Bonnet Shores Beach Club Condominium Association, Inc. v. Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council, C.A. No.: PC00-3255.
| Decision Date | 28 October 2003 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No.: PC01-4615.,C.A. No.: PC00-3255. |
| Parties | BONNET SHORES BEACH CLUB CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. RHODE ISLAND COASTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT COUNCIL; SEASIDE REALTY TRUST; LESLEY-ANN ARCHIBALD, Trustee of Seaside Realty Trust; ROSEMARIE ARICO, Trustee of Seaside Realty Trust; and HEATH MANAGEMENT CO., INC, Defendants. BONNET SHORES BEACH CLUB CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. RHODE ISLAND COASTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT COUNCIL; SEASIDE REALTY TRUST; LESLEY-ANN ARCHIBALD, Trustee of Seaside Realty Trust; ROSEMARIE ARICO, Trustee of Seaside Realty Trust; and HEATH MANAGEMENT CO., INC, Defendants. |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
Consolidated before this Court are appeals from two decisions of the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC). Bonnet Shores Beach Club Condominium Association, Inc. (Bonnet Shores)1 appeals (1) the decision of the CRMC Executive Director to grant a permit extension and (2) the CRMC's decision declining to find the permit extension invalid. Both appeals are pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15.
Seaside Realty Trust (Seaside) owned the development rights under the Bonnet Shores Beach Club Declaration of Condominium. On March 3, 1989, Seaside obtained an Assent from the CRMC, permitting it to construct additional cabana units at the Bonnet Shores condominium complex.2 Among other stipulations and conditions, the Assent stated "all work must be completed within three years...." Construction was not completed within this period, however. On April 28, 1994, the Executive Director of CRMC granted Seaside a one-year permit extension.3 On April 6, 1995, the Executive Director granted Seaside another one-year permit extension. The parties agree that Seaside applied for a third extension on April 4, 1996, but CRMC records do not show whether or not it granted the request. The Executive Director issued Seaside another extension on May 9, 1997.
Shortly after the May 1997 extension, Heath Management Company (Heath) acquired all of Seaside's development rights by a Mortgagee's Deed. The CRMC continued to grant permit extensions to "Seaside Realty Trust," however. On April 20, 1999; March 18, 1999; and May 25, 2000, the CRMC issued Seaside three more permit extensions, respectively, for the periods of May 9, 1998 to May 9, 1999; May 9, 1999 to May 9, 2000; and May 9, 2000 to May 9, 2001. Overall, the Executive Director of CRMC granted a total of six permit extensions for construction at the Bonnet Shores complex, excluding the questionable 1996 extension.
Upon the Executive Director's granting of the May 25, 2000 extension, Bonnet Shores filed a complaint on June 21, 2001, seeking judicial review of the permit extension. The following day, Bonnet Shores filed a petition with the CRMC for a declaratory ruling on the validity of the May 2000 permit extension. The CRMC heard the matter on September 26, 2000; November 28, 2000; January 23, 2001; and March 13, 2001. On August 6, 2001, the CRMC issued a decision that declined making a declaratory ruling.4 Consequently, on September 4, 2001, Bonnet Shores filed a second complaint, timely appealing the CRMC's decision. Bonnet Shores's first and second complaint are consolidated before this Court.
Bonnet Shores's first complaint, C.A. No. P.C.00-3255, requests judicial review of a final administrative agency decision pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15. It requests this Court to reverse and vacate the decision of CRMC's Executive Director that granted the permit extension. Bonnet Shore's second complaint, C.A. No. P.C.01-4615, appeals the CRMC's decision declining to declare the permit extension invalid. Bonnet Shores asks the Court to reverse the decision and grant the declaratory ruling. In support of its complaints, Bonnet Shores argues that the May 2000 permit extension is invalid because
1. The CRMC continued to issue the extensions to "Seaside Realty Trust" after Heath acquired the development rights;
2. There is no evidence that the CRMC conducted a site inspection, a prerequisite to issuing an extension, prior to issuing the May 2000 extension;
3. The Assent expired in 1996 because there is no evidence any extension was granted that year 4. Assuming the 1996 extension was validly issued, it would have expired on April 28, 1997, thus voiding the extension granted on May 9, 1997, and all subsequently issued extensions;
5. Assuming it was validly issued, the 1999 extension expired on May 9, 2000 and could not be extended "retroactively" on May 25, 2000;
6. The first extension, which was issued in 1994, was invalid because the Assent had expired in 1992 and was not extended prior to its expiration.
Section 42-35-15(g) of the General Laws governs this Court's review of a contested administrative agency decision. This section of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) provides that:
"[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error or law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
When reviewing determinations of an administrative agency, this Court sits as an appellate court with a limited scope of review. Therefore, the Superior Court justice does not weigh evidence and the credibility of witnesses as to questions of fact. Center for Behavioral Health v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680, 684 (R.I. 1998); Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Berry, 620 A.2d 1255, 1259 (R.I. 1993). The Court merely reviews the record in order to determine whether there is legally competent evidence to support the agency decision. Turner v. Department of Employment Security, Board of Review, 479 A.2d 740, 742 (R.I.1984). This requisite level of evidence is "such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion ... [which is] an amount more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance." Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co., R.I., 424 A.2d 646, 647 (1981). Moreover, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Bunch v. Board of Review, R.I. Dept. of Employment and Training, 690 A.2d 335, 337 (R.I. 1997). This principle holds true even where the court "might be inclined to view the evidence differently and draw inferences different from those of the agency." Rhode Island Public Telecommunications Authority v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, 650 A.2d 479, 485 (R.I.1994).
When the decision of an agency is based upon a question of law, however, the Court reviews those findings de novo. Johnston Ambulatory Surgical Associates, Ltd. v. Nolan, 755 A.2d 799, 805 (R.I.2000). That is, questions of law are not binding and may be reviewed to determine what the law is and its applicability to the facts. Narragansett Wire Co. v. Norberg, 376 A.2d 1, 6 (R.I. 1977). The Rhode Island Supreme Court, however, voices one caveat to this general rule: a court should give deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute "that it has been charged with administering and enforcing, provided that the agency's construction is neither clearly erroneous nor unauthorized." Arnold v. R.I. Dept. of Labor and Training Bd. of Review, 822 A.2d 164, 169 (R.I. 2003); see also Pawtucket Power Associates Limited Partnership v. City of Pawtucket, 622 A.2d 452, 456-57 (R.I.1993) (). Additionally, proper deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations requires a court "to presume the validity and reasonableness of that construction until and unless the party challenging its interpretation prove[ ] otherwise." State v. Cluley, 808 A.2d 1098, 1104 (R.I. 2002). Deference to an agency interpretation should not rise to the level of blind allegiance, however. Citizens Savings Bank v. Bell, 605 F. Supp. 1033, 1042 (D.R.I. 1985).
A threshold issue, which neither party argues but which this Court raises sua sponte, is this Court's jurisdiction to entertain Bonnet Shores's complaints. An axiomatic rule of civil procedure is that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any time in a proceeding. Bradford Associates v. R.I. Division of Purchases, 772 A.2d 485, 488 (R.I. 2001). Section 42-35-15(a) of the APA provides:
(Emphasis added.)
A "contested case" is defined as a "proceeding, including but not restricted to ratemaking, price fixing, and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a specific party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing." G.L. 1956 § 42-35-1(c) (emphasis added); ...
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