Bowler v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 392, Shoshone County, Mullan

• Decision Date: 25 September 1980
• Docket Number: Nos. 13176,13440,s. 13176
• Citation: 101 Idaho 537,617 P.2d 841
• Parties: Kenneth BOWLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 392, SHOSHONE COUNTY, MULLAN, Idaho, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 841

617 P.2d 841

101 Idaho 537

Kenneth BOWLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 392, SHOSHONE COUNTY, MULLAN, Idaho, Defendant-Respondent.

Nos. 13176, 13440.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Sept. 25, 1980.

Byron J. Johnson, Boise, for plaintiff-appellant.

Barbara J. Miller of Cumer L. Green Law Offices, Boise, for defendant-respondent.

BAKES, Justice.

This controversy concerns the discharge of a grade school teacher, plaintiff appellant Kenneth Bowler. Bowler's complaint alleges that the defendant respondent Board of Trustees violated his constitutional right to due process by discharging him without the benefit of certain procedural safeguards. The district court held otherwise and entered summary judgment on behalf of the board. Bowler appeals, and we reverse.

Bowler was a fifth grade teacher in the Mullan, Idaho, school district with a renewable teaching contract, as specified in I.C. § 33-1212. In April, 1976, Bowler properly notified the school district of his intention to accept the annual contract renewal. Under I.C. § 33-1212 this notice automatically renewed his teaching contract for the 1976-77 school year. See Robinson v. Joint School Dist. No. 150, 100 Idaho 263, 596 P.2d 436 (1979). However, in May, 1976, the district superintendent received complaints about appellant's teaching from several parents. Some of these complaints were expressed in letters written to the superintendent. At the June 7, 1976, school board meeting the board heard oral complaints from the parents about appellant's teaching performance. A discussion followed. Appellant was not present. Appellant was not advised of the nature of the complaints presented at the meeting and was not at that time given leave to respond to them. On June 14, 1976, the district superintendent sent appellant a "notice of suspension" informing him that he was officially suspended from his position as of June 15, 1976, for several alleged breaches of duty specified in the notice. Appellant was notified that the superintendent's suspension would be presented to the school board for its approval or rejection at a special meeting to be held on June 21, 1976. Appellant was further informed that if the suspension was approved he would be entitled to a hearing before the board on the matter. On June 21, 1976, the board met to consider appellant's suspension. Appellant and his counsel were present. The board then issued a "notice of confirmation" in which the board ratified the superintendent's suspension. The notice specifically delineated fifteen reasons in support of the board's action.

At appellant's request an open meeting on the matter of his suspension was scheduled for July 19, 1976. Appellant appeared at this hearing accompanied by counsel and requested a continuance of the matter to enable his attorneys to prepare his defense. The hearing was continued until a time to be mutually acceptable to both parties. In addition to obtaining the continuance, appellant's attorney and counsel for the school board entered into a stipulation. Counsel for Bowler and the board agreed to exchange documents and witness lists in advance of the hearing, even though no discovery is provided for either by state statute or local board rule. The stipulation also included the following waiver:

"MR. GREEN:...

"Mr. Hannon and Mr. Frazier, on behalf of Mr. Bowler, waive any due process objections that relate to the notice, the timeliness of the notices, the notice of suspension, hearing dates, and of rights to counsel at this time.

"Mr. Hannon and Mr. Frazier further agree that if they have any additional due process objections, if they will give notice to the Board and to myself (board counsel) at least one week before the hearing such objections will not cause another delay in the hearing and can be heard at that time.

"I think that the due process would include form and substance of notice and timeliness."

Attempts to establish a date acceptable to Bowler and his counsel proved fruitless. Thus, on September 7, 1976, the board unilaterally established September 16, 1976, as the hearing date. Sometime prior to September 16, 1976, the school district hired a new teacher to replace Bowler for the 1976-77 school year.

The hearing on Bowler's discharge was held by the board on September 16 and 17 1976. Appellant made no due process objections prior to commencement of the hearing. However, he made strenuous objections at the hearing concerning the school district's failure to adhere to its own regulations governing the suspension or discharge of school district employees.

