Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Authority

• Decision Date: 07 August 1992
• Docket Number: No. 18540,18540
• Citation: 835 P.2d 1282,122 Idaho 471
• Parties: Donald BOTT, John Anton Berg, and James E. Hoar, individually and as joint venturers, Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-respondents, v. IDAHO STATE BUILDING AUTHORITY, an Independent Public Body Corporate, Defendant-Respondent/Cross-appellant. Boise, February 1992 Term
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 1282

835 P.2d 1282

122 Idaho 471

Donald BOTT, John Anton Berg, and James E. Hoar, individually and as joint venturers, Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-respondents, v. IDAHO STATE BUILDING AUTHORITY, an Independent Public Body Corporate, Defendant-Respondent/Cross-appellant.

No. 18540.

Supreme Court of Idaho,

Boise, February 1992 Term.

Aug. 7, 1992.

Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, Boise, for plaintiffs-appellants. Raymond D. Powers, argued.

Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, Boise, for defendant-respondent. Albert P. Barker, argued.

BISTLINE, Justice.

This breach of contract case arises out of the dismissal of architects Bott, Berg, and Hoar ("BBH") by the Idaho State Building Authority ("the Authority") from a project to expand and modernize the Idaho State School for the Deaf and Blind located in Gooding, Idaho ("the Project").

In January of 1985, BBH and the Authority entered into a contract ("the Agreement") providing that BBH would provide architectural and certain other services for the project. The Agreement provided that the Authority would pay BBH 7.75% of the total construction cost plus an incentive fee equal to 10% of the amount by which the total construction cost was less than $8.2 million. Any "additional services" rendered by BBH were to be compensated at an hourly rate. According to the Agreement, BBH's services were divided into the following phases: schematic design, design development, final documents and bidding, and construction. BBH was terminated before they were able to complete the construction phase.

After their termination, BBH brought suit seeking compensation for work they had completed in providing the project design. The parties' theories at trial as articulated by the district court, were as follows:

The plaintiffs contended that they performed the architectural services that they were hired to perform but that repeated delays were caused when the [ ] Authority changed its mind and continually adjusted, in major ways, their designs. The defendant contended that the architects caused numerous delays and were difficult to work with and caused problems for themselves because they did not follow the 'chain of command.'

Decision on Post-Trial Motions at 2.

At trial, the jury found unanimously that BBH had substantially performed under the contract until their termination, and The Authority filed several post-judgment motions. First, the Authority moved for judgment n.o.v. under I.R.C.P. 50(b), arguing that insufficient evidence supported BBH's damages award. Second, the Authority moved for a new trial under three distinct theories, under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5), (6), and (7). Relying upon I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5), the Authority argued that the damages awarded to BBH were excessive and resulted from passion or prejudice; as an alternative to a new trial, the Authority requested a remittitur. Also under Rule 59(a)(5), the Authority argued that the set-off damages awarded to it were inadequate and resulted from passion or prejudice; as an alternative to a new trial, the Authority requested an additur. Under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6), the Authority argued the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict. Relying upon Rule 59(a)(7), the Authority also argued that the verdict was based upon prejudicial errors of law which occurred at trial.

[122 Idaho 474] that the Authority had breached the contract. The jury awarded BBH damages of $201,542 less an offset of $2250 for a total verdict of $199,292. That jury award included amounts for schematic design work, the incentive bonus fee, and landscaping and interior design services.

The district court ruled that the Authority was not entitled to judgment n.o.v. The court granted a new trial confined to the issue of BBH's damages, stating that it was not able to make a damage determination based on the record before it, for which reason it could not order a remittitur.

BBH requested costs, attorney fees and prejudgment interest. The Authority filed a motion in opposition to the request. The district court postponed ruling on that motion to await the outcome of the new trial which it had ordered. BBH appealed and the Authority cross-appealed. The main issues raised on appeal are:

I. Whether the district court erred in refusing to grant judgment n.o.v. in favor of the Authority.

II. Whether the district court erred in granting a motion for a new trial on the issue of damages, and not allowing a new trial on the issue of liability.

