Bragg v. State, 63480
| Decision Date | 05 May 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 63480,63480 |
| Citation | 162 Ga.App. 264,291 S.E.2d 112 |
| Parties | BRAGG v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
C. Theodore Lee, Villa Rica, for appellant.
Art Mallory, LaGrange, Gerald S. Stovall, Newnan, for appellee.
Defendant was convicted of the offense of motor vehicle theft. Defendant's motion for new trial was denied, and defendant appeals. Held :
1. Defendant enumerates as error the allowance in evidence of testimony as to an admission of guilt made to his parole officer who did not give the defendant the full Miranda warnings (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) prior to his discussion with the defendant. On the same date, but prior to defendant's discussion with the parole officer, he had been questioned by police officers and at that time given the full Miranda warnings, but denied any knowledge of or participation in the crime. When the parole officer talked to him later the same day, he first advised defendant "of his rights pertaining to a final hearing before the parole board." The parole officer explained at the Jackson-Denno hearing that this warning was Defendant then told the parole officer that he "did it," that he couldn't stop himself when "I get off smoking pot and drinking beer," and would like to have the three months remaining of his parole revoked and the parole board to send him someplace where he could get help for his problems. However, the parole officer refused defendant's request to sign a waiver of parole hearing at that time and advised him to seek advice from an attorney. The parole officer again talked to defendant six days later. Defendant had not retained legal counsel, but he still wanted to sign a waiver admitting his involvement in order to revoke parole. The parole officer testified he again advised defendant of his right to an attorney before allowing him to sign a waiver.
On cross-examination the parole officer was asked: "You did not specifically tell [defendant] that anything he said with respect to his parole revocation might also be used against him with respect to these criminal charges we have here today, did you?" The parole officer replied: ..." Queried as to whether he was not dealing with defendant "solely as to any possible parole revocation," the witness responded: When he returned later, and the defendant still wished to waive his right to a hearing the parole officer first read the waiver and explained to the defendant that he was In answer to a question by the court, the parole officer stated that in his opinion the defendant fully understood what he was signing.
The defendant testified that he did not steal the automobile and had admitted guilt only in order to get some help with his drug and alcohol problems. He further stated that he did not understand from the parole officer's warning that his admission would be used against him not only to revoke parole but also in a criminal prosecution. The court found that the defendant was given his Miranda rights by the police officer and seemed to fully understand them; that he was also given his rights by the parole officer; and that the waiver was freely and voluntarily made and defendant was cognizant of his rights. The statement was therefore allowed in evidence.
After an individual in custody on criminal charges has been given the complete Miranda warnings, it is not necessary that subsequent incidents of questioning the arrested person be preceded by repetition of the complete warning if that full warning is reinforced prior to subsequent interrogation by reminding the individual in custody that he was previously advised of his rights. See Anglin v. State, 244 Ga. 1, 3(2), 257 S.E.2d 513, and cits. See also Brownlee v. State, 155 Ga.App. 875, 877(4), 273 S.E.2d 636. The warning given by the parole officer, although structured for another purpose, was so substantially similar to the Miranda warnings previously given to the defendant as to authorize the trial court to conclude that the warnings given by the parole officer sufficiently reinforced the previously given Miranda warnings. The evidence authorized the trial court's conclusion, after a Jackson-Denno hearing (Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908), that the preponderance of the evidence indicated that the defendant's incriminating statement was freely and voluntarily given as the defendant was properly advised...
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