Williams v. State

• Citation: 742 S.E.2d 445,292 Ga. 844
• Decision Date: 29 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. S13A0292.,S13A0292.
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. The STATE.
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

292 Ga. 844

742 S.E.2d 445

WILLIAMS

v.The STATE.

No. S13A0292.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April 29, 2013.

Steven Lee Sparger, Savannah, for appellant.

Larry Chisolm, Dist. Atty., Arvo Howard Henifin, Asst. Dist. Atty., Paula Khristian Smith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Jason Charles Fisher, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

BLACKWELL, Justice.

Taron Maurice Williams was tried by a Chatham County jury and convicted of the murder of Aljene Flannings and other crimes related to the unlawful possession of a firearm. Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Williams appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it limited his cross-examination of a prosecution witness about another case in which the witness had been charged with armed robbery but had been allowed to plead guilty to a lesser included offense. Williams also claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Having reviewed the briefs and record, we find no error, and we affirm.¹

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that on the afternoon of November 27, 2009, Flannings repeatedly contacted Williams about a debt that Williams owed to Flannings, and Flannings asked Marcus Black to drive Flannings to a public housing project. When they arrived, Flannings exited the vehicle, spotted Williams, and walked up to meet him. After a short conversation, Williams handed Flannings some money and then shot him, once in the neck and twice in the head. Flannings died as a result of his wounds. Williams fled, and Black drove away and called 911. Within minutes, Williams called Elton Cheru and told Cheru that he and Flannings had gotten into an altercation. And in another phone call later that evening, Williams told Cheru that he shot Flannings because Flannings “came towards him with aggression.” The police interviewed Black and searched his person and his vehicle but found nothing that incriminated him. When police interviewed Williams, he admitted that he had talked with, and given money to, Flannings just before Flannings was shot, but Williams said that the shooter was an unknown third party. Although Williams does not dispute that the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions, we have independently reviewed the record, and we conclude that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319(III)(B), 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See also Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 892, 894(1), 734 S.E.2d 23 (2012); Milinavicius v. State, 290 Ga. 374, 376(1), 721 S.E.2d 843 (2012).

[292 Ga. 846]2. We next consider whether the trial court erred when it limited the cross-examination of Cheru as to a case in which Cheru originally had been charged with armed robbery and had faced a mandatory sentence of life without parole, but in which Cheru ultimately was allowed to plead guilty to aggravated assault instead. The trial court admitted the conviction for aggravated assault but would not allow Williams to cross-examine Cheru about the sentence he might have received for armed robbery. “[D]efense counsel is entitled to a reasonable cross-examination on the relevant issue of whether a witness entertained any belief of personal benefit from testifying favorably for the prosecution.” Manley v. State, 287 Ga. 338, 340(2), 698 S.E.2d 301 (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted). Accordingly, a defendant must be permitted to cross-examine a witness for the State about a charge that was pending either at the time the witness gave a statement or at the time of trial. See id. at 346(5), 698 S.E.2d 301. See also Hibbs v. State, 299 Ga.App. 723, 724–727(2), 683 S.E.2d 329 (2009); George v. State, 276 Ga. 564, 565(4), 580 S.E.2d 238 (2003). But no charges were pending against Cheru either at the time of his interview or at the time of trial that might have led Cheru to offer evidence against Williams to curry favor with the State.² See Bosnak v. State, 263 Ga.App. 313, 315(2), 587 S.E.2d 814 (2003).

Moreover, even if no charges were pending against a witness when he was interviewed or testified, a defendant must be allowed to cross-examine a witness about punishment that the witness may have avoided as a result of a deal with the State for his testimony in the prosecution of the defendant. See State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637, 639–640(1), 571 S.E.2d 752 (2002) (“the trial court abused its discretion when it did not permit defense counsel to question a witness who is testifying for the State in exchange for a reduction in prison time about the witness's belief concerning the amount of prison time he is avoiding by testifying against the defendant”) (citations omitted). Here, however, Cheru said that no one made any promises to him for testifying against Williams. And Williams presented no evidence of any deal or potential deal between Cheru and the State for his statement or testimony.³ See Wright v. State, 266 Ga. 887, 889(2), 471 S.E.2d 883 (1996); Sapp v. State, 263 Ga.App. 122, 123–124, 587 S.E.2d 267 (2003).

The trial court did not cut off all inquiry into the potential bias of Cheru, but rather allowed the cross-examination to proceed unfettered with the exception of an inquiry into the penalty that Cheru might have received for armed robbery. See Bosnak, 263 Ga.App. at 315(2), 587 S.E.2d 814. “The right of cross-examination integral to the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is not an absolute right that mandates unlimited questioning by the defense.” Id. We see no abuse of discretion in the limitation of the cross-examination of Cheru. Hodo v. State, 272 Ga. 272, 275(4), 528 S.E.2d 250. See also Bosnak, 263 Ga.App. at 315(2), 587 S.E.2d 814.

3. Last, we consider the contention that Williams was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, Williams must prove both that the performance of his lawyers was deficient and that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687(III), 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To show that the performance of his lawyers was deficient, Williams must prove that they performed their duties at trial in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances, and in the light of prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687–688(III)(A), 104 S.Ct. 2052. See also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381(II)(C), 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). And to show that he was prejudiced by the performance of his lawyers, Williams must prove “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694(III)(B), 104 S.Ct. 2052. See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391(III), 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). This burden, though not impossible to carry, is a heavy one. See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 382(II)(C), 106 S.Ct. 2574. We conclude that Williams has failed to carry his burden.

(a) Williams claims that his lawyers were ineffective because they failed to object to hearsay testimony about the contents of certain cell phone records and a 911 call log. According to Williams, his lawyers should have challenged this testimony because it corroborated testimony given by Black and Cheru, contradicted a statement that Williams had given, and was consistent with the prosecution theory of the case. But at the hearing on the motion for new trial, one of the lawyers explained that the phone records were not altogether bad for Williams. Those records, the lawyer said, tied Cheru to the murder scene and to Flannings and supported the defense theory that Cheru knew where Flannings was going. Moreover, the lawyer explained, the very short length of the calls was inconsistent with the prosecution theory of a verbal altercation between Flannings and Williams, and the records tended to show that Cheru or Black had the motive and opportunity to shoot Flannings and pin the murder on Williams. As for the 911 call log, the lawyers decided not to object to the testimony about it because they desired to impress upon the jury that they were not hiding evidence, especially the evidence that Black called 911 within a very few minutes of the shooting and did not wait half an hour as one of the lawyers inadvertently misrepresented in her opening statement.

As to deficient performance, the first element of ineffective assistance, the United States Supreme Court has explained that we “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689(III)(A), 104 S.Ct. 2052 (citation and punctuation omitted). Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the decision of Williams's trial lawyers not to object to the testimony about the phone records—based on the lawyers' analysis of the consistency of those records with the respective theories of the State and the defense—was a trial strategy that a reasonable lawyer might have pursued. See Sims v. State, 278 Ga. 587, 590(3)(a), 604 S.E.2d 799 (2004). “The reasonableness of counsel's conduct is examined from counsel's perspective at the time of trial and under the circumstances of the case. The fact that present counsel would pursue a different strategy does not render trial counsel's strategy unreasonable.” Id. (citations and punctuation omitted). Likewise, the decision to forego an objection to the testimony about the 911 call log so as to rebuild credibility with the jury and avoid any appearance of hiding evidence falls within...