Bowman v. Collins

• Decision Date: 16 June 1960
• Citation: 181 Cal.App.2d 807,5 Cal.Rptr. 776
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Ailison BOWMAN and Clifford Bowman, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Bobble Joe COLLINS et al., Defendants, Elizabeth Wilson Farrar, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 6094.

Page 776

5 Cal.Rptr. 776

181 Cal.App.2d 807

Ailison BOWMAN and Clifford Bowman, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Bobble Joe COLLINS et al., Defendants Elizabeth Wilson Farrar, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 6094.

District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, California.

June 16, 1960.

Stammer, McKnight & Barnum, and Joseph L. Joy, Fresno, for appellants.

Manfredo, Best & Forbes, Fresno, for respondent.

COUGHLIN, Justice.

On December 4, 1957 Ailison Bowman, hereinafter referred to as 'plaintiff', sustained serious injuries as the result of a collision between an automobile owned and operated by the defendant Farrar, in which the plaintiff was riding, and an automobile operated by a person named Collins, who is not now a party to this action. A covenant not to sue was executed by plaintiffs in favor of Collins upon the payment of $50,000. The complaint herein was based on negligence, and to state a cause of action under the provisions of the 'guest law', i.e., Section 403 of the Vehicle Code ¹, alleged that the plaintiff was a passenger for compensation in the automobile of defendant Farrar. The plaintiffs contend that the evidence establishes this allegation as a matter of law and, at the trial, requested the court to instruct the jury accordingly; the court refused; the issue was submitted to the jury for its determination; and a verdict in favor of said defendant ensued. From a judgment on this verdict the plaintiffs appeal contending that the refusal to give the requested instruction was error. Hereinafter the respondent Farrar will be referred to as the 'defendant'.

It is error to submit to a jury as a question of fact an issue which is determinable as a matter of law under the evidence. Huebotter v. Follett, 27 Cal.2d 765, 770, 167 P.2d 193; Baker v. Novak, 144 Cal.App.2d 514, 515, 301 P.2d 257. As a consequence, under the circumstances of this case, the sole question on this appeal is whether the evidence establishes as a matter of law that the plaintiff was a passenger for compensation, as distinguished from a guest, within the meaning of Section 403 of the Vehicle Code.

If there is any substantial evidence in the record, either direct or indirect, from which it reasonably may be concluded that the plaintiff was not a passenger, the issue thus presented is not one of law. Martinez v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 Cal.2d 244, 248, 288 P.2d 868. Unless the evidence, including the reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the testimony, admits of but a single conclusion the question presented is one of fact and not of law. Clapp v. Hester, 169 Cal.App.2d 558, 560, 337 P.2d 525; Ray v. Hanisch, 147 Cal.App.2d 742, 750, 306 P.2d 30; Benjamin v. Rutherford, 146 Cal.App.2d 561, 562, 303 P.2d 1079; Winn v. Ferguson, 132 Cal.App.2d 539, 543, 282 P.2d 515. When conflicting interpretations of the testimony or conflicting inferences which reasonably may be drawn therefrom support prospective opposite conclusions, the issue presented is one for the jury as a question of fact. Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221, 223, 143 P.2d 689; Juchert v. California Water Service Co., 16 Cal.2d 500, 508, 106 P.2d 886; Hamilton v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 12 Cal.2d 598, 602, 86 P.2d 829; State of California v. Day, 76 Cal.App.2d 536, 549, 173 P.2d 399; Garland v. Hirsh, 74 Cal.App.2d 629, 636, 169 P.2d 405. The evidence in the record before us must be considered in the light of these time-honored rules. Martinez v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 Cal.2d 244, 248, 288 P.2d 868.

At the time of the accident in question plaintiff and defendant were on their way to a roller skating rink to supervise skating activities sponsored by the Girl Scouts. The plaintiff had been interested in this organization ever since her oldest daughter started as a Brownie; a period of about 20 years; during the last five thereof she was a troop leader. As such, her duties generally were to supervise the activities of a Scout troop of which her youngest daughter was a member. The defendant and a Mrs. Simmons were assistant troop leaders of the same troop and each of them had a daughter who was a member thereof. In October of 1957 these three ladies, together with the monthers of other girls in the troop, met at defendant's home and planned their troop's Scouting program for the coming year. Among other things, it was decided that the defendant and Mrs. Simmons, who had automobiles, would furnish transportation for the girls living in their respective neighborhoods in order that they might attend the Scout meetings or other planned activities. As the plaintiff had no automobile, she was included in these arrangements and, being in the defendant's neighborhood, rode in the defendant's automobile in order to attend these various functions. As a part of the planned program, several of the girls in the troop were taken to a roller skating rink to enable them to earn merit badges in Scouting.

