Brantley v. Tex. Youth Comm'n

• Citation: 365 S.W.3d 89
• Decision Date: 31 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 03–10–00019–CV.,03–10–00019–CV.
• Parties: Dr. Don BRANTLEY, Belinda Castillo, Dr. Corinne Alvarez–Sanders and Patricia Logterman, Appellants, Texas Youth Commission; Cherrie Townsend in her official capacity as Executive Director, Cross–Appellants, v. TEXAS YOUTH COMMISSION; Cherrie Townsend in her official capacity as Executive Director, Appellees, Dr. Don Brantley, Belinda Castillo, Dr. Corinne Alvarez–Sanders and Patricia Logterman, Cross–Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas

365 S.W.3d 89

Dr. Don BRANTLEY, Belinda Castillo, Dr. Corinne Alvarez–Sanders and Patricia Logterman, Appellants,Texas Youth Commission; Cherrie Townsend in her official capacity as Executive Director, Cross–Appellants,

v. TEXAS YOUTH COMMISSION; Cherrie Townsend in her official capacity as Executive Director, Appellees,Dr. Don Brantley, Belinda Castillo, Dr. Corinne Alvarez–Sanders and Patricia Logterman, Cross–Appellees.

No. 03–10–00019–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Austin.

Oct. 12, 2011.

Rehearing Overruled Jan. 31, 2012.

Graham Baker, Law Office of Graham Baker, P.L.L.C., San Antonio, TX, for appellants.

Angela V. Colmenero, Assistant Attorney General, General Litigation Division, Austin, TX, for appellees.

Before Justices PATTERSON, PEMBERTON and HENSON.

OPINION

BOB PEMBERTON, Justice.

After allegations surfaced that employees of the Texas Youth Commission (TYC) had sexually abused youths housed in that agency's facilities, the Eightieth Texas Legislature enacted Senate Bill 103, which amended a number of statutory provisions governing that agency.¹ In section 37 of S.B. 103, the Legislature changed the basis of employment at TYC, which prior statutes had previously made for-cause, to at-will.² This appeal concerns attempts by a group of present and former TYC employees to challenge the constitutionality of that change.

Four current or former TYC employees who had begun working at the agency before section 37 took effect—two of whom allegedly resigned under threat of termination before section 37 took effect, one of whom was terminated after section 37 took effect, and one of whom continues to work for the agency (collectively, Plaintiffs)—sued TYC and its executive director seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief based principally on the allegation that section 37 unconstitutionally deprived them of property rights in their employment. TYC and its executive director (collectively, the TYC Defendants) interposed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the district court granted in part and denied in part. Both Plaintiffs and the TYC Defendants appeal the district court's order. We will affirm the district court's order in part and reverse in part.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A plea to the jurisdiction challenges a trial court's authority to decide the subject matter of a specific cause of action. See Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225–26 (Tex.2004). Analysis of whether this authority exists begins with the plaintiff's live pleadings. Id. at 226. The plaintiff has the initial burden of alleging facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction to hear the cause. Id. (citing Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.1993)). Whether the plaintiff met this burden is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. We construe the pleadings liberally, taking them as true, and look to the pleader's intent. Id.;Texas Logos, L.P. v. Brinkmeyer, 254 S.W.3d 644, 659 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, no pet.). Mere unsupported legal conclusions are insufficient. See Creedmoor–Maha Water Supply Corp. v. Texas Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 307 S.W.3d 505, 515–16 & nn. 7 & 8 (Tex.App.-Austin 2010, no pet.). If the pleadings fail to allege sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction but also fail to affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency, and the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27. If, on the other hand, the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Id. at 227.

We must also consider evidence the parties presented below that is relevant to the jurisdictional issues, Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex.2000), including evidence that a party has presented to negate the existence of facts alleged in the plaintiff's pleading. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227;see also Combs v. Entertainment Publ'n, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, no pet.) (summarizing different standards governing evidentiary challenges to the existence of pleaded jurisdictional facts where such facts implicate both jurisdiction and the merits versus where they implicate only jurisdiction). Our ultimate inquiry is whether the plaintiff's pleaded and un-negated facts, taken as true and liberally construed with an eye to the pleader's intent, would affirmatively demonstrate a claim or claims within the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226;Creedmoor–Maha, 307 S.W.3d at 513, 516 n. 8. This is a question of law that we review de novo. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226;Creedmoor–Maha, 307 S.W.3d at 513, 516 n. 8.

