Brantley v. State, S97A0318
| Decision Date | 30 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. S97A0318,S97A0318 |
| Citation | 268 Ga. 151,486 S.E.2d 169 |
| Parties | , 97 FCDR 2351 BRANTLEY v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Michael C. Garrett, Melissa S. Padgett, Garrett & Gilliard, P.C., Agusta, for Brantley.
Dennis C. Sanders, Dist. Atty., Thomson, Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Paula K. Smith, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, and M. Eric Eberhardt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Thomson, for the State.
Jeffrey David Brantley was convicted of two counts of malice murder and of one count each of aggravated assault, burglary and a firearms possession charge in connection with the shootings of his ex-wife, her sister, and her mother. This Court affirmed Brantley's convictions, but reversed the death sentence imposed for the murder of Brantley's sister-in-law and remanded the case for resentencing. Brantley v. State, 262 Ga. 786, 427 S.E.2d 758 (1993). On remand, and with the express consent of the State, Brantley elected to be sentenced to life without parole for the murder of his former sister-in-law. See OCGA § 17-10-16 and Ga. L.1993, p. 1654, § 7. Accordingly, Brantley was sentenced to life without parole, to be served consecutively to his sentences on the other charges. Brantley appeals the denial of his challenges to his resentence. For the reasons which follow, we uphold the imposition of life without parole. 1
1. Brantley contends that the trial court erred in failing to set aside his sentence of life without parole because ineffective assistance of counsel rendered his acceptance of the sentencing agreement involuntary as a matter of law. He claims that he accepted the sentence in reliance on the inaccurate advice of his appellate attorneys regarding the constitutionality of the life-without-parole statute and his parole eligibility, and thus, he was denied his constitutional right to a new sentencing trial by jury.
Brantley's election to be sentenced to life without parole included his execution of a written acknowledgment of guilt for the murder of his former sister-in-law similar to a guilty plea statement. 2 In the context of guilty pleas, the two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) employs a standard of objective reasonableness with regard to counsel's performance and requires that the defendant establish the reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Thompson v. Greene, 265 Ga. 782, 784(2), 462 S.E.2d 747 (1995), citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Brantley cannot make the required showing.
Brantley was represented in the resentencing by appointed counsel Richard E. Allen, who was at the hearing in the matter and whose name appears as the sole attorney of record on the sentencing documents. At the hearing on Brantley's ineffectiveness of counsel claims, Allen testified that over a period of a couple of months prior to the sentencing, he had several conversations with Brantley about electing life without parole. Allen had talked with people in Burke County, and the consensus was that Brantley would again be sentenced to death. Allen related this to Brantley, and Brantley told Allen that he understood the situation and that a trial was "hopeless." Brantley considered the possibility of his death and ultimately agreed that he did not want to die. Accordingly, Allen negotiated for a life sentence without parole in order to save his client's life. No promises or threats were made to Brantley or to Allen. Allen was confident that Brantley understood the implications of the sentence and elected it knowingly and voluntarily. Prior to the sentencing, Allen advised Brantley that the constitutionality of OCGA § 17-10-16 had been upheld. See Freeman v. State, 264 Ga. 27, 440 S.E.2d 181 (1994).
On the day of sentencing, but prior to entering into the sentencing agreement, Brantley unsuccessfully attempted to give the sentencing judge a letter in which Brantley stated: This evidence more than amply supports the conclusion that Brantley did not rely on inaccurate advice from Allen in electing imprisonment for life without parole.
Brantley is likewise unsuccessful in his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in regard to attorneys Clive A. Stafford Smith and Steve Bayliss. Assuming arguendo that Stafford Smith and Bayliss afforded such aid to Brantley in the resentencing as to amount to assistance of counsel, their comments in correspondence regarding the life-without-parole statute and Brantley's possibility of parole do not constitute inadequate representation. The letters did not make any promises or guarantees of parole, and the evidence plainly shows that Brantley's decision did not turn on the attorneys' conjecture, rather Brantley knowingly opted for life in prison without the possibility of parole in order to spare himself.
2. Brantley fails in the claim that the application of OCGA § 17-10-16 to his case is violative of the ex post facto prohibitions of the State and Federal Constitutions. In general, a law is ex post facto if it inflicts upon the party being tried a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime at the time it was committed or it alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage. Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746, 751, 187 S.E.2d 831 (1972). That is clearly not the case here. As Brantley acknowledges, he expressly elected the retrospective application of the statute, Ga. L.1993, p. 1654, § 7, and we have...
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