Borders v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 06 June 1962
• Citation: 22 Cal.Rptr. 243,204 Cal.App.2d 401
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: R. W. BORDERS, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Clinton H. ANDERSON, Chief of Police of Beverly Hills; Civil Service Commission of the City of Beverly Hills, et al., Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 25821.

Page 243

22 Cal.Rptr. 243

204 Cal.App.2d 401

R. W. BORDERS, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Clinton H. ANDERSON, Chief of Police of Beverly Hills; Civil Service Commission of the City of Beverly Hills, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Civ. 25821.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

June 6, 1962.

Robert H. Baida, City Atty., Beverly Hills, and Martin E. Whelan, J., Whittier, for appellants.

Paul Caruso and Isabelle Trotti, Beverly Hills, for respondent.

FOURT, Justice.

This is an appeal from the judgment whereby the court '* * * ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Petitioner herein, R. W. Borders, is entitled to the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate requiring the Respondent Civil Service Commission of the City of Beverly Hills to set aside its Findings and Order dated March 24, 1960, and requiring said Commission to reconsider Petitioner's case in the light of the Court's opinion and judgment as expressed in its Memorandum 1960, and in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 1960, and in its Findings o Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment herein and requiring Respondent Clinton H. Anderson, Chief of Police of Beverly Hills, to comply with Respondent Commission's new order.'

A fair resume of the facts is as follows:

R. W. Borders (hereinafter referred to as respondent) started as a member of the Beverly Hills Police Department in 1942 as a partrolman. In 1946 he was appointed as sergeant. In 1952 he was appointed a lieutenant, and in 1958 he was appointed a captain. Subsequently he was appointed captain of detectives. He performed his work in an excellent manner and was called by the Chief of Police of Beverly Hills, appellant Clinton H. Anderson (hereinafter referred to as Anderson), the best detective he ever had.

On February 15, 1960, respondent was summarily dismissed by Anderson. At that time respondent was given a letter setting forth the reasons for his dismissal. ¹

Subsequently the letter of dismissal and a so-called case history ² were filed with the Beverly Hills Civil Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as Commission).

The trial court found that both the copy of the letter of discharge and the case history constituted the statement of reasons so required to be filed, and each was a part of the charges before the Commission; that both counsel and the Commission so treated the matter and there is no appeal herein by Borders with respect to this matter.

After a hearing which lasted three days the Commission rendered its findings and order. ³

Respondent Borders sought a writ of mandate in the superior court. A peremptory writ was issued pursuant to judgment entered against both the Commission and Anderson.

The essence of the trial court's determination is as follows:

First, that the respondent Commission's Finding II (i. e. disobedience of respondent Anderson's order relating to associating with Marudas) was partially sustained by the evidence.

The trial court's memorandum of decision, which is referred to in the judgment, incorporated by reference in the trial court's findings of fact and incorporated by reference in the trial court's conclusions of law, provides in pertinent part that:

'From the evidence this finding must be sustained in part, but cannot be sustained in part.

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'* * * the record does support an order from Chief Anderson to petitioner not to contact Marudas and to stay away from him. This was about January 1, 1960 * * *.

'Thereafter, there is evidence * * * that petitioner did contact Marudas and that he did contact the F.B.I. in connection with some police matter involving Marudas.

'This Court, therefore, must accept the finding of the Commission as to some of these contacts made after January 1, 1960. * * * I am of the opinion that when the Chief gave orders not to contact Marudas and to stay away from him, that the Chief was clearly acting within the scope of his authority and that petitioner was bound thereby regardless of any reasoning on his part.

'* * * this finding in that respect and to that extent must be sustained.'

Second, that the respondent Commission's finding III (i. e. failure to come forward and testify at Marudas' trial while having knowledge tending to show the innocence of said person); finding IV (i. e. Borders' intercession on behalf of Marudas with the district attorney, probation department, and the trial judge in an improper and unethical manner without prior consent or knowledge of appellant Chief Anderson); and finding V (i. e. Borders' false statement to Judge Walker after the conviction of Marudas that Chief Deputy District Attorney Manley J. Bowler had told Borders not to testify at the trial of Marudas), were:

1. Not contained as charges within the statement of reasons (i. e. letter of discharge and case history) and therefore not within the scope of the hearing; and

2. Not supported by substantial evidence.

Third, that Borders was not accorded a fair hearing because:

