Bradley v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.
| Decision Date | 26 February 1973 |
| Citation | 30 Cal.App.3d 818,106 Cal.Rptr. 718 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | William O. BRADLEY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY et al., Defendants and Respondents. Peter ECHEVERRIA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 28878, 28879. |
Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland, Teerlink & Bell, Edward J. Niland, San Jose, for appellants.
Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May, Edwin A. Heafey, Jr., Raoul D. Kennedy, Oakland, for respondents.
In this consolidated action plaintiffs appeal from the judgments of dismissal entered after respondents' demurrers to the second amended complaints ('Complaints') were sustained without leave to amend.
The present defamation action grew out of a personal injury suit brought by one Cecil Wyatt ('Wyatt action') against the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District and one Joseph Broyles ('Broyles') to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in a water skiing accident in Nevada. Appellants William O. Bradley ('Bradley'), John Squire Drendel ('Drendel') and Peter Echeverria ('Echeverria') are all attorneys practicing law in Nevada. Bradley and Drendel represented plaintiff Wyatt, while Echeverria was the attorney for defendant Broyles in the Wyatt action. During the trial in 1968, the action against Broyles was dismissed. Thereafter the jury awarded damages in favor of Wyatt in the sum of $500,000, and the judgment was affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court on November 25, 1968.
According to the allegations of the first causes of action of the Complaints, during and after the pendency of the Wyatt action respondents, The Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company ('Hartford') and Donald H. Dewberry ('Dewberry'), acting jointly and in conspiracy, induced one Ayala, a prisoner in a California jail, to make false and defamatory statements which, it is alleged, maliciously charged that appellants colluded and prevailed upon Broyles to give false testimony in return for which he was dropped from the Wyatt suit; and, moreover, that appellants manufactured evidence, suborned perjury, and conducted themselves in an unprofessional and illegal manner in the Wyatt action. It is further alleged that these defamatory statements were uttered orally outside of court and not in the course of any legal proceedings to third persons who had no interest in the Wyatt action. It is also affirmatively alleged that respondent Hartford, an insurance company, was not a party to, nor was Ayala either a party or a witness in, the Wyatt action, and that respondent Dewberry was not an attorney of record in that action.
The second causes of action of the Complaints allege that while the Wyatt action was pending, pursuant to a conspiracy to defame appellants, respondents caused certain extrajudicial documents not appropriately a part of the judicial proceedings relating to the Wyatt action, to be filed with both the Nevada Supreme Court and the district court where the case was tried; that these documents were filed for the sole purpose of having the defamatory statements contained therein quoted and republished by the Nevada news media; and that in furtherance of this purpose respondents falsely and maliciously represented to certain newspaper and television reporters that the documents, which had been filed with the courts, proved that appellants had collusively prevailed upon Broyles to give false and perjured testimony favorable to Wyatt, and that appellants were therefore guilty of suborning perjury, manufacturing evidence, and conducting themselves in an unprofessional and illegal manner in the Wyatt action.
In the third and fourth causes of action of the Echeverria second amended complaint, Broyles put forth allegations which were substantially the same as those set out in the first and second causes of action of the Complaints, with the exception that Broyles alleged that the false and malicious statements uttered were intended to charge him with the commission of the criminal offenses of perjury and fraud.
Relying on the doctrine of judicial immunity, and especially the absolute privilege provided for in Civil Code, section 47, subdivision 2, respondents demurred to the Complaints. The trial court sustained respondents' demurrers to each count without leave to amend on the general ground that none of said counts stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Thereafter, judgments of dismissal were entered in each action and the present appeal followed.
Although the trial court failed to specify whether its ruling was founded on the absolute privilege contained in Civil Code, section 47, subdivision 2, or the conditional or qualified privilege provided in subdivision 3 of the same section, it seems apparent that the trial court accepted respondents' argument that the Complaints showed upon their face that the defamatory statements had 'some connection with or some relation to' a judicial proceeding, and were therefore absolutely privileged under subdivision 2. This proposition is further underlined by the circumstance that appellants alleged malice in fact in the Complaints which, under well settled law, destroyed the existence of conditional privilege which, by definition, is predicated upon defamatory statements made without malice Civ.Code, § 47, subd. 3; 1 Smith v. Hatch (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 39, 47, 76 Cal.Rptr. 350; Larrick v. Gilloon (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 408, 416, 1 Cal.Rptr. 360. Thus, the clear issue presented is whether the allegations of the Complaints show upon their face that they are protected by absolute privilege.
