Braswell v. State
Decision Date | 28 January 1975 |
Docket Number | No. S--178,S--178 |
Citation | 306 So.2d 609 |
Parties | W. D. BRASWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
W. Dexter Douglass, Douglass & Powell, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Andrew W. Lindsey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant here seeks reversal of a judgment and sentence following a jury verdict rendered August 23, 1972. Several points are raised by appellant, but we find only one to have merit.
During cross examination of appellant the prosecutor asked 'Have you ever been convicted of a crime?' to wich appellant replied 'No, sir, I haven't.' The prosecutor then countered with the query 'have you ever been in the army?' whereupon appellant's attorney suggested that the jury be temporarily excused. The prosecutor then developed by questions to appellant, propounded out of the presence of the jury, that appellant while in the Army during the Berlin Airlift was convicted by a three officer summary court martial of larceny on September 20, 1948. When the jury returned to the courtroom the prosecutor was permitted to again ask of the appellant whether he had ever been convicted of a crime to which he answered, in light of the proceedings which had taken place out of the presence of the jury as above recited, 'Yes, sir.'
The exact point therefore for our determination is whether a prior 'conviction' of 24 years standing for larceny in a military summary court martial proceeding is admissible in a criminal trial to impeach a defendant who has taken the stand in his own defense and has responded negatively to a question by the prosecutor as to whether he has ever been convicted of a crime.
This point has apparently never before been considered by an appellate court of this State. F.S. 90.08 provides that no person shall be disqualified to testify as a witness by reason of conviction of any crime but that:
'* * * Evidence of such conviction, including the fact that the prior conviction was for the crime of perjury, may be given to affect the credibility of the said witness, and such conviction may be proved by questioning the proposed witness or, if he deny it, by producing a record of his conviction. * * *'
The procedural requirements incident to application of F.S. 90.08 was recited by our Supreme Court in McArthur v. Cook, Sup.Ct.Fla.1957, 99 So.2d 565, wherein it was stated, inter alia:
In 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 507, p. 409 it is said:
The Supreme Court of Arizona, in Medkiff v. State, 29 Ariz. 523, 243 P. 601, in 1927, held that the lower court had properly sustained objections to questions seeking to show that a witness had been convicted of desertion by a court martial, holding that desertion is purely a military offense, is not a crime under general law and that its character is not such as to involve moral turpitude or to indicate a disposition or trait that would make the witness' testimony questionable. Remosteness does not appear to have been an issue in that case.
In United States v. Frazier, U.S.C.A.4th 1969, 418 F.2d 854, the United States Court of Appeals affirmed a refusal by a District Judge to permit impeachment of a witness by the propounding to the witness of questions on cross examination seeking to elicit information regarding two previous military offenses of being absent without leave.
The Supreme Court of Missouri in State v. Lee, 404 S.W.2d 740 (1966), recognizing the propriety under its statute (which is similar to the Florida statute) of admitting evidence of defendant's court-martial conviction for murder as being properly admitted to impeach the defendant, said:
The courts of Alabama have held that a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude by the court of another state may be shown for the purpose of discrediting a witness. (Dickey v. State, 32 Ala.App. 413, 26 So.2d 532; Williams v. State, 238 Ala. 40, 189 So. 84) The Alabama courts have also held that evidence of a conviction in a Federal court is admissible to impeach a witness testifying in a state court action. (Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 231 Ala. 680, 166 So. 604)
In 1920 the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that it was proper to cross examine a defendant relative to his conviction by a court martial for desertion, the Court stating: 'A witness may be impeached by drawing out of him on cross-examination that he has been guilty of acts of moral turpitude, and especially of crime, which reflects upon his integrity or credibility as a witness.' (Jordan v. State, 141 Ark. 504, 217 S.W. 788, 790) Remoteness of the court martial conviction was not an issue in that case.
In Nelson v. State, Ala.App.1950, 44 So.2d 802, the court considered a statute the wording of which is very similar to Florida Statute 90.08, and there held that a conviction of the offense of desertion in time of war by a United States Navy Court Martial involved moral turpitude and was admissible as affecting the credibility of the defendant who was a witness in his own behalf. The court rested the decision squarely upon the determination that desertion in time of war was an act of moral turpitude, expressly rejecting the contention that an offense purely military in character negates the existence of moral turpitude. The court further said, citing numerous authorities, that the moral turpitude, as a concept, does not lend itself to a neat or exact definition. The time in which an act is done is a determining factor in judging its morality as reflected in social duty. It then quoted a definition of moral turpitude as:
Upon considering the foregoing decisions from other jurisdictions it becomes apparent that those courts have generally, when rejecting evidence of prior court martial convictions, based their reasoning upon the concept of moral turpitude. However, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Hendrick v. Strazzulla, Sup.Ct.Fla.1961, 135 So.2d 1, has specifically rejected a differentiation based upon moral turpitude, saying:
We must resolve, therefore, whether a summary court martial 'conviction' constitutes a conviction of a 'crime', within the meaning of the statute. We think that it does not.
Whether a general court martial conviction would be admissible is not before us, therefore we do not here consider that question. We think, however, that we may appropriately take judicial notice of just how 'summary' a summary court martial proceeding was during and immediately following World War II. The officers selected to conduct the court martials seldom had any legal experience or training and little or no guide for conducting the proceeding. The presumption of innocence which is the counterstone of American criminal jurisprudence received little if any recognition. To close our eyes to such facts of common knowledge would render us little more perceptive than a mule with blinders on his bridle or the proverbial ostrich with his head in the sand.
In Roe v. State, Sup.Ct.Fla.1928, 96 Fla. 723, 119 So. 118, the Supreme Court held that the violation of a municipal ordinance does not constitute a 'crime' and that the record of a conviction of a...
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