Bowie v. The State
| Decision Date | 29 March 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. S10A0050.,S10A0050. |
| Parties | BOWIEv.The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Patricia F. Angeli, Jonesboro, for appellant.
Tracy G. Lawson, District Attorney, Billy J. Dixon, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Benjamin H. Pierman, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
A jury found Philanders Lamont Bowie guilty of felony murder and cruelty to children in the first degree in connection with the beating death of his girlfriend's seventeen-month-old daughter, Makayla Valley. Following the denial of his motion for new trial, as amended, Bowie appeals his convictions, claiming that bad character evidence was improperly admitted and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.1
The evidence construed in favor of the verdicts showed the following. On July 6, 2005, Candace Jakes left Makayla in the care of Bowie, while she went to work. Nothing appeared to be wrong with Makayla at the time Jakes left for work; in fact, Jakes bathed and changed the child before she left and the baby acted normally and had no bruises on her body. Twice during her evening work shift, after 6:00 p.m. and after 8:00 p.m., Jakes telephoned her residence to check on Makayla; during the later call, Bowie told Jakes that “ he was still playing a game” and that Makayla was “laying down” and was asleep. At approximately 10:00 p.m., Bowie telephoned 911 and reported that the baby “was throwing up and her stomach got bloated and she stopped breathing”; Bowie also told the 911 operator that “nobody is with me.” Emergency responders found Makayla dead on the scene and badly bruised. The baby's belly was very “extended” and bruised, and the bruising was fresh. Bowie's responses to the responders' questions were “vague” and his demeanor was “cold.” Later, Bowie admitted to police that he shook Makayla, that he picked her up in her “bouncy chair” and was “tossing her back and forth,” and that he had “forcibly push[ed] her.” He also acknowledged that he was “overly aggressive” in handling the child. The police investigation revealed a dent in the wall near the bed where Makayla was kept in her bouncy chair. Inside the dent was red paint, the same color as the red railings on the bouncy chair. Also, the stabilizer bar on the chair had a crusty white substance on it, consistent with the plaster on the dented wall. The autopsy on Makayla revealed that the baby had suffered internal bleeding, a torn liver, and significant impact to her skull; she died from the cumulative injuries. The medical examiner testified that Makayla's head might have been slammed on a table, chair, floor, or wall, and that she had received a severe beating, including blows from a fist.
1. The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Bowie guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. Bowie contends that the trial court erred in admitting “bad character evidence” when it allowed the State to cross-examine an investigating detective about Jakes's statement in an interview that during an altercation with Bowie her thirteen-year-old brother had gotten a black eye. But, the contention is unavailing. The detective's interview with Jakes was videotaped, and the defense itself admitted into evidence a DVD of the interview, in which the statement at issue was made, and had it played for the jury. Thus, the defense clearly opened the door for cross-examination regarding the interview, including the statement about Bowie's prior violence in regard to Jakes's young brother. Grant v. State, 302 Ga.App. 661, 691 S.E.2d 581 (2010), citing Pye v. State, 269 Ga. 779, 788(17), 505 S.E.2d 4 (1998); Parker v. State, 256 Ga. 543, 549(7), 350 S.E.2d 570 (1986). Even arguendo, if permitting the questioning was error, it would have to be deemed harmless, as the elicited testimony was merely cumulative of what was put before the jury by the defendant's own hand. Flanders v. State, 279 Ga. 35, 39(7), 609 S.E.2d 346 (2005).
3. Bowie also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel withdrew the requested jury charge on voluntary manslaughter and because counsel introduced into evidence the DVD containing the account of the altercation with Jakes's brother. But, in order for Bowie to prevail on these claims of ineffectiveness, he must demonstrate a deficiency in trial counsel's performance and that the shown deficiency worked to his prejudice so that there is the reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of his trial would have been different; furthermore, there is the strong presumption that counsel's actions fall within the range of professional conduct, which is broad. Jarvis v. State, 285 Ga. 787, 788(2), 683 S.E.2d 606 (2009); Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 428, 434(6), 677 S.E.2d 82 (2009). Bowie does not meet his burden.
(a) As to the withdrawal of the request to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense, at the hearing on the motion for new trial, as amended, lead defense counsel testified that he withdrew such request because if the defense claimed voluntary manslaughter, Bowie would have been forced to admit the act of killing the...
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