1. The Commission made findings on charges not contained in the statement of reasons;

2. One of the commissioners seemed biased; and

3. The punishment imposed was too severe.

The Commission is a local administrative tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions. What is stated in Takata v. City of Los Angeles, 184 Cal.App.2d 154, 159, 7 Cal.Rptr. 516, 519 is pertinent to the scope of review by the trial court:

'[1.] In reviewing the findings and orders of a local, quasi-judicial administrative body, the trial court is confined to the evidence received by the respondent Board; and in reviewing that evidence may not reweigh it, but may only consider whether there is any substantial competent and material evidence in the administrative record to sustain the findings and order attacked. Thompson v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal.2d 235, 259 P.2d 649; Damiani v. Albert, 48 Cal.2d 15, 306 P.2d 780; Jenner v. City Council of City of Covina, 164 Cal.App.2d 490, 331 P.2d 176; Sultan Turkish Bath, Inc., v. Board of Police Commissioners, 169 Cal.App.2d 188, 337 P.2d 203; Rudolph v. [State] Athletic Commission, 177 Cal.App.2d 1, 1 Cal.Rptr. 898.

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' The term 'substantial evidence in light of the whole record' is equivalent to the 'substantial evidence rule.' Martin v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 52 Cal.2d 238, 246, 340 P.2d 1, 6; Marini v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 177 Cal.App.2d 785, 2 Cal.Rptr. 714.' (See Greenblatt v. Martin, 189 Cal.App.2d 787, 789 .)

It is appropriately stated by Mr. Justice White in Schneider v. Civil Service Comm., 137 Cal.App.2d 277, 284, 290 P.2d 306, 310 that:

' The Civil Service Commission of Los Angeles County is a local administrative tribunal exercising quasi judicial powers and its actions may be reviewed by mandamus. However, on such a review the chief issues are whether the person affected has been accorded a fair hearing, and if so, whether there is any substantial evidence to support the determination of the administrative board. In the review proceedings the court must confine itself to the showing made before the administrative tribunal with regard to the sufficiency of the evidence. The power to make the determination of whether or not there is a basis for the discharge in the instant case is vested in respondent commission. In the absence of a claim that the commission proceeded without or in excess of jurisdiction, or that the trial was not full or fair, or that there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion in some other respects, the courts are confined to the question of determining whether the decision of the commission is supported by the findings and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the light of the entire record. [Citations.]'

The function of the appellate court with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence is to ascertain whether the findings of the Commission and trial court are supported by substantial evidence. (See Greenblatt v. Martin, 189 Cal.App.2d 787, 789, 790, 11 Cal.Rptr. 669; Barr v. City of San Diego, 182 Cal.App.2d 776, 780, 6 Cal.Rptr. 510; Fromberg v. Dept. of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 169 Cal.App.2d 230, 232, 337 P.2d 123.) Where the trial court determines that the Commission's findings are not supported by substantial evidence, the appellate court examines the record to ascertain whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's order and decision. (See Greenblatt v. Martin, supra.)

Appellants' first contention is that each of the Commission's findings was sustained by substantial evidence and that the matters embraced thereby were properly before the Commission.

The appellants have extensively digested the evidence in an attempt to demonstrate that each of the Commission's findings (i. e. findings II through VI) is supported by substantial evidence. However, the Commission's findings of fact VIII, that 'any of the foregoing findings (II through VI), in and of itself, would cause the Commission to make its Order as hereinafter set forth' obviates the necessity of determining whether all the findings are supported by substantial evidence. (See Black v. State Personnel Board, 136 Cal.App.2d 904, 912, 289 P.2d 863; Fuller v. Board of Medical Examiners, 14 Cal.App.2d 734, 736, 59 P.2d 171.) In the Black case it is stated at page 912 of 136 Cal.App.2d, at page 867 of 289 P.2d in pertinent part as follows:

'The trial judge, observing that the Board had specifically found in paragraph X * * * that each of the causes for punitive action set forth in paragraphs IV, V and VI, 'separately and severally, so found to be true is sufficient to support the punitive action taken,' concluded that it was unecessary to determine whether substantial evidence existed in support of finding IV. There was no error in this, for having found that paragraphs V and VI of the findings are supported by substantial evidence, paragraph IV could be of consequence only with respect to the penalty...