Bowen v. State
| Decision Date | 07 September 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 32419,32419 |
| Citation | 239 Ga. 517,238 S.E.2d 62 |
| Parties | Arnold F. BOWEN v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Joe Salem, Atlanta, for appellant.
V. D. Stockton, Dist. Atty., Michael H. Crawford, Clayton, for appellee.
This case involves two procedural questions certified to this court from the Court of Appeals. The first question inquires as to the effect on criminal cases of the repeal of Code Ann. §§ 110-702 and 703 by the Civil Practice Act, Code Ann. § 81A-201, while the second question concerns the term in which a judgment may be amended or rescinded by the trial court in its discretion.
1. There are three subparts to question one: (1) Are Code Ann. §§ 110-702 and 703 repealed for all purposes, both civil and criminal? (2) Are all statutes specifically repealed by the Civil Practice Act, Section 135 (Code Ann. § 81A-201) repealed for all purposes, both civil and criminal? (3) Is existing case law interpreting or citing repealed Code sections, where applicable, to be considered valid or controlling authority?
The first question, outlined above, is based on Pritchard v. State, 224 Ga. 776, 780, 164 S.E.2d 808, 810-11 (1968). There we held that "(s)ince the statute authorizing directed verdicts (Code Ann. § 110-104) in existence at the time of the Sutton case (Sutton v. State, 223 Ga. 313, 154 S.E.2d 578 (1967)) was decided has been repealed, and there is presently no statutory authority for the direction of a verdict in a criminal case, the ruling in the Sutton case . . . is no longer controlling authority." (Emphasis supplied.) After Pritchard, however, the legislature amended Title 27 on Criminal Procedure in order to provide for motions for directed verdict in criminal cases. Ga.L.1971, pp. 460, 461 (Code Ann. § 27-1802). In Merino v. State, 230 Ga. 604, 198 S.E.2d 311 (1973), we pointed out this fact. Therefore, the ruling in Pritchard that there is no statutory authority for a directed verdict in a criminal case is no longer viable.
Code Ann. §§ 110-702 and 703 have also been repealed by Code Ann. § 81A-201. These sections provided for, and distinguished, the motion in arrest of judgment. Although that statute has been specifically repealed, Title 27 still provides for a motion in arrest of judgment in criminal cases: Cobb 833; Code Ann. § 27-1601. Marshall v. State, 229 Ga. 841, 195 S.E.2d 12 (1972).
It is clear then that the provisions of Title 110 which have been repealed specifically by Code Ann. § 81A-201 have been rendered void and are generally no longer effective. 1 Cases construing these sections of the Code, however, are of precedential value in construing the same or similar provisions found elsewhere in the Code, e.g. : Frost v. Frost, 235 Ga. 672, 221 S.E.2d 567 (1975).
The answer to each of the three subparts of question one is, therefore, yes, with only the limitation expressed in Footnote 1.
2. The second question is "Can a trial court, on request by one of the parties in a criminal case, review and amend or rescind its order or judgment granting a new trial in a case in which the order was signed in one term, but not entered by the clerk until the following term?"
The Court of Appeals inquiry is predicated on our language in, for example, Ammons v. Bolick, 233 Ga. 324, 325, 210 S.E.2d 796, 797 (1974): (Emphasis supplied.) Accord, Martin v. General Motors Corp., 226 Ga. 860, 178 S.E.2d 183 (1970); Maxwell v. Cofer, 201 Ga. 222, 39 S.E.2d 314 (1942). The Court of Appeals query is focused on the emphasized word, "rendered." Does the term in which the judgment is rendered or the term in which it was entered control?
We think that Ammons v. Bolick, supra, and the other cases cited, contemplated not only the rendering, but also the entry of that judgment. The rule is clear under the Civil Practice Act, Code Ann. § 81A-158(b), and under the Appellate Practice Act, Code Ann. § 6-903, that a judgment is effective only upon entry, and that filing a judgment signed by the judge with the clerk constitutes entry. Although there is no...
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Bowen v. State
...repealed statutes be "considered valid or controlling authority?" We certified these questions to the Supreme Court in Bowen v. State, 239 Ga. 517, 518, 238 S.E.2d 62, and they answered all questions in the affirmative, i. e. the cited statutes were repealed for all purposes both civil and ......
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Hipp v. State
...when, as in this case, the proceedings to vacate the order were begun during the term in which it was entered. See Bowen v. State, 239 Ga. 517(2), 238 S.E.2d 62 (1977); Pledger, 193 Ga.App. at 589, 388 S.E.2d 425. Relying on this inherent power, our appellate courts have concluded that tria......
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Awadelkariem v. State
...a timely fashion. See People v. Weller, 679 P.2d 1077 (Colo.1984); Britain v. State, 533 So.2d 684 (Ala.Crim.App.1988); Bowen v. State, 239 Ga. 517, 238 S.E.2d 62 (1977); Hefton, previously cited (Ind.) (vacating of order must occur within same term); Luft, previously cited (Kan.) (if order......
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Pledger v. State
...entered in one term and vacated in another. In a criminal case the inherent power still ceases with the term's end. Bowen v. State, 239 Ga. 517, 518(2), 238 S.E.2d 62 (1977), held that a trial court could rescind its order granting a new trial where proceedings to vacate such order were beg......