Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 26565.,26565.
• Citation: 138 Idaho 315,63 P.3d 441
• Parties: GRIFF, INC., an Idaho corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, and State of Idaho, Department of Agriculture, Plaintiff, v. CURRY BEAN CO., INC., an Idaho corporation, Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

63 P.3d 441

138 Idaho 315

GRIFF, INC., an Idaho corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, and State of Idaho, Department of Agriculture, Plaintiff, v. CURRY BEAN CO., INC., an Idaho corporation, Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent.

No. 26565.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Twin Falls, November 2002 Term.

January 24, 2003.

Hollifield & Bevan, P.A., Twin Falls, for appellant. G. Richard Bevan argued.

Jones, Gledhill, Hess, Andrews, Fuhrman, Bradbury & Eiden, P.A., Boise, for respondent. Rory R. Jones argued.

KIDWELL, Justice.

Griff, Inc. (Griff) filed suit against Curry Bean Company, Inc. (Curry) for breach of contract. A jury awarded Griff compensatory and punitive damages totaling $538,621.20. The district court awarded attorney fees to Griff, including fees expended attempting to collect on the judgment. Curry timely filed this appeal.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Griff grew pinto beans and pink beans near Twin Falls. Curry operated a bonded agricultural warehouse pursuant to Bonded Warehouse Law, Title 69, Chapter 2, Idaho Code. Griff had an ongoing relationship with Curry whereby Griff deposited its beans with Curry. Then, Curry would mill and market the beans. Upon sale of the beans to a third party, Curry would pay Griff the price received for the beans minus a three-dollar milling and marketing charge per cut weight (cwt.).¹

In 1996, Griff delivered 39,271.09 cwt. of beans to Curry.² Curry eventually sold all of the beans to third parties. A dispute arose regarding whether the beans were sold in 1996 or 1997 and whether they were marketed by Curry to third parties or purchased by Curry to cover a "short position."³ The dispute created uncertainty about the price that Curry owed Griff for the beans—beans were significantly less expensive in 1997 than in 1996. Griff contended that the beans were sold upon delivery to Curry, rather than a third party, in 1996, so that Curry could cover its short position. Pursuant to Griff's contention, the price of the beans was established upon delivery in 1996. Curry, on the other hand, argued that it sold Griff's beans on the same terms that it had always sold them—the price for the beans was not established until Curry sold the beans to a third party. Curry contended that this occurred in 1997.

Griff filed suit against Curry, alleging breach of contract. Subsequently, the district court allowed Griff to amend its complaint to include a prayer for punitive damages.

Griff moved for summary judgment. The court entered an order granting in part and denying in part Griff's motion for summary judgment. The court found that in 1996 the parties entered into a contract for the storage and eventual sale of 39,271.09 cwt. of beans for which Griff had not been paid. Issues of material fact remained, however, regarding setoffs and sale price. Curry filed a motion for reconsideration. Upon reconsideration, the court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether the contracts for sale arose in 1996 or 1997. Curry does not appeal summary judgment or the court's order upon reconsideration. The issues that remained for trial were: (1) the timing of the contracts for sale; (2) the sale price of the beans; and (3) setoffs or discounts for color, cookability, storage, and seed charges. At trial, the jury found that Curry purchased Griff's beans in three lots, one in May 1996 at $28.00 per cwt., and two in June 1997 at $27.50 per cwt. Curry appeals the jury's findings regarding timing and price of the contracts, but does not appeal the issue of setoffs or discounts.

Curry moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. In an order dated April 20, 2000, the district court denied both motions.

After the district court entered judgment, Griff filed a claim with the state's Commodity Indemnity Account Program (CIAP). The CIAP indemnified Griff in an amount equal to 90% of the jury's compensatory damage award and, to that extent, Griff subrogated the CIAP to its claim against Curry. Griff then returned to the district court and, pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(5), sought costs and fees accrued as a result of its efforts to "collect on the judgment" through the CIAP. The district court ordered Curry to pay $14,047.00 for attorney fees and costs incurred recovering from the CIAP.

Curry appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo a district court's decision to deny a motion for directed verdict or motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 311, 17 P.3d 247, 255 (2000) (citing Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 764, 727 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1986)). Either motion is properly denied if the verdict is supported by substantial competent evidence. Id. (citing Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 495, 943 P.2d 912, 921 (1997)). This Court may not reweigh the evidence or consider the witnesses' credibility, rather, this Court must accept the truth of all evidence against the moving party and draw all legitimate inferences therefrom in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 312, 17 P.3d at 256.

