Brennan v. City of Willow Park

Decision Date16 August 2012
Docket NumberNo. 02–11–00265–CV.,02–11–00265–CV.
Citation376 S.W.3d 910
PartiesTodd C. BRENNAN, Valerie S. Smith, Frank Gallison, Nanette Gallison, Rebecca Hanley, Gordon Hiebert, Kimberly Hiebert, William Hood, Leonila Hood, Layne Kasper, Jessica Kasper, James Kitchen, Martha Kitchen, Shaun Kretzschmar, Natalie Kretzschmar, Scott Mitchell, Leslie Mitchell, Evan Peterson, Gayle Peterson, Brian Stagner, Amy Stagner, Steven Tomhave, Jetty Tomhave, Robert Wood, and Mary Frances Wood, Appellants v. CITY OF WILLOW PARK, Texas; City of Aledo, Texas; Parker County Appraisal District; Parker County Appraisal Review Board; and Larry Hammonds In His Official Capacity as Parker County Tax Assessor/Collector, Appellees.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Joshua W. Carden, Joshua Carden Law Firm, P.C., Irving, TX, for Appellant.

E. Allen Taylor, Jr., Fredrick ‘Fritz’ Quast Taylor, Olson, Adkins, Sralla & Elam L.L.P., Fort Worth, TX, Judith A. Hargrove, Hargrove & Evans, LLP, Austin, TX, for Appellees.

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; WALKER and McCOY, JJ.

OPINION ON REHEARING

SUE WALKER, Justice.

On June 21, 2012, this court issued an opinion reversing the trial court's judgment and remanding Appellants' claims for declaratory judgment, for injunctive relief, and for a writ of mandamus asserted against all Appellees, to the trial court for further proceedings. Appellee City of Aledo filed a motion for rehearing and motion for en banc reconsideration. After due consideration, we deny City of Aledo's motion but withdraw our prior opinion and judgment dated June 21, 2012, and substitute the following in its place solely to correct a factual misstatement in our original opinion that both Cities 1 had filed collection suits against Appellants; as pointed out by City of Aledo in its motion, only City of Willow Park had filed collection suits.

I. Introduction

The primary issue that we address in this appeal is whether the trial court erred by dismissing for want of jurisdiction Appellants' claims against Appellees for declaratory judgment, for injunctive relief, and for mandamus. Because we hold that the trial court possesses jurisdiction over all of Appellants' claims against all Appellees, we will reverse the trial court's judgment sustaining Appellees' pleas to the jurisdiction and remand Appellants' claims to the trial court.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

Appellants own homes in Parker County, Texas. Appellants received tax bills from Parker County Appraisal District and paid the bills. At some point in the fall of 2008, Appellees realized that prior tax bills for the years 20032007 that were submitted by Parker County Appraisal District to Appellants—and paid by Appellants—had erroneously not included city taxes. Consequently, in October 2008, Parker County Appraisal District mailed Appellants a “notice” stating that “pursuant to the requirements of Property Tax Code section 25.21[,] Appellants' properties had been “omitted” from the appraisal rolls for the past five years. The notices enclosed a tax bill for city taxes for the years 20032007, and the notices stated that the “total tax shown on the attached statement is due upon receipt.”

On December 9, 2008, Parker County Appraisal Review Board (ARB) approved the supplemental appraisal records for the year 2008 as corrected and found that the supplemental appraisal records “should be ... added to the appraisal roll for the district.”

Appellants refused to pay the tax bills purportedly assessing back city taxes for the years 20032007, and City of Willow Park filed collection suits against Appellants. Appellants joined third-party defendants City of Aledo, Parker County Appraisal District, Parker County ARB, each of Parker County ARB's members in their official capacity, and Larry Hammonds in his official capacity as Parker County Tax Assessor/Collector.2 Appellants also asserted counterclaims and third-party claims for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and mandamus.

Appellees filed pleas to the jurisdiction, alleging that Appellants had not exhausted their administrative remedies and that, in any event, Appellees were entitled to governmental immunity. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Appellees' pleas to the jurisdiction, ordering that all counterclaims and third-party claims asserted by Appellants were dismissed with prejudice. 3

Appellants perfected this appeal, raising one issue that contains three subissues. In subissues A and B, Appellants claim that their failure to pursue any protest procedures does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over their claims. In subissue C, Appellants claim that the doctrine of governmental immunity does not bar their claims.

