Boy Scouts of America, Inc. v. Thompson

• Citation: 380 P.2d 705
• Decision Date: 09 April 1963
• Docket Number: No. 39833,39833
• Parties: BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, INC., Plaintiff in Error, v. Glen A. THOMPSON, County Assessor of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Page 705

380 P.2d 705

1963 OK 80

BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, INC., Plaintiff in Error, v. Glen A. THOMPSON, County Assessor of Tulsa County, Oklahoma Defendant in Error.

No. 39833.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

April 9, 1963.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A right, question, or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies, although the subsequent suit is on a different cause of action; and a plea setting up the former adjudication of a fact, right or question distinctly put in issue between the same parties or their privies is not a plea in bar, but a plea of estoppel by judgment. Identity of causes of action is not a necessary element in the plea of estoppel by judgment, but it is necessary that the point upon which the plea of estoppel by judgment is based is in issue in the latter case and was in issue and decided in the former.

2. The doctrine of res adjudicata applies only to tax proceedings involving the same claim and the same tax period, whereas the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or estoppel by judgment, applies to tax proceedings involving similar claims containing the same legal points, or different tax years, when there has been no change in the controlling facts or applicable legal principles.

Appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County; Leslie Webb, Judge.

Appeal by Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (Taxpayer) from a judgment of the District Court on trial de novo on appeal by Taxpayer from an order of the County Equalization Board denying protest to the assessed valuation for ad valorem tax purposes, as fixed by the County Assessor on the Philtower Building in the City of Tulsa. Remanded with instructions.

C. N. Haskell, Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

David Hall, County Atty., Donald D. Cameron, Asst. County Atty., Tulsa, for defendant in error.

DAVISON, Justice.

This is an appeal on the original record by Boy Scouts of America, Incorporated (herein referred to as appellant), from a judgment of the District Court of Tulsa County, fixing the assessed valuation for ad valorem tax for the year 1959 upon the Philtower Building in the City of Tulsa. Appellant is the owner of said building. The appellant complains only as to the valuation placed on the building and makes no issue as to the valuation of the lot.

It was stipulated by appellant and the county assessor, Glen A. Thompson, that the formula used by the assessor in fixing the initial valuation for 1959 was:

200,246 square feet (in the building) times $20 per square foot (replacement cost) equals $4,004,920 less 30% depreciation, amount to $1,201,476, leaves a value of $2,803,444, and 30% thereof makes an assessed value for the improvements of $841,030.

The appellant protested this valuation and the protest was heard and denied by the equalization board. Appellant appealed to the district court. After trial in the district court the judge rendered a judgment adopting and approving the above formula, except that the court fixed the depreciation at the rate of 40% instead of the 30% used by the assessor. This resulted in the assessed valuation of the improvements being set at $720,885.60. Appellant has appealed to this court from the judgment.

Appellant contends that prior judgments of the District Court, and affirmed by the Supreme Court, are res judicata or constitute estoppel by judgment against the assessor, on the issue of appellant's claimed right to a rate of 50% depreciation on the building. In connection with such contention the appellant further contends that there should be a change of conditions before other values for taxation purposes are placed on the property for succeeding years.

Appellant shows and it was stipulated that the formula, including the provision for 30% depreciation, used by the county assessor in fixing the 1959 assessed valuation of appellant's property was the same formula that was used by the assessor in fixing the valuation for appellant's property and a number of other business buildings for the years 1953, 1954, and 1955. It appears that appellant and others protested these earlier valuations and appealed from adverse rulings of the equalization board to the district court. Upon hearing these appeals the court rendered judgments aimed at equalizing the assessed valuations and fixed the depreciation at 2% per year, but limited to 25 years or 50%. The county assessor appealed to this court and the judgments were affirmed. Several of these decisions are Appeal of National Bank of Tulsa, Okl., 312 P.2d 495; Appeal of National Bank of Commerce of Tulsa, Okl., 316 P.2d 175; and Appeal of Boy Scouts of America, Okl., 317 P.2d 262. The property valuations of appellant's building for the years 1956, 1957, and 1958, were fixed under a formula with a depreciation factor in accordance with that approved in the above decisions. It is not controverted that, if applicable, appellant's building is entitled to a depreciation of 50% under this formula.

It further appears that upon his reelection as assessor, Thompson reverted to a formula with a 30% depreciation factor, not only as to appellant's property, but as to a number of other similar business properties. After the property owners' protests were denied by the equalization board there were appeals to the district court. Approximately 40 of these matters were settled by the assessor and taxpayers by compromise and agreed settlements whereby a depreciation of 40% was used rather than a factor of 50% depreciation that was claimed by the taxpayers. In rendering judgment in the instant case the trial court took judicial notice of the prior judgments involving the 1953-1955 valuations and the affirmance thereof by this court and also of the compromise judgments mentioned above. The judgment of the lower court does not make any findings as to the particular grounds or evidence from which the trial court concluded that there should be an allowance of 40% depreciation, rather than the 30% set by the assessor and the 50% claimed by the appellant. From our examination of the record it is our belief that the trial court was persuaded or...