Lone Star Coll. Sys. v. Immigration Reform Coal. Texas

• Decision Date: 26 November 2013
• Docket Number: No. 14–12–00819–CV.,14–12–00819–CV.
• Citation: 418 S.W.3d 263
• Parties: LONE STAR COLLEGE SYSTEM and Richard Carpenter, Appellants v. IMMIGRATION REFORM COALITION OF TEXAS (IRCOT), Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

418 S.W.3d 263

LONE STAR COLLEGE SYSTEM and Richard Carpenter, Appellants

v.IMMIGRATION REFORM COALITION OF TEXAS (IRCOT), Appellee.

No. 14–12–00819–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Nov. 26, 2013.

Mario Castillo, Jacob Montilijo Monty, Adolph R. Guerra, Houston, for Appellants.

David Rogers, Steven W. Smith, Austin, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Justices CHRISTOPHER, JAMISON, and McCALLY

OPINION

MARTHA HILL JAMISON, Justice.

Appellants, Lone Star College System (LSCS) and its chancellor, Richard Carpenter, bring this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's order denying, in part, their Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Appellee, the Immigration Reform Coalition of Texas (IRCOT), brought this state taxpayer lawsuit against appellants, among other Texas governmental entities and officials, alleging that state funds were being expended pursuant to state laws that are preempted by federal law. IRCOT seeks declarations and injunctive relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA). On appeal, appellants contend that the trial court and this court do not have subject-matter jurisdiction over IRCOT's claims because (1) appellants have governmental immunity, (2) IRCOT lacks standing, and (3) the claims are not ripe.

We issued an opinion in this case on October 17, 2013, affirming the trial court's order. Appellants subsequently filed a motion for rehearing. Without changing the disposition of the case, we deny the motion for rehearing, withdraw our previous opinion, and issue this substitute opinion in its place.

I. Standard of Review

Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 133–34 (Tex.2011). Appellants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is effectively a plea to the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Richardson Hosp. Auth. v. Duru, 387 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.); Dahl ex rel. Dahl v. State, 92 S.W.3d 856, 860 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). When considering a plea to the jurisdiction, our analysis begins with the live pleadings. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex.2012). We first determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the cause. Tex. Dep't. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.2004). In doing so, we construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, and unless challenged with evidence, we accept all allegations as true. Id. at 226–27. We may also consider evidence submitted to negate the existence of jurisdiction, and we must consider such evidence when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150. We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in favor of the nonmovant. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. The plea must be granted if the plaintiff's pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction or if the defendant presents undisputed evidence that negates the existence of the court's jurisdiction. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150. In ruling on such a plea, a court should not consider the merits of the parties' claims. E.g., County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex.2002); TAC Realty, Inc. v. City of Bryan, 126 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m).

II. Proceedings in Trial Court

In its live pleadings, IRCOT alleges that appellants, among other Texas entities and officials, have in the past and will continue in the future to provide education grants to illegal aliens ¹ using Texas state funds in violation of federal statutes.² IRCOT asserts associational standing on behalf of its members, whom it alleges include people who pay a variety of state taxes that go into the state's General Revenue Fund. The taxes IRCOT identifies include those placed on sales, motor vehicles, fuel, franchises, oil and natural gas production, and occupation as an attorney.

IRCOT specifically seeks declaratory judgment that “in Texas, an illegal alien is not eligible for” state student financial aid and that provisions of Texas law authorizing such aid are “preempted, void, and of no effect.” IRCOT further “seeks an order enjoining the defendants from making, approving, or forwarding a monetary grant to an illegal alien under the Texas Educational Opportunity Grant Program, the Toward Excellence, Access, & Success [TEXAS] Grant Program, or the Tuition Equalization Grant Program.” IRCOT also requests a declaration that the section of the LSCS policy manual implementing certain portions of the Texas Education Code are preempted by federal law. IRCOT asserts that illegal aliens attending state-supported universities in Harris County receive grants under the listed programs.³

According to IRCOT, the awarding of these grants to illegal aliens is facially authorized under Texas statutes; however, IRCOT further contends that these statutes are preempted by federal statutes. The specific state statutes IRCOT contends are preempted include portions of the Texas Education Code defining who can be considered a Texas resident for educational purposes as well as sections of the code authorizing awards of grant funds to Texas residents. ⁴ IRCOT urges that the following sections of Title 8 of the United States Code have preemptive effect:

• Section 1601(6), which states that: “It is a compelling government interest to remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public benefits.”

• Section 1621, which provides that, except for specifically defined classes of aliens, aliens are generally ineligible for any State or locally provided benefits, including postsecondary education benefits. However, it further authorizes States to provide such benefits to illegal aliens through the enactment of State laws after August 22, 1996.

• Section 1623, which states: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a State (or a political subdivision) for any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States is eligible for such a benefit (in no less an amount, duration, and scope) without regard to whether the citizen or national is such a resident.”

• Section 1625, which states: “A State or political subdivision of a State is authorized to require an applicant for State and local public benefits (as defined in section 1621(c) of this title) to provide proof of eligibility.”

8 U.S.C. §§ 1601(6), 1621, 1623, 1625.

After answering in the litigation, appellants filed their plea to the jurisdiction, contending the trial court did not have jurisdiction in this case because appellants have governmental immunity, IRCOT lacks standing, and the asserted claims are not ripe. IRCOT filed a response, and the trial court denied the motion in part and granted it in part. Appellants then filed a motion for reconsideration, and the trial court entered an Order Regarding Jurisdiction. In this order, the court specifically set forth its rulings, including, as relevant to this appeal: (1) IRCOT does not have standing based on its members paying state sales, motor vehicle, or fuel taxes ⁵; (2) the record is insufficient to make a determination regarding standing based on payment of the franchise, attorney occupation, and oil and gas production taxes; (3) IRCOT met its pleading requirement for standing when it alleged its members pay taxes that are expended on allegedly illegal activity; (4) the UDJA waives governmental immunity for “relevant government entities” on claims under the act which challenge the validity of ordinances or statutes; and (5) IRCOT met its pleading requirement in regards to Chancellor Carpenter when it alleged that he had authority under state law to comply with applicable federal laws. On the basis of these holdings, the court granted appellants' plea regarding standing based on the payment of sales, motor vehicle, and fuel taxes.⁶ The court otherwise denied the relief appellants sought.

III. Governmental Immunity⁷

Appellants first contend that the trial court and this court do not have jurisdiction in this case based on application of the doctrine of governmental immunity. Governmental immunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225–26. Absent a waiver of governmental immunity, a state entity may not be sued. See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999). Governmental immunity bars UDJA actions against the state and its political subdivisions absent a legislative waiver. See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 620 (Tex.2011). We review immunity issues under a de novo standard. Id.

IRCOT alleged in its pleadings that the UDJA waived LSCS's immunity and that Carpenter was not immune because his actions were ultra vires, or outside his authority. Appellants asserted in their plea to the jurisdiction that LSCS's immunity was not in fact waived and that IRCOT has not alleged any ultra vires conduct by Carpenter. The trial court found in favor of IRCOT on both propositions, specifically stating the UDJA waived immunity for LSCS and that IRCOT sufficiently pleaded ultra vires claims against Carpenter. We concur with both rulings.

A. Waiver of LSCS's Immunity

Section 37.006(b) of the UDJA contains a waiver of immunity from suit. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 37.006(b)⁸; City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 373 n. 6 (Tex.2009); Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 446 (Tex.1994). Based on this statutory waiver, the Texas Supreme Court has declared that when claims challenge the validity of ordinances or statutes, relevant governmental entities must be made parties; thus,...