Before we turn to the California rules governing the absolute privilege accorded in judicial proceedings, we call to mind that the doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy. The obvious Purpose of section 47 is to afford litigants freedom of access to the courts to secure and defend their rights without fear of being harassed by actions for defamation (Albertson v. Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375, 380, 295 P.2d 405; Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings (1909) 9 Colum.L.Rev. 463, 469) And to promote the unfettered administration of justice even though as an incidental result it may in some instances provide an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer (Abbott v. Tacoma Bank of Commerce (1899) 175 U.S. 409, 411, 20 S.Ct. 153, 44 L.Ed. 217; 50 Am.Jur.2d, Libel and Slander § 231, p. 744). Thus, the application of the absolute privilege On certain occasions (Timmis v. Bennett (1958) 352 Mich. 355, 89 N.W.2d 748, 752) must be confined within narrow limits and the tendency of the courts is not to extend such limits unless the public policy upon which the privilege rests in found to exist in a new situation (Matthis v. Kennedy (1954) 243 Minn. 219, 67 N.W.2d 413; 50 Am.Jur.2d, Libel and Slander § 194, p. 697). Accordingly, while it has been held that there is a tendency to extend the absolute privilege to occasions where the communication is provided for and required by law, the class of occasions where the publication of defamatory matter is absolutely privileged is confined to cases in which the public service or the administration of justice requires complete immunity (Pulliam v. Bond (Mo.1966) 406 S.W.2d 635, 640).
The California law is in complete accord with these principles. Thus, under Civil Code, section 47, subdivision 2, a publication or broadcast is privileged only on certain occasions, namely, in (1) legislative or (2) judicial proceedings, or (3) other official proceeding authorized by law. Although defamatory publications made in the course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged even if made with actual malice (Albertson v. Raboff, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 379, 295 P.2d 405; Gosewisch v. Doran (1911) 161 Cal. 511, 513--515, 119 P. 656), the absolute privilege attaches only to a publication that has a reasonable relation to the action, is permitted by law And, more importantly, If it is made to achieve the objects of the litigation. If these requirements are met, the publication is absolutely privileged even though made outside the courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is invoked (Albertson v. Raboff, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 381, 295 P.2d 405; Smith v. Hatch, supra, 271 Cal.App.2d at p. 45, 76 Cal.Rptr. 350). And although the cases stress that to be privileged under subdivision 2 of section 47 the defamatory matter need not be relevant, pertinent or material to any issue before the court, It is an absolute necessity that the publication have some connection or logical relation to the judicial proceeding (Thornton v. Rhoden (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 80, 90, 53 Cal.Rptr. 706; Jordan v. Lemaire (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 622, 625, 35 Cal.Rptr. 337; Lewis v. Linn (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 394, 399, 26 Cal.Rptr. 6; Rest., Torts, §§ 585--589). The California cases likewise delineate the circle of persons to whom the judicial privilege is applicable. In harmony with Restatement of Torts, sections 585--589, the privilege has been held to extend to judges and other official officers (§ 585; Lewis v. Linn, supra); attorneys (§ 586; Friedman v. Knecht (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 455, 56 Cal.Rptr. 540; Jordan v. Lemaire, supra); parties (§ 587; Albertson v. Raboff, supra, 46 Cal.2d at pp. 378--379, 295 P.2d 405); witnesses and prospective witnesses (§ 588; Ascherman v. Natanson (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 861, 865, 100 Cal.Rptr. 656); and jurors (§ 589). It follows, therefore, that absolute privilege in judicial proceedings is afforded only if the following conditions have been met: the publication (1) was made in a judicial proceeding; (2) had some connection or logical relation to the action; (3) was made to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) involved litigants or other participants authorized by law.
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