At the hearing, several parents testified about appellant's teaching methods and abilities. Testimony was also taken from the district superintendent, teaching aides who worked with appellant, and appellant himself. On September 20, 1976, the board sent appellant a "notification of discharge" terminating his employment with the district as of the date of notice. The notification of discharge specified no reasons for the board's action, but noted only that "a majority of the Board of Trustees voted to discharge you from your employment with the district." Appellant did not object to the notice of discharge, nor did he request a statement of reasons for the board's action.

On October 21, 1977, over a year later, appellant filed a complaint in district court seeking reinstatement, back pay, interest and attorney fees. The complaint alleged that the board discharged the appellant in violation of its own published regulations and the state and federal constitutions.

The defendant school board moved for summary judgment in July, 1978, and supported the motion with affidavits by board members. Appellant submitted opposing affidavits. Following a hearing the district court granted the board's summary judgment motion. The summary judgment was entered on November 7, 1978. Appellant filed his first appeal, No. 13176, from that summary judgment.

On June 14,1979, after briefs were filed in appeal No. 13176, the district court entered judgment against appellant for costs. The cost bill included a $1,015.65 charge for respondent's cost of "reporting and transcribing" certain board meetings. Appellant also brought an appeal, No. 13440, from that judgment. Prior to oral argument, the two appeals were consolidated for hearing and decision.

At the outset, it is important to recognize what this case does not involve. It does not involve an appellate review of the type found in I.C. § 67-5215 (relating to appeals from administrative agencies). We are aware of no statute providing for judicial appellate review from decisions of the board of trustees of a school district, and none has been called to our attention by counsel for the parties. This case does not involve a claim for breach of contract, as did the case of Robinson v. Joint School Dist. No. 150, 100 Idaho 263, 596 P.2d 436 (1979). Appellant's claim is simply and solely that he was denied procedural due process of law.

Appellant's allegations of procedural error are derived from three different sources. The first is a set of "policies" adopted by the board prior to the 1975-76 school year. Appellant alleges that the board violated its own policies: by failing to require parents' complaints to be signed and in writing (Policy Nos. 204.7 & 1002.5); by failing to grant appellant an opportunity to respond to the complaints as they were presented to the board (Policy No. 1002.5); by dismissing appellant without an opportunity to participate in an "improvement program" prior to his ultimate discharge (Policy No. 602.12); by failing to give him an opportunity to correct the proposed reasons for dismissal (Policy No. 603.3); and by discharging appellant without a statement of reasons (Policy No. 603.3).

Appellant's second source of procedural protection is the Idaho Code. Appellant maintains that the board violated I.C. § 33-1212 by discharging him without benefit of a probationary period. Appellant also alleges that the statutory scheme for renewable teacher contracts, I.C. § 33-1212 et seq., precluded the board from considering evidence of events preceding April 1, 1976, the last date for the board to notify a teacher with renewable contract rights of its intention not to renew his contract. See I.C. § 33-1213.

The third source of procedural safeguards is the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, which requires that the state observe certain procedures in terminating an individual's liberty or property interest. E. g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Ferguson v. Board of Trustees of Bonner County School Dist. No. 82, 98 Idaho 359, 564 P.2d 971 (1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 939, 98 S.Ct. 431, 54 L.Ed.2d 299 (1977); Buckalew v. City of Grangeville, 97 Idaho 168, 540 P.2d 1347 (1975). Appellant maintains that the board ran afoul of constitutional due process by failing to give appellant a statement of reasons for his discharge. Appellant also asserts that the board was not an impartial decisionmaker. Appellant further contends that the procedural safeguards embodied in the board's "policies" became part of his property interest and thus are of constitutional dimension. In essence, appellant argues that the board's policies are incorporated into the concept of constitutional due process. See Oppenheimer Mendez v. Acevedo, 512 F.2d 1373 (1st Cir. 1975).

Both parties agree that appellant's interest in continued employment as a teacher was a property interest entitled to procedural due process protection. Ferguson v. Board of Trustees of Bonner County School Dist. No. 82, supra. The primary issue in this case concerns the nature of the process due. For purposes of analysis, we will separate the alleged procedural defects described above into two groups, those arising prior to the September 16 hearing on...