III. Whether either party is entitled to attorney fees at trial or on appeal.

IV. Whether an award of prejudgment interest is appropriate.

I. THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT N.O.V.

In response to the Authority's request for judgment n.o.v. the district court ruled that "[t]he defendant is not entitled to a judgment n.o.v. on the issue of breach of contract. There is substantial evidence that would support the jury's determination that the plaintiffs substantially performed the contract, were wrongfully terminated and were damaged as a result of the termination." Decision on Post-Trial Motions at 4.

In determining on appeal whether a judgment n.o.v. should or should not have been granted, this Court applies the same standard as does the trial court, and grants no deference to that court's views. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986). This Court must review the record, drawing all inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to BBH, to determine whether substantial evidence supports the jury verdict. However, in the present situation we cannot properly review the trial court's decision because the court misconstrued the Authority's judgment n.o.v. motion, in particular, that portion of the Authority's motion which asserts that "[t]here is not sufficient evidence to support a substantial portion of Plaintiffs' claims for damages, and the Defendant should be granted a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict with respect to these damages under Rule 50(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." R. at 201 (emphasis added).

The Authority's main contention in its motion and on appeal is that, as a matter of law, based upon the evidence presented at trial, BBH is not entitled to damages for any alleged "additional services" performed by them, or for the incentive bonus.

[122 Idaho 475] The trial court only discussed BBH's proof at trial on these issues in the context of the Authority's new trial motion. Because the trial court did not discuss whether substantial evidence supported the jury's award of damages to BBH, and only addressed the jury's finding of liability, it did not adequately address the Authority's motion for a judgment n.o.v. Therefore, we must remand for the trial court's reconsideration of the Authority's motion, in accordance with this opinion.

II. THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

In response to the Authority's motion for a new trial based upon Rules 59(a)(5), (6) and (7), the court granted a new trial on the issue of damages only. A trial court may properly grant a motion for a new trial even though there is substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict and a judgment n.o.v. would be inappropriate. Quick, 111 Idaho at 767, 727 P.2d at 1195; see also Sheets v. Agro-West, Inc., 104 Idaho 880, 884, 664 P.2d 787, 791 (Ct.App.1983). The two motions serve distinct purposes and different standards govern their allowance. Quick.

In determining whether to order a new trial, the trial court has broad discretion to redress what it perceives to be a miscarriage of justice. Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 733 P.2d 1234 (1986). The trial court is better positioned than an appellate court to evaluate the demeanor, credibility, and testimony of the witnesses in weighing the evidence before it. Quick, 111 Idaho at 770, 727 P.2d at 1198.

Appellate review must be more limited; we review the evidence but do not "weigh" it in the same manner as the trial court does. Id. (citing Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575 (1979)). This Court will not reverse a trial court's order granting a motion for a new trial unless the court has manifestly abused its broad discretion. Quick; Jones v. Panhandle Distribs., Inc., 117 Idaho 750, 792 P.2d 315 (1990). In Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 803 P.2d 993 (1991), we set out the test for evaluating whether a trial court has abused its discretion:

(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. (Citation omitted).

Id. at 94, 803 P.2d at 1000.

A. Grounds for Grant of a New Trial

In making its ruling, the trial court stated,

There is no reasonable basis in the evidence for the jury's determination that the plaintiffs were entitled to the full fee for the duplicative schematic design work nor for the other additional services. Additional services, under the unambiguous language of the contract, were to be reimbursed on an hourly rate. Because of the errors in the jury's determination of damages, I find that the defendant is entitled to a new trial on the issue of damages. The errors in the damage computations are so substantial that the Court can only conclude that the jury was acting under the influence of prejudice. Moreover, there is no basis at all for an incentive bonus under the express terms of the contract. The language of the contract is clear that the bonus is based on the total cost of construction. The plaintiffs' attempts to skirt the language and avoid its limits are unavailing.

Decision on Post-Trial Motions at 8.

That discussion by the trial court gives no indication that the court considered separately each basis for the Authority's request for a new trial, thereby "act[ing] within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently...