Bower v. D'Onfro

• Decision Date: 24 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. AC,AC
• Citation: 45 Conn.App. 543,696 A.2d 1285
• Parties: Amy BOWER et. al., v. David D'ONFRO et. al. 15682.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

Page 1285

696 A.2d 1285

45 Conn.App. 543

Amy BOWER et. al., v. David D'ONFRO et. al.

No. AC 15682.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 27, 1997.

Decided June 24, 1997.

Roger J. Frechette, with whom were Matthew E. Frechette, New Haven, and Melinda P. Frechette, for appellants-appellees (defendant Bradley Ausmus et al.).

Susan M. Cormier, with whom were Wesley W. Horton, Hartford, and, on the brief, Anthony Nuzzo, Jr., Cheshire, for appellees-appellants (plaintiffs).

Before HEIMAN, FRANCIS X. HENNESSY and SPALLONE, JJ.

SPALLONE, Judge.

The defendants appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting postjudgment interest to the plaintiffs from the date of the verdict to the date judgment was rendered by the trial court following remand by this court. The defendants claim that the trial court (1) failed to comply with the rescript of Bower v. D'Onfro, 38 Conn.App. 685, 663 A.2d 1061, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 911, 665 A.2d 606 (1995) (Bower I ), (2) improperly acted on motions that were untimely made, (3) improperly acted pursuant to a motion for clarification, (4) improperly rejected the defendants' claims of finality of judgment, res judicata, issue preclusion, collateral estoppel and failure to appeal, and (5) incorrectly concluded that it had the authority to exercise "equity jurisdiction" in ruling suo motu against the defendants. ¹ The plaintiffs filed a cross appeal, claiming that the trial court improperly denied their motion for clarification.

We conclude that the trial court complied with our mandate in Bower I and acted within its discretion in deciding to grant postjudgment interest, but that the award of interest from the date of the verdict was improper because interest should have been awarded from the date that the trial court originally rendered judgment on the verdict.

The following facts are pertinent to the appeal and cross appeal. On March 26, 1992, a jury returned a verdict of $1,000,000 against all the defendants. ² Ten months later, on January 28, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs against the defendants in the amount of $478,326.95. The trial court, acting under the plaintiffs' offer of judgment, also awarded interest from September 22, 1987. See General Statutes § 52-192a. The defendants appealed to this court. In our decision of August 8, 1995, we ruled against the defendants on most of their claims, but reversed the award of prejudgment interest and concluded that the award of economic damages should be reduced from $100,000 to $65,019.40, the amount proven.

On October 17, 1995, the plaintiffs filed a motion in this court seeking to clarify our rescript by asking us to determine the proper commencement date for postjudgment interest. This court, without comment, denied the motion on November 8, 1995.

On November 20, 1995, the plaintiffs filed a motion in the trial court for a modified judgment. The trial court did not act on that motion. On November 27, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment, in accordance with our rescript, in the amount of $460,836.85 without prejudgment interest. ³

The plaintiffs, on January 11, 1996, ⁴ filed with the trial court a "motion for clarification" requesting that the trial court "clarify its judgment to state whether [the plaintiffs] are entitled to interest ... at 10% per annum: (1) from the date of the verdict (March 26, 1992) to the date of the judgment ... in the amount of $169,310.19 ... or (2) from the date of the original judgment (January 28, 1993) to the date of the modified judgment (November 27, 1995) in the amount of $130,423.14...." The defendants objected to that motion.

The trial court, on January 31, 1996, denied the plaintiffs' "motion for clarification" and overruled the defendants' objection. The court, however, invoking its powers of "equitable jurisdiction," then acted suo motu and reversed itself by ruling that the plaintiffs were entitled to "statutory interest" on the judgment from the date of the verdict, March 26, 1992. This appeal and cross appeal followed.

We first discuss the plaintiffs' cross appeal. ⁵ On January 11, 1996, seven weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment in accordance with our remand, the plaintiffs filed their "motion for clarification." The plaintiffs sought a ruling on their entitlement to postjudgment interest. Even though the plaintiffs' motion was captioned "motion for clarification," "we look to the substance of the claim rather than the form"; Whalen v. Ives, 37 Conn.App. 7, 15, 654 A.2d 798, cert. denied, 233 Conn. 905, 657 A.2d 645 (1995); and determine that it was a motion for postjudgment interest ⁶ under General Statutes § 37-3b. ⁷ Here, the substance of the plaintiffs' motion was a request for a determination of when postjudgment interest began to accrue.

The trial court in the present case first denied the motion and, later, in the same memorandum, concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled postjudgment interest from March 26, 1992. Although the court originally denied the motion, it effectively overruled itself by granting the relief the plaintiffs sought. The trial court described its action as being suo motu. In reality, it reversed its own decision. Such action is within the discretion of the trial court. "[A]lthough a judge should not lightly depart from a prior ruling on a motion before the same or a different judge, the prior ruling is not binding." Barnes v. Schlein, 192 Conn. 732, 734, 473 A.2d 1221 (1984). "[A] trial court possesses the inherent power to modify its own judgments during the term at which they were rendered. Steve Viglione Sheet Metal Co. v. Sakonchick, 190 Conn. 707, 710, 462 A.2d 1037 (1983); Tyler v. Aspinwall, 73 Conn. 493, 497, 47 A. 755 (1901). During the continuance of a term of court the judge holding it has, in a sense, absolute control over judgments rendered; that is, he can declare and subsequently modify or annul them. Sturdevant v. Stanton, 47 Conn. 579, 580 (1880)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blake v. Blake, 211 Conn. 485, 494, 560 A.2d 396 (1989); see State v. Wilson, 199 Conn. 417, 436, 513 A.2d 620 (1986). Though this common law power is now restricted by statute, ⁸ courts continue to have inherent authority to modify judgments. See Connecticut National Bank v. Oxenhandler, 30 Conn.App. 541, 546, 621 A.2d 300, cert. denied, 225 Conn. 924, 625 A.2d 822 (1993); Batory v. Bajor, 22 Conn.App. 4, 8, 575 A.2d 1042, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 812, 576 A.2d 541 (1990).

The defendants claim that, because the plaintiffs filed the motion approximately seven weeks after judgment had been rendered following our remand, the motion was untimely and the trial court was precluded from granting the motion. General Statutes § 37-3b does not provide for any time limits by which a party must seek interest. Nor does any other statute or rule of Practice set a time limit. Statutory and case law clearly recognize that motions for postjudgment interest may be made after judgment has been rendered. See generally General Statutes § 52-192a; Balf Co. v. Spera Construction Co., 222 Conn. 211, 214-15, 608 A.2d 682 (1992); IBM Credit Corp. v. Mark Facey & Co., 44 Conn.App. 490, 493-94, 690 A.2d 410 (1997) (regarding postjudgment motions for determination of interest under General Statutes § 37-3a); Edward Denike Tree Co. v. Butler, 21 Conn.App. 366, 369, 573 A.2d 349 (1990). Common sense also dictates that a party seeking an award of postjudgment interest must file a posttrial motion because the award can be determined only after judgment has been rendered. Cf. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Winters, 26 Conn.App. 322, 326, 600 A.2d 1048 (1991) (regarding interest under General Statutes § 52-192a), aff'd, 225 Conn. 146, 622 A.2d 536 (1993). We also note that this court, in Stafford Higgins Industries, Inc. v. Norwalk, 15 Conn.App. 752, 759, 546 A.2d 340 1988), ruled that interest on a judgment should not be denied solely because judgment was rendered five years earlier. ⁹ Therefore, the motion to grant interest, filed seven weeks after the judgment was rendered following our remand, was not untimely. ¹⁰

A decision to deny or grant postjudgment interest is "primarily an equitable determination and a matter lying within the discretion of the trial court." O'Hara v. State, 218 Conn. 628, 643, 590 A.2d 948 (1991); Maluszewski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 34 Conn.App. 27, 38, 640 A.2d 129, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 921, 642 A.2d 1214 (1994). General Statutes § 37-3b provides in relevant part that "interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in any action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, computed from the date of judgment." "In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we must make every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maluszewski v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, at 39, 640 A.2d 129. "The court's determination regarding the award of interest should be made in view of the demands of justice rather than through the application of any arbitrary rule.... Whether interest may be awarded depends on whether the money involved is payable ... and whether the detention of the money is or is not wrongful under the circumstances...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Here, the trial court, weighing equitable considerations, determined that postjudgment interest was due. We see no reasonable ground upon which to find an abuse of discretion in that determination.

"[U]pon determining that interest was appropriate, [however] the court had no discretion to start its accrual from any time other than the date of judgment." Misiurka v. Maple Hill Farms, Inc., 15 Conn.App. 381, 386, 544 A.2d 673, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 813, 550 A.2d 1083 (1988). The jury rendered a verdict on March 26, 1992. The trial court...