III. Standard of Review

A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the trial court's authority to determine the subject matter of the action. See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999). It is the plaintiff's burden to allege facts that affirmatively establish the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.1993). In determining whether the plaintiff has met this burden, we look to the allegations in the plaintiff's pleadings, accept them as true, and construe them in favor of the plaintiff. See Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.2004). While we must construe the allegations in favor of the plaintiff, we are not bound by legal conclusions. Tex. Natural Res. & Conservation Comm'n v. White, 13 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000), rev'd on other grounds,46 S.W.3d 864 (Tex.2001); Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Garrett Place, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.). When deciding a plea to the jurisdiction, we must consider evidence “when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised.” Bland ISD v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex.2000). The standard of review of an order granting a plea to the jurisdiction is de novo. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex.2002); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex.1998), cert. denied,526 U.S. 1144, 119 S.Ct. 2018, 143 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1999).

IV. The Trial Court's Jurisdiction

Appellees' pleas to the jurisdiction asserted two grounds for their contention that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Appellants' counterclaims and third-party claims for declaratory judgment, for injunctive relief, and for mandamus: first, that Appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the tax code; 4 and second, that governmental immunity bars Appellants' suit. We address these issues in turn.

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
1. The Law

The statutory administrative review requirements of the tax code are mandatory and jurisdictional. See, e.g., Cameron Appraisal Dist. v. Rourk, 194 S.W.3d 501, 502 (Tex.2006); Matagorda Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Coastal Liquids Partners, L.P., 165 S.W.3d 329, 331 (Tex.2005). The policy behind the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine is to allow the agency involved to resolve disputed issues of fact and policy and to assure that the appropriate body adjudicates the dispute. Essenburg v. Dallas Cnty., 988 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tex.1998). Similarly, the policy seeks to encourage parties to resolve their dispute without resorting to litigation when an administrative procedure is provided for that purpose. See Strayhorn v. Lexington Ins. Co., 128 S.W.3d 772, 780 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004), aff'd,209 S.W.3d 83 (Tex.2006); Vela v. Waco ISD, 69 S.W.3d 695, 702 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. withdrawn). But there are several long-recognized exceptions to the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine: (1) when an injunction is sought and irreparable harm would result; (2) when the administrative agency cannot grant the requested relief; (3) when the issue presented is purely a question of law; (4) when certain constitutional issues are involved; and (5) when an administrative agency purports to act outside its statutory powers. Strayhorn, 128 S.W.3d at 780;Gibson v. Waco ISD, 971 S.W.2d 199, 201–02 (Tex.App.-Waco 1998), vacated on other grounds,22 S.W.3d 849 (Tex.2000); see Larry Koch, Inc. v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 52 S.W.3d 833, 839–40 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied). In the case of an agency acting outside of its statutory power, “the purposes underlying the exhaustion rule are not applicable: judicial and administrative efficiency are not served, and agency policies and expertise are irrelevant, if the agency's final action will be a nullity.” Strayhorn, 128 S.W.3d at 780 (quoting Larry Koch, Inc., 52 S.W.3d at 840).

2. Application of the Law to the Present Facts

The October 3, 2008 “Notice of Omitted Property Determination” and the enclosed tax bill that Appellants received provided, in pertinent part:

This Notice is provided pursuant to the requirements of Texas Property Tax Code Sec. 25.21, which requires the chief appraiser, if he discovers that real property was omitted from an appraisal roll in any one of the five preceding years, to add the appraised value of the omitted property to the appraisal records as of January 1 of each year that it was omitted. Please be advised that the [City of Willow Park or City of Aledo] has informed me that the property described above was located within its jurisdiction but was not included on its appraisal roll for the tax years described on the attached tax statement. Therefore, the property value must be supplemented to the City's appraisal roll and [City of Willow Park or City of Aledo] taxes collected for each year that it was omitted.

You have the right to appeal this determination to the Parker County Appraisal Review Board (ARB)....

The total tax shown on the attached statement is due upon receipt and will be delinquent if not paid before February 1, 2010.

It is undisputed that the October 3, 2008 determination of omitted property was the only notice provided to Appella...

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