Boyle v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles

• Decision Date: 12 June 1975
• Citation: 331 N.E.2d 52,368 Mass. 141
• Parties: Paul F. BOYLE v. REGISTRAR OF MOTOR VEHICLES (and a companion case 1 ).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 52

331 N.E.2d 52

368 Mass. 141

Paul F. BOYLE

v. REGISTRAR OF MOTOR VEHICLES (and a companion case

¹

).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued April 7, 1975.

Decided June 12, 1975.

Robert W. Hagopian, Wrentham, for plaintiff.

William A. Schroeder, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.

Before TAURO, C.J., and BRAUCHER, HENNESSEY, KAPLAN, and WILKINS, JJ.

BRAUCHER, Justice.

The plaintiffs were charged with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and were tried in a District Court without a jury, found guilty, and fined. Before trial, the plaintiff Whitmarsh moved for a trial by jury in the first instance, and the motion was denied; the plaintiff Boyle made no such motion. Each appealed to the Superior Court for a trial de novo under G.L. c. 278, § 18, and the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, pursuant to G.L. c. 90, § 24(1) (b), revoked the license of each to operate a motor vehicle. We uphold the statutes and the actions taken under them against the constitutional attacks of the plaintiffs.

These cases were brought in the county court, and each case was reserved and reported to the full court without decision by a single justice of this court. Statements of agreed facts were filed. Each plaintiff asserted a claim within the general equity jurisdiction of the court and a claim under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The Boyle complaint was framed as a complaint in a class action, but the record discloses none of the findings required by Mass.R.Civ.P. 23, --- Mass. --- (1974), for the maintenance of a class action. Each plaintiff sought preliminary and permanent injunctions against the suspension of the plaintiff's license.

The plaintiffs contend that revocation of a license to operate motor vehicles by reason of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor is a criminal penalty, and that such revocation without trial by jury violates the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. They also contend that denial of trial by jury in the first instance violates the same constitutional provisions, and that license revocation places an unconstitutional burden on the rights of appeal and trial by jury.

We have recently given extended consideration to the claim that our two-tier court system violates a right of the accused to have a jury trial 'in the first instance,' and we rejected the claim. Whitmarsh v. Commonwealth, --- Mass. ---, --- - --- ^a, 316 N.E.2d 610 (1974), app. dism., --- U.S. ---, 95 S.Ct. 1945, 44 L.Ed.2d --- (1975). Cf. Costarelli v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, --- Mass. ---, --- - --- ^b, 323 N.E.2d 859 (1975); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, --- Mass. --- ^c, --- N.E.2d ---; Costarelli v. Massachusetts, --- U.S. ---, 95 S.Ct. 1534, 44 L.Ed.2d 76 (1975). We decline the plaintiffs' invitation to reconsider that claim.

The remainder of the plaintiffs' contentions were fully considered by a three-judge Federal District Court in Almeida v. Lucey, 372 F.Supp. 109 (D.Mass. 1974), affd., 419 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 22, 42 L.Ed.2d 36 (1974). We agree with that court that driving under the influence constitutes reasonable cause for revocation of a driver's license, that a jury trial is not required, and that a determination of the facts by a District Court judge provides all the necessary elements of due process.

Moreover, while the registrar is given no discretion...