On the day of the accident the defendant and her daughter first picked up the plaintiff; then two other girls; and the five of them proceeded to the skating rink. The plaintiff and the defendant occupied the front seat of the automobile while the three girls occupied the back seat. On the way the accident happened.

Relying upon testimony by the defendant, the plaintiffs contend that the Scouting program including the skating activity in question, was beneficial to the defendant's daughter; that she desired to promote this program because it was beneficial to her daughter; that the plaintiff's participation therein promoted the program; that the defendant's only purpose in furnishing transportation to the plaintiff was to enable the latter to participate in and thus promote the program; that such participation constituted a tangible benefit to the defendant who was desirous of promoting an activity which was beneficial to her daughter; that the benefit so received by the defendant was a motivating influence for furnishing transportation to the plaintiff; and, therefore, under well-settled rules, the plaintiff was a passenger for compensation. This contention, in a measure, is based upon plaintiffs' interpretation of the testimony. As a part of her testimony the defendant agreed with plaintiffs' counsel that she furnished plaintiff transportation in order that plaintiff might participate in the Scouting activities and that she and her daughter were benefited by this participation, but stated that she did not give this matter any thought when offering to give the plaintiff a ride in her automobile; that she believed she 'was helping by driving'; that anything she did was for the benefit of the troop; and that all of it was connected with Scouting.

The plaintiff testified that her participation in Scouting work was voluntary and without pay; that the defendant and Mrs. Simmons served on the same basis; that she did not consider she was giving any compensation for the ride offered her by the defendant; that she would have rendered the same service to each of the girls in the troop whether or not she had been furnished the transportation, although without transportation she would not have been able to attend; that all of the girls were treated the same and she did not give the defendant's daughter any special attention because of the transportation furnished; that her participation was a part of 'Girl Scouting'; and that she felt the defendant was doing the hospitable thing and rendering her a favor in giving her a ride.

A passenger, as distinguished from a guest, within the meaning of Section 403 of the Vehicle Code, is one who gives compensation for a ride. Martinez v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 Cal.2d 244, 248, 288 P.2d 868, 871; Humphreys v. S. F. Area Council, 22 Cal.2d 436, 441, 139 P.2d 941; Shapiro v. Bookspan, 155 Cal.App.2d 353, 357, 318 P.2d 123; Follansbee v. Benzenberg, 122 Cal.App.2d 466, 471, 265 P.2d 183, 42 A.L.R.2d 832. In resolving an issue created by this distinction, the inquiry is whether or not some tangible benefit motivated the driver to furnish the transportation to the rider. The determinative factors in such an inquiry concern the nature of that benefit and its effect upon the transaction which resulted in furnishing the ride. This benefit has been judicially referred to as 'a tangible benefit, monetary or otherwise.' Martinez v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 Cal.2d 244, 250-253, 288 P.2d 868, 871; Whitmore v. French, 37 Cal.2d 744, 746, 235 P.2d 3; Clapp v. Hester, 169 Cal.App.2d 558, 559, 337 P.2d 525; Shapiro v. Bookspan, 155 Cal.App.2d 353, 357, 318 P.2d 123; as a 'special tangible benefit' (McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal.2d 279, 286, 70 P.2d 909, 913); and as a 'substantial benefit'. Kruzie v. Sanders, 23 Cal.2d 237, 242, 143 P.2d 704; Martinez v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 Cal.2d 244, 251, 288 P.2d 868. Such a benefit may be anticipated or prospective as well as immediate or direct. Martinez v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 Cal.2d 244, 251, 288 P.2d 868. Exhaustive factual analyses of cases considering situations constituting compensation within the rule are set forth in Gillespie v. Rawlings, 49 Cal.2d 359, 365, 317 P.2d 601, and Clapp v. Hester, 169 Cal.App.2d 558, 559, 337 P.2d 525. None of the cases reviewed, however, presents facts similar to those in the case at bar.

The effect that a benefit has upon a transaction which results in furnishing...