Ammons v. Bolick
| Decision Date | 18 November 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 29325,29325 |
| Citation | 233 Ga. 324,210 S.E.2d 796 |
| Parties | Harold A. AMMONS v. Earl A. BOLICK et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Smith, Cohen, Ringel, Kohler, Martin & Lowe, Robert L. Kiser, Atlanta, for appellant.
Wendell K. Willard, L. C. Chrietzberg, Decatur, for appellees.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
Harold A. Ammons, defendant below, appeals from the August 14, 1974, order of the DeKalb Superior Court which (1) vacated a prior order dismissing plaintiff Earl A. Bolick's action against Ammons for improper venue, (2) reinstated Bolick's action, and (3) overruled Ammons' motion to dismiss for improper venue.
The record shows that Bolick's complaint sought relief against Ammons, two other individual defendants, and DeKalb County for an injunction and damages for improper handling of surface waters to the injury of Bolick's real property. The other two individual defendants were dismissed. Thereafter Ammons' motion to dismiss on the ground that he was not a resident of DeKalb County was heard and granted on July 28 in the absence of Bolick's attorney who was then in court elsewhere on another matter. On July 30, the trial court issued an ex parte order temporarily vacating the July 29 order and set a hearing for August 8. On August 14 the trial court found that DeKalb County was a party against whom substantial equitable relief was sought and that venue was therefore properly laid in DeKalb County. The court then issued an order overruling Ammons' motion to dismiss for improper venue from which Ammons appeals with a certificate of immediate review.
Basically, Ammons raises two contentions: (1) that the order granting his motion to dismiss could not be set aside other than under the procedures of the Civil Practice Act, or, alternatively that once it had been granted the case was no longer before the court; and (2) no substantial equitable relief was sought against DeKalb County which would justify joining Ammons, a non-resident, in the suit.
1. The rule as to the power of the trial court to change its judgment during the term in which it is rendered is an inherent power unchanged by the CPA. Holloman v. Holloman, 228 Ga. 246, 184 S.E.2d 653; City of Cornelia v. Gunter, 227 Ga. 464, 181 S.E.2d 489; Martin v. General Motors Corp., 226 Ga. 860, 178 S.E.2d 183. While this authority does not exist after the term of rendition, if the proceedings are begun during the term, they may be continued...
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Gray v. State
...See, e.g., Doby v. Evans , 258 Ga. 777, 777-78, 373 S.E.2d 757 (1988) (quoting Porterfield in criminal appeal); Ammons v. Bolick , 233 Ga. 324, 325 (1), 210 S.E.2d 796 (1974) (In civil cases, "if the proceedings are begun during the term, they may be continued over and the judgment set asid......
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Bowen v. State
...court to change its judgment during the term in which it is rendered is an inherent power unchanged by the CPA." Ammons v. Bolick, 233 Ga. 324, 325, 210 S.E.2d 796, 797. Thus, even if the prior statutes did not survive the CPA, the inherent power of the court to change its judgment in the s......
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Winslett v. Guthrie
...the judgment aside under its broader, inherent power rather than the more limited grounds of OCGA § 9–11–60. See Ammons v. Bolick, 233 Ga. 324, 325(1), 210 S.E.2d 796 (1974); Miranda, 312 Ga.App. at 291, 718 S.E.2d 123; Lee v. Restaurant Mgmt. Svcs., 232 Ga.App. 902, 903(1), 503 S.E.2d 59 (......
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Ga. Gov't Transparency v. State Mut. Ins. Co.
...during the term of court in which it is rendered. Maxwell v. Cofer, 201 Ga. 222, 226, 39 S.E.2d 314 (1946); Ammons v. Bolick, 233 Ga. 324, 325, 210 S.E.2d 796 (1974). As to change to a final judgment at subsequent terms of court, the general rule is that “a court cannot set aside or alter i......