STATUTORY AND PROCEDURAL CONTEXT

Before turning to the record in this appeal, it is helpful first to briefly review the changes to the statute and TYC procedures that provide the context for Plaintiffs'claims and the parties' appellate issues. Prior to being amended by section 37 of S.B. 103, section 61.035 of the human resources code provided that the TYC “may remove any employee for cause.” The United States Supreme Court has held that state laws conferring to public employees more than a unilateral expectation of continued employment create a property right in that employment, such that an employee must be afforded procedural due process before being involuntarily terminated, including receiving notice of the grounds for termination and an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–46, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). To implement these requirements, TYC had promulgated policies and procedures requiring the agency, when terminating an employee, to first provide the employee a written recommendation-to-terminate letter giving notice of the basis for the proposed discharge and of the opportunity to be heard by the decision-maker prior to a final decision. If the recommendation was adopted and the employee was terminated, the employee then had access to a grievance process that entailed an evidentiary hearing in which TYC had the burden of proof as to the basis for termination. After hearing evidence, the hearing officer would then prepare a proposal for decision, including proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and transmit it to TYC's executive director. The executive director then made the final decision on the grievance, and could either affirm the termination or reinstate the employee with or without backpay and with or without discipline or other conditions.

Section 37 of S.B. 103 amended the human resources code to replace the “for cause” requirement with a provision stating that “an employee of the commission is employed on an at-will basis.” ³ The Legislature also mandated that TYC “establish procedures and practices governing: (1) employment-related grievances submitted by commission employees; and (2) disciplinary actions within the commission, including a procedure allowing a commission employee to elect to participate in an independent dismissal mediation if the employee is recommended for dismissal.” ⁴ Section 37, along with the other provisions of S.B. 103, took effect on June 8, 2007.⁵

After section 37 took effect, TYC, although retaining a grievance process for employees who are involuntarily terminated, amended its policies and procedures to emphasize that the process “does not create a property interest in agency employment, nor is it a promise or guarantee of any particular procedure.” The agency also changed its grievance process to provide that a termination decision made directly by the executive director—i.e., the same official who would serve as the ultimate decisionmaker on any employee grievance concerning the termination—was “final and not appealable” via that administrative process.

THE RECORD

The record in this case consists of Plaintiffs' live petition at the time of the hearing on the TYC Defendants' plea to the jurisdiction,⁶ evidence that the TYC Defendants attached to their plea, and evidence that Plaintiffs attached to their response.

Plaintiffs' petition

Two of the four Plaintiffs—Patricia Logterman and Dr. Corinne Alvarez–Sanders—allege that on April 19, 2007 (which, it is undisputed, is the day on which S.B. 103 passed the Texas Senate), they were each summoned to the office of TYC's then-acting chief of staff, Dimitria Pope, and given the choice of either resigning from their jobs with the agency or being fired. “When asked why,” the two allege, “Pope replied that Plaintiffs would be told if and when they chose to be terminated.” “Threatened with possible investigation by the Texas Rangers and the Office of the Inspector General,” Logterman and Alvarez–Sanders further assert, they “chose to be constructively discharged rather than face the possibility of being vilified in the media.” They add that although they “subsequently requested to withdraw their resignations, Pope denied their requests” and similarly denied grievances each subsequently attempted to file.

A third Plaintiff, Dr. Don Brantley, alleges that “Pope also requested [that he] quit or be fired on April 19, 2007.” In contrast to Alvarez–Sanders and Logterman, Brantley demanded “due process and a hearing.” In response, Brantley complains, TYC did not proceed with terminating him but instead suspended him until after section 37 took effect. Then, in July 2007, TYC and its acting executive director at the time, Ed Owens, “informed Dr. Brantley that because Senate Bill 103 took away his status as a for-cause employee, he was not entitled to due process or a termination hearing,” and “then terminated Dr. Brantley without affording him due process or a hearing.”

The fourth Plaintiff, Castillo, alleges that she has “been continuously employed by the TYC from 1994 to the date of the filing of...