Brady v. Star of Sea Church Corporation of Unionville
| Decision Date | 14 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | HHDCV085022030S. |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Kathleen BRADY v. STAR OF THE SEA CHURCH CORPORATION OF UNIONVILLE, Connecticut. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
On July 30, 2006, the plaintiff entered the Saint Mary's Star of the Sea Church of Unionville (St. Mary's Church) operated by the defendant Star of the Sea Church Corporation wherein she sought to light a votive candle located near the altar. The candles were organized in rows on a candle stand some lighted and some unlighted. A set of stairs with loose pads on them for kneeling was arranged in front of the candle stand. All the candles in the lower rows were already lighted. When the plaintiff stepped on the stairs to attempt to reach and light a candle with the lighting stick provided for that purpose, the loose pad slid off, causing the plaintiff to lurch forward and fall on the candles igniting her blouse and causing her injury.
In her one-count complaint, filed on August 11, 2008, the plaintiff alleges that she was a business invitee on the defendant's premises and that the defendant failed to keep the property reasonably safe by failing to keep lighted candles from igniting her clothing and injuring her. She further alleges that the defendant was negligent in the placement of the candle stand in that the candle stand was too high and far from the floor; it contained rows of lighted candles in front of unlighted candles forcing people to reach over and across lighted candles in order to light other candles; that it placed the candle stand in front of stairs with loose pads on them thereby creating a risk that the loose pads would move underneath people standing on them; and that the defendant knew or should have known that the area was unsafe due to loose pads on the stairs and lighted candles in the front rows of the votive candle stand. The plaintiff also alleges that the defendant failed to discover or warn of the foregoing defect or dangerous condition, or to correct it, or provide proper ameliorative safeguards, such as a fire extinguisher that may have lessened the extent of the plaintiff's injuries.
On January 31, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss with a memorandum of law arguing that adjudication of this case would require the court to review and interpret religious doctrines and practices thereby running afoul of the free exercise clause of the first amendment the United States Constitution, the comparable provisions of the Connecticut Constitution contained in its first and seventh articles, and Connecticut's freedom of religion statute General Statute § 52-571b. The issues have been fully briefed and were argued at short calendar on August 20, 2012.
" A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011). " A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759, 774, 23 A.3d 1192 (2012).
" Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction ." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). Because the question of whether the court must impermissibly interpret ecclesiastical teachings in order to adjudicate a claim is one of subject matter jurisdiction, a motion to dismiss is the proper procedural vehicle to raise such an argument. See Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, supra, 301 Conn. at 759; Bellman v. West Hartford, 96 Conn.App. 387, 392, 900 A.2d 82 (2006).
" [T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n. 12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). " [I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ... clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 413-14, 35 A.3d 188 (2012). " [T]he well established notion [is] that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, supra, 301 Conn. at 759.
" Trial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 10-31(a)(1) may encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case ... [L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts ... Different rules and procedures will apply, depending on the state of the record at the time the motion is filed." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650-51, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).
" [I]f the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss ... other types of undisputed evidence ... and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken ... the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint ... Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts] ... If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counter affidavits ... or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings ... If, however, the defendant submits either no proof to rebut the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations ... or only evidence that fails to call those allegations into question ... the plaintiff need not supply counter affidavits or other evidence to support the complaint, but may rest on the jurisdictional allegations therein." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, supra, 292 Conn. at 651-52.
In support of its motion to dismiss, the defendant submitted an affidavit of the pastor of St. Mary's Church [1] describing the lighting of the candles as a religious exercise " in remembrance that our prayers are rising to God ..." The pastor further states that the church provided votive candles for parishioners to light prior to Mass. The defendant also submitted excerpts of the Code of Canon Law, which address aspects of church liturgy and the role of diocesan bishops. The defendant argues that judicial resolution of this case requires interpretation of ecclesiastical law. The defendant further argues that the incident occurred in the context of a prayer ritual, and therefore, the court is barred by the first amendment, relevant provisions of the Connecticut Constitution, and General Statutes § 52-571b[2] from reviewing the plaintiff's claim. For similar reasons, the defendant argues that the placement of the kneeling pads and candles are a matter within the church's discretion in interpreting their religious law, and, as such, the court cannot delve into whether such placement violated the applicable standard of care.
In response, the plaintiff replies that her claim does not pertain to religious matters, but rather, that it is fundamentally a premises liability claim. The plaintiff points out that she is not claiming that the candles cannot be lit in church or that the defendant cannot have a votive candle stand in the church building. The plaintiff is simply claiming that the defendant owed her a duty as an invitee to safely locate the candle stand away from defective kneeling pads, and this determination can be made under generally applicable state law.[3]
New York Annual Conference v. Fisher, supra, 182 Conn.... at [272] 281, 438 A.2d 62. ‘ The central question ... is whether the disputes require the court to interpret and to apply religious doctrine and practices or whether the dispute is simply a controversy that involves church officials but to which neutral principles of secular law can be applied without need to inquire into ecclesiastical matters.’ " Thibodeau v. American Baptist Churches of Connecticut, supra, at 675, 994 A.2d 212; see, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979) ()." Kubala v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 52 Conn.Supp. 218, 229, ...
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