Bresolin v. Morris

• Decision Date: 07 January 1977
• Docket Number: No. 43846,43846
• Citation: 88 Wn.2d 167,558 P.2d 1350
• Parties: Bradley Lave BRESOLIN, Petitioner, v. Charles MORRIS, Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services of the State of Washington, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 167

88 Wn.2d 167

558 P.2d 1350

Bradley Lave BRESOLIN, Petitioner, v. Charles MORRIS, Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services of the State of Washington, Respondent.

No. 43846.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Jan. 7, 1977.

Bradley Lave Bresolin in pro. per.

Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., William C. Collins, Olympia, for respondent.

ROSELLINI, Associate Justice.

An inmate of the State's correctional institution at Walla Walla brought this action seeking mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services to establish and maintain a drug rehabilitation program at the institution. In a previous hearing, we ordered the Secretary to take steps to secure financing for isolated facilities for drug addicts, which were required under RCW 69.32.090, and to report to the court. Bresolin v. Morris, 86 Wash.2d 241, 543 P.2d 325 (1975).

After three reports had been rendered, the legislature enacted Laws of 1975, 2nd Ex.Sess., ch. 103, which repealed RCW 69.32.090, and made the establishment of a drug treatment and rehabilitation program discretionary rather than mandatory.

In the meantime, we are advised that the petitioner has, in spite of his ineligibility, been transferred to Western State Hospital where he is enrolled in that institution's drug offender program. Since this was one of the alternative forms of relief which he sought in the original action, the case would appear to be moot. However, we are asked to consider the constitutional questions which were passed in the original opinion. The question of the constitutional duty of prison officials with respect to drug rehabilitation, we are told, is one of great public concern which will continue to recur in similar suits until the court answers the contentions raised.

Being assured by the parties that this case is as well prepared and argued as any that is likely to come before the court in the near future, we will dispose of these questions.

The petitioner contends that a prisoner has a right to treatment of his psychological dependence on drugs, for rehabilitative purposes, and that the denial of this right constitutes cruel and unusual punishment (forbidden by the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 14, of the Washington State Constitution) as well as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law and a denial of equal protection of the law.

The authorites cited do not establish these contentions. None of them holds that a prisoner in a penal institution has a right to rehabilitation, and none holds that the failure to rehabilitate amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.

It is established that prisoners do not lose all of their constitutional rights and that the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment follow them into prison and protect them there. Washington v. Lee, 263 F.Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966), Aff'd and approved, 390 U.S. 333, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1968); Accord, Smith v. Schneckloth, 414 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1969).

As the federal district court in the latter case said, however, it is also settled that correctional authorities have wide discretion in matters of internal administration and that reasonable action within the scope of this discretion does not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights.

The petitioner cites Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404--06, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), for the proposition that rehabilitation is a basic penal goal, and reasons that because it is a goal, punishment is cruel and unusual if it fails to substantially further such rehabilitation. The United States Supreme Court in Martinez was concerned with the censorship of prisoners' mail in a State institution. Before deciding that such prisoners have a right of free speech and a right of access to the courts, both of which are subject to reasonable restrictions in furtherance of legitimate governmental interests, the court summarized the role of courts in solving prison administration problems. While the language was directed primarily to the question of the intervention of federal courts in state penal matters, its import is equally valid with respect to the role of state courts in such matters, if it is borne in mind that such courts have also the duty of protecting statutory rights of prisoners. ¹

The United States Supreme Court said:

Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration. In part this policy is the product of various limitations on the scope of federal review of conditions in state penal institutions. More fundamentally, this attitude springs from complementary perceptions about the nature of the problems and the efficacy of judicial intervention. Prison administrators are responsible for maintaining internal order and discipline, for securing their institutions against unauthorized access or escape, and for rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature and inadequate resources allow, the inmates placed in their custody. The Herculean obstacles to effective discharge of these duties are too apparent to warrant explication. Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities.

But a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution. When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.

(Footnotes omitted.)

The court in Martinez recognized that rehabilitation is a Governmental interest, 416 U.S. at 412, 94 S.Ct. 1800. It did not characterize it as a prisoner's right. The legislature in this state has also adopted rehabilitation as a penal goal. RCW 72.08.101. ² But to say that the government has an interest in rehabilitation and that this is a legitimate institutional goal is one thing. To say that a prisoner has an enforceable right to such rehabilitation is another. The United States Supreme Court has spoken to that subject in a case not cited by the parties to this action but which we find to be directly in point and controlling.

That court, in Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 421, 94 S.Ct. 700, 38 L.Ed.2d 618 (1974), affirmed a holding of the court of Appeals (Marshall v. Parker, 470 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1972)) that 'there is no 'fundamental right' to rehabilitation . . . at public expense after conviction of a crime.' In that case, the petitioner claimed that the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-- 4255, denied him due process and equal protection of the laws because it excluded persons in his situation from its benefits. Noting that no suspect classification was involved, the high court said that the correct standard to be applied was whether the statutory classification bore some relevance to the purpose for which the classification was made. The Congress, the court said, could reasonably find that some types of offenders were more likely to be susceptible and suitable to treatment than others, and could justifiably make classifications upon this basis.

There is no contention here that the drug treatment program at the State correctional institution discriminates among prisoners; rather, the factual allegation of the petitioner is that it is inadequate. Certainly, if a legislative body may enact a statute which discriminates among prisoners (upon a nonsuspect basis) in providing drug treatment, and may deny such treatment to some prisoners, it may constitutionally decide that no drug rehabilitation program shall be required at all. ³

The petitioner relies upon federal cases which have held that a prisoner is entitled to essential or reasonable medical care. We have no quarrel with this concept; however, the cases generally recognize that the burden is on the complainant to show that his disease or condition is amendable to medical treatment. For example, in Smith v. Schneckloth, supra, it was held that under the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a complaint can be maintained in federal court if it alleges that a state prisoner suffering an acute physical condition and having urgent need for medical care was refused such care and suffered tangible injury thereby. But as that court pointed out, implicit in the formulation is the requirement of proof that medical treatment in fact exists and is available to State officials before their refusal to provide it can be said to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.

It should be emphasized that the petitioner is not contending that the institution withholds needed medication and medical treatment. ⁴ He makes no showing that there is an accepted method of treating psychological addiction, either within be confines of prison or without. At the same time, the respondent's authorizes and affidavits stress the uncertainties which exist with respect to the efficacy of attempts to rehabilitate drug addicts, and particularly within the prison setting. That the entire concept of rehabilitation as a practical goal of confinement is under question can be appreciated by examining the current literature upon this subject. See, e.g., L. Pierce, Rehabilitation in...