbie Ann Bolton's pending Motion to Remand (Doc. No. 17) calls upon the Court to determine whether the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act ("PREP Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e, creates federal subject matter jurisdiction over state-law claims involving a nursing home's allegedly inadequate response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant Gallatin Center for Rehabilitation & Healing, LLC ("Gallatin") has responded in opposition to Bolton's motion (Doc. No. 23), Bolton replied (Doc. No. 24), and both parties filed multiple rounds of supplemental briefing and notices of new authority (Doc. Nos. 29–30, 32–33, 36, 38–40, 43, 45–46). The United States also filed a Statement of Interest (Doc. Nos. 35, 35-1), to which Bolton responded (Doc. No. 37). For the following reasons, Bolton's Motion to Remand will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Bolton's mother, Ruth Summers, was an 89-year-old resident at Gallatin's nursing home when she contracted COVID-19 and died from related complications on March 29, 2020. (Compl. ¶ 1). Following her mother's death, Bolton filed this action against Gallatin in the Circuit Court for Sumner County, Tennessee, on July 8, 2020.

The Complaint alleges that Gallatin's staff did not take proper measures to prevent or mitigate the spread of COVID-19 among residents, which ultimately caused the death of Ms. Summers. (Id. ¶¶ 24–41, 45). As a result, the Complaint asserts two state-law claims against Gallatin for gross negligence and recklessness.

On August 7, 2020, Gallatin filed a Notice of Removal (Doc. No. 1) stating that this case is removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) because it asserts claims "arising under" federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Id. ¶ 6). Specifically, Gallatin argues that Bolton's state law claims present a federal question because they necessarily involve a federal issue, are completely preempted by the PREP Act, and fall within the Act's scope. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 7–8). In response, Bolton filed a Motion to Remand (Doc. No. 17) contending that the PREP Act does not provide grounds for removal.¹

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Because federal district courts only have original jurisdiction over civil actions "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (emphasis added), defendants sued in state court generally may remove the case to federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) if the case arises under federal law.² See Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 324–25 (6th Cir. 2007). On the other hand, "[i]f the complaint relies only on state law, the district court generally lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the action is not removable." Palkow v. CSX Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 543, 552 (6th Cir. 2005).

To determine whether a claim arises under federal law, courts apply what is commonly referred to as the "well-pleaded complaint rule." This rule provides that federal jurisdiction exists only in those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint (1) states a federal cause of action or (2) includes state-law claims that necessarily depend on a substantial and disputed federal issue.³ Id. at 550 (quoting Thornton v. SW Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1133 (6th Cir. 1990) ); see also Ohio ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 629 F.3d 527, 530 (6th Cir. 2010). As its name suggests, the well-pleaded complaint rule requires courts to ignore potential defenses and look only to the face of the complaint to determine whether a federal question exists. See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003). Ultimately, "the plaintiff [is] the master of the complaint" and she "may simply avoid federal jurisdiction by relying exclusively on state law." Gentek, 491 F.3d at 325 (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398–99, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) ).

"Most rules have exceptions, of course, and the well-pleaded complaint rule is no different." Dillon v. Medtronic, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 751, 757 (E.D. Ky. 2014) (Thapar, J.). "It has two: complete preemption and artful pleading." Id. Regarding the first exception, "[i]f Congress intends that a federal statute should ‘completely preempt’ an area of state law, any complaint alleging claims under that area of state law is presumed to allege a claim arising under federal law." Palkow, 431 F.3d at 552 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987) ); see also Loftis v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 342 F.3d 509, 515 (6th Cir. 2003). "The complaint may thus be removed to federal court and will be treated as alleging a federal cause of action, notwithstanding that on its face, the ... complaint alleges only a state-law cause of action." Id. Under the second exception, the artful-pleading doctrine, "plaintiffs may not avoid removal jurisdiction by artfully casting their essentially federal law claims as state-law claims." Mikulski, 501 F.3d at 560 ; see also Brunner, 629 F.3d at 530 (noting that this exception applies if the complaint "artfully pleads state-law claims that amount to federal-law claims in disguise").

