Bowles v. Clipp
| Decision Date | 22 February 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-94-01832-CV,05-94-01832-CV |
| Citation | 920 S.W.2d 752 |
| Parties | Jim BOWLES, Sheriff of Dallas County, Texas, and Dallas County, Appellants, v. James Ronald CLIPP, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Thomas F. Keever, Assistant District Attorney, Dallas, for Appellants.
Arch McColl, III, S. Michael McColloch, McColl & McColloch, Dallas, Luther H. Soules, Robinson C. Ramsey, Soules & Wallace, San Antonio, W. James Kronzer, Houston, for Appellees.
Before MORRIS, WHITTINGTON and JAMES, JJ.
In this case we address the legal consequences of Dallas County collecting bail bond approval fees for a number of years before the Texas Supreme Court declared such fees to be unauthorized. We address the extent of liability of Dallas County as well as the liability of the Dallas County Sheriff, Jim Bowles, who collected the fees for Dallas County. We also address whether a statutory penalty may be imposed on Sheriff Bowles for being the officer who collected the fees. Incidental to these determinations, we address the statute of limitations to be applied in this case.
As appellants, Sheriff Jim Bowles and Dallas County appeal a district court judgment signed in favor of a certified class of persons who had paid bail bond approval fees. Appellees James Ronald Clipp, Stephen Scott Baker, Ruben DeLeon, and Thomas DeLeon, who each had paid fees, represent the certified class. We refer to appellees collectively as the "Class."
In nine points of error asserted in a single brief, Sheriff Bowles and Dallas County contend the trial court erred in: (1) finding the County liable for a refund of bail bond approval fees; (2) finding Bowles liable for a refund of bail bond approval fees; (3) assessing a penalty as damages against Bowles under article 3909 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes; (4) awarding prejudgment and postjudgment interest on the additional damages; (5) finding that the collection of bail bond approval fees violated the Texas Constitution; (6) failing to apply a two-year statute of limitations; (7) applying retroactively the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Camacho v. Samaniego, 831 S.W.2d 804 (Tex.1992); (8) finding the Class's claims were not barred by laches; and (9) finding Bowles and the County should not recover on their setoff claims.
We conclude the County and Bowles are liable for a refund of the bail bond approval fees. But we also conclude Bowles is not liable for the penalty the trial court imposed on him. Moreover, we conclude the trial court erred in applying a four-year statute of limitations because, in this case, a two-year limitation period must be applied. Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court's judgment in part and reverse it in part.
The facts are undisputed because the parties submitted to the trial court a written stipulation of facts to be binding at trial. The stipulated facts are extensive and detailed. We summarize the parties' stipulations to the extent necessary to discuss the points of error asserted.
From December 1, 1981 to June 17, 1992, every person who wanted a bail bond in Dallas County for either a felony or misdemeanor charge was required to pay to the Dallas County Sheriff a fee for each bail bond filed. The amount of the fee increased during this time period, but always related to services performed by the Sheriff with respect to the reviewing, approving and processing of bail bonds. The bail bond approval fees collected by Sheriff Bowles were never used for his personal gain or benefit but were deposited into the general fund of Dallas County. The parties stipulated specifically that the "business of executing bail bonds is a business effecting [sic] the public interest."
The Dallas County Commissioners Court, through various orders issued from time to time, authorized the Sheriff to collect the fees. The first order was effective December 1, 1981. At that time, former Texas Revised Civil Statutes article 3926a () provided that "the commissioners court of each county may set reasonable fees to be charged for services by the offices of sheriffs and constables." The Commissioners Court relied on this language to set the fees. The amount of the fee initially set by the Commissioners Court was based on an analysis prepared by the Dallas County Auditor of the projected costs of the Sheriff's services in taking and approving bail bonds. Before the Commissioners Court changed the fee amount, the auditor prepared a new analysis to determine the level of fees required to recoup the costs to the County of providing the Sheriff's services. The Commissioners Court increased the fee only when the auditor concluded a higher fee was necessary to recoup increased costs. The County and Bowles stopped collecting the fees when the Texas Supreme Court held in Camacho v. Samaniego that Texas counties were not authorized to collect preconviction bail bond approval fees under article 3926a or section 118.131 because those statutes authorized the collection of fees only in civil matters.
The Class brought suit on August 27, 1992 to recover damages based on the collection of the fees. The parties stipulated that from August 27, 1988 to the date suit was filed, Bowles collected and the County received $5,415,510 in bail bond approval fees. Of that amount, $3,695,820 was collected from August 27, 1990 to August 27, 1992. The parties did not stipulate to the amount of fees collected for any specific period other than as described.
Following a trial before the court without a jury, the trial court held the collection of fees by the County and Bowles violated Article XI, Section 1 and Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution. The trial court further found that Bowles received unlawful fees in violation of Texas Revised Civil Statutes article 3909. The trial court awarded actual damages jointly and severally against Bowles and the County in the amount of $5,415,510. The trial court also awarded statutory damages under article 3909 against Bowles in the additional amount of $16,246,530. Prejudgment and postjudgment interest were awarded on both amounts.
In addressing the issues presented in this appeal, we first discuss the liabilities associated with collecting bail bond approval fees. This discussion includes an analysis of whether the collection of such fees violated the Texas Constitution. We also address the liability of the County and Bowles for the actions giving rise to any constitutional violations.
Following our analysis of the liabilities in this case, we address the extent of damages arising from the collection of bail bond approval fees. The amount of actual damages is dependent upon the correct application of both Camacho v. Samaniego and the statute of limitations. We further analyze the propriety of awarding statutory damages under article 3909 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes as well as prejudgment and postjudgment interest on the statutory damages.
Finally, we address the County's and Bowles's arguments relating to their affirmative defenses. Because the order of the points of error presented by the County and Bowles does not correspond with the structure of our analysis, we address the points of error out of order.
In its suit, the Class generally alleged the County and Bowles were not authorized to "charge a fee to persons making bail." Although the Class's pleadings are very general and, in fact, do not allege any specific constitutional violation, 1 the trial court held the County's and Bowles's actions violated Article XI, Section 1 and Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution. 2 In their fifth point of error, the County and Bowles claim the trial court erred in holding that the collection of bail bond approval fees violated these constitutional provisions.
We are unable to discern from the record or the parties' briefs any argument about Article XI, Section 1. In their brief, the County and Bowles cryptically say that Article XI, Section 1 imposes no duty on the County and provides no cause of action for the Class. The only other reference to this particular constitutional provision by the County and Bowles is their asserted conclusion that it "clearly does not apply to this action." These claims are unsupported by any argument or citation to any authority. We are not responsible for making argument for the parties. Because the County and Bowles have not briefed the issue, they have failed to present anything for review with respect to their complaint that the trial court erred in holding they violated Article XI, Section 1. TEX.R.APP.P. 74(f); Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Striland Constr. Co., 753 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1988, writ denied).
We are able, however, to review the trial court's holding that the County and Bowles violated Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution. Article I, Section 17 states in pertinent part, "[n]o person's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person...." To recover for a "taking" under this provision, a plaintiff must show that (1) the State [or legal subdivision] intentionally performed certain acts (2) which resulted in a "taking" of the plaintiff's property (3) for public use. Dalon v. City of DeSoto, 852 S.W.2d 530, 537-38 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1992, writ denied). The County and Bowles do not challenge whether the collection of bail bond approval fees was a "taking" within the meaning of Article I, Section 17. Instead, they contend only that the fees were not taken for "public use." Accordingly, we do not address whether the collection of fees is the type of governmental "taking" restricted by this constitutional provision, which apparently is the contention of the Class. In the absence of briefing and...
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