When considering an appeal from a district court's ruling on a motion for new trial, this Court applies the abuse of discretion standard. Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'l. Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 780, 25 P.3d 88, 93 (2001) (citing Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 122 Idaho 471, 835 P.2d 1282 (1992)). "To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court considers whether it correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 56, 44 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2002).

This Court exercises free review over questions of law and may draw its own conclusions from the evidence in the record. Kohring v. Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 98, 44 P.3d 1149, 1153 (2002) (citing Regjovich v. First W. Inv., Inc., 134 Idaho 154, 997 P.2d 615 (2000); Mut. of Enumclaw v. Box, 127 Idaho 851, 852, 908 P.2d 153, 154 (1995)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The District Court Properly Denied Curry's Motions For Directed Verdict And For Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict Because The Jury's Findings Of Fact Are Supported By Substantial, Competent Evidence.

1. Substantial, competent evidence supports the jury's finding regarding timing of contracts between Griff and Curry.

In the district court's summary judgment order, from which Curry does not appeal, the district court found that Griff and Curry entered into contracts for the sale of beans; however, genuine issues remained regarding the timing of the contracts and, thus, the damages.

Richard Griff (Richard) testified at trial that in spring 1996, Greg Hull (Hull) offered to purchase all the beans that Griff could deliver. During this time, Griff delivered several lots of beans totaling 39,271.09 cwt. Richard and Ron Griff (Ron) testified that Curry purchased 7,500 cwt. of beans in May 1996. Notations in Curry's Daily Position Register (DPR) reflect that Curry owned the beans in May and June 1996. In light of the evidence at trial regarding Curry's severe short position, a reasonable person could infer that Curry purchased Griff's beans in May and June 1996. Therefore, substantial, competent evidence supports the jury's verdict regarding the timing of the contracts between Griff and Curry. See Polk, 135 Idaho at 312,

17 P.3d at 256; Opportunity, L.L.C., 136 Idaho 602, 605, 38 P.3d 1258, 1261 (2002).

2. Substantial, competent evidence supports the jury's finding regarding price and the jury's findings regarding price are reasonably certain.

Issues of the BEAN MARKET NEWS (BMN) 1997 SUMMARY, Exhibit No. 36, show Idaho dealer prices of $32.00 to $35.00 per cwt. during May and June 1996. Jim Perkins, who owned another local warehouse, testified that the BMN was a good "indicator" of market price for beans, though the actual price was dependent on finding a ready buyer. Perkins estimated that dealers and warehousemen were receiving $31.75 to $32.50 per cwt., depending on whether the beans sold were packed in fifty or one-hundred pound bags.

Ron and Eugene Griff both testified that the price they got for their beans was $3.00 less than the price Curry received for the beans when it sold them. Both also testified that the $3.00 difference was attributable to a milling and marketing charge collected by Curry.

Curry's bean settlement sheets, Exhibit No. 35, showed that Curry paid other growers between $26.00 and $29.00 per cwt. in May and June 1996. Hull testified that because Griff was a large producer, it often received a premium price for its beans. Hull stated, "[I] would say on the average a dollar or two more than everybody else on a lot of occasions." The BMN showed the average price Idaho growers received for beans as $26.75 in May 1996; in June, the average rose to $27.00. The prices found by the jury—$28.00 for the May 1996 sale and $27.50 for the June 1996 sale—are well within the range of prices that growers could expect to receive at these times.

Accepting all evidence adverse to Curry as true and drawing all inferences in favor of Griff, we find that substantial, competent evidence supports the jury's finding of prices of $28.00 per cwt. for the May 1996 sale and $27.50 per cwt. for the June 1996 sale. See Polk, 135 Idaho at 312,

17 P.3d at 256; Opportunity, L.L.C. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 605, 38 P.3d 1258, 1261 (2002).

Notably, in the course of arguing that the prices found by the jury are not supported by substantial, competent evidence, Curry argues that the prices on which the compensatory damage award is based are not reasonably certain. Evidence need not provide mathematical certainty of price, it is sufficient if it takes the jury's finding regarding price out of the realm of speculation. See Lamb v. Robinson, 101 Idaho 703, 705, 620 P.2d 276, 278 (1980)

. The...