The party seeking removal has the burden of demonstrating that the claims arise under federal law, either through the well-pleaded complaint rule or one of its exceptions, and all doubts should be resolved against removal. See Eastman v. Marine Mech. Corp., 438 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). And if "a plaintiff believes that removal is improper because the complaint does not arise under federal law, the plaintiff may challenge removal, including by moving to remand the matter to state court." Gentek, 491 F.3d at 325.

III. ANALYSIS

As explained above, "[a] complaint arises under federal law if it: (1) states a federal cause of action; (2) includes state-law claims that necessarily depend on a substantial and disputed federal issue; (3) raises state-law claims that are completely preempted by federal law; or (4) artfully pleads state-law claims that amount to federal-law claims in disguise." Brunner, 629 F.3d at 530. The "first and most common road to federal court" under the well-pleaded complaint rule is not at issue here, however, because the Complaint does not state a federal cause of action on its face. See Dillon, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 755 ; see also Dupervil v. All. Health Operations, LLC, No. 20-CV-4042 (PKC) (PK), ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, ––––, 2021 WL 355137, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2021), appeal docketed, No. 21-505 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2021). Instead, the Complaint merely alleges Tennessee law claims of gross negligence and recklessness. (Doc. No. 1-1 ¶¶ 22–47).

In any event, Gallatin argues that this case should stay in federal court because: (1) the Complaint's allegations necessarily depend on a substantial and disputed federal issue of whether the immunities afforded under the PREP Act apply here; (2) the PREP Act completely preempts Bolton's claims; (3) Bolton's counsel has engaged in "artful pleading"; and (4) the Court should exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. (See Doc. No. 23; Doc. No. 29 at 6–8). The Court will address each of these arguments below after first summarizing the relevant provisions of the PREP Act.

A. The PREP Act

In conjunction with the Public Health Service Act, the PREP Act empowers the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") ("the Secretary") "to deem an event a ‘public health emergency’ and then take action to utilize funds established by the Treasury to manage the emergency." Sherod v. Comprehensive Healthcare Mgmt. Servs., LLC, No. 20cv1198, 2020 WL 6140474, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2020) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) ); see also 42 U.S.C. § 247d(b)(1). If the Secretary determines that a public health emergency exists, "the Secretary may make a declaration ... recommending ... the manufacture, testing, development, distribution, administration, or use of one or more covered countermeasures"⁴ to combat the emergency. 42 U.S.C. § 247 -6d(b)(1).

In March 2020, the Secretary used this power and deemed "the spread of SARS-CoV-2 or a virus mutating therefrom and the resulting disease, COVID-19," a "public health emergency" under the PREP Act. 85 Fed. Reg. 15198 (Mar. 17, 2020). The Secretary's Declaration, which has been amended and expanded seven times to date, also recommended certain covered countermeasures to combat COVID-19. See id.

Where, as here, the Secretary recommends covered countermeasures, the PREP Act grants immunity from suit and liability to any "covered person" for any "claims for loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the use by an individual of [those authorized] covered countermeasures." 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1). Generally, the exclusive remedy for those injured "is an administrative ‘Covered Countermeasure Process Fund’ (‘Process Fund’), administered by the Secretary, that provides ‘timely, uniform, and adequate compensation to eligible individuals for covered injuries directly caused by the administration or use of a covered countermeasure.’ " Dupervil, ––– F. Supp. 3d at ––––, 2021 WL 355137, at *6 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6e(a), 247d-6e(b)(1) ). The Secretary's administration of the Process Fund is not subject to judicial review. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-(b)(5)(C).

The "sole exception" to the PREP Act's immunity provision is if a "death or serious physical injury [is] proximately caused by willful...