Briar Cliff College v. Campolo

• Decision Date: 19 December 1984
• Docket Number: Nos. 83-1460,84-78,s. 83-1460
• Citation: 360 N.W.2d 91
• Parties: 22 Ed. Law Rep. 397 BRIAR CLIFF COLLEGE and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Appellants, v. Lois CAMPOLO, Surviving Spouse of Charles Campolo, and Dependent Minor Children, Appellees. BRIAR CLIFF COLLEGE and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Plaintiffs, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT In and For WOODBURY COUNTY, Honorable J.P. Kelley, Judge, Defendant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 91

360 N.W.2d 91

22 Ed. Law Rep. 397

BRIAR CLIFF COLLEGE and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Appellants, v. Lois CAMPOLO, Surviving Spouse of Charles Campolo, and Dependent Minor Children, Appellees.

BRIAR CLIFF COLLEGE and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Plaintiffs, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT In and For WOODBURY COUNTY, Honorable J.P. Kelley, Judge, Defendant.

Nos. 83-1460, 84-78.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 19, 1984.

P.D. Furlong, Sioux City, and Curtis Hewett of Smith, Peterson, Beckman & Willson, Council Bluffs, for appellants and plaintiffs.

Charles T. Patterson of Gleysteen, Harper, Eidsmoe, Heidman & Redmond, Sioux City, for appellees and defendant.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and McGIVERIN, LARSON, SCHULTZ and WOLLE, JJ.

SCHULTZ, Justice.

Charles Campolo, an assistant professor of psychology at Briar Cliff College, died of cardiac failure shortly after his participation in an intramural basketball game on the college campus as a member of the faculty team. Lois Campolo, the surviving spouse, filed a petition for death benefits with the Iowa industrial commissioner pursuant to Iowa Code section 85.31 on behalf of herself and dependent children, Andrea J., Charles T., and Damon A., against Briar Cliff College, the employer, and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, the insurance carrier, seeking to recover workers' compensation benefits for the death. The deputy industrial commissioner's benefit award was affirmed in successive reviews by the industrial commissioner and the district court.

The employer and insurance carrier appeal the decision of the district court on judicial review. For simplicity, we will refer to appellants as the employer. The district court refused to allow the posting of a supersedeas bond during the pendency of the appeal; appellants challenge this action in a certiorari action. Pending our ruling, we ordered the execution of the appealed judgment stayed upon the filing of a surety bond by appellants.

I. Appeal. On appeal, the employer asserts claimants have failed to meet their burden of proof in two areas: (1) that decedent's participation in the basketball game was in the course of his employment; and (2) that the injury, if any, arose out of his employment. The hearing officer and the industrial commissioner held contrary to both of these claims, and the district court affirmed.

The district court reviews decisions of the industrial commissioner pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 17A. Iowa Code § 86.26 (1983). The scope of review by the district court pursuant to section 17A.19 and of our review on appeal pursuant to section 17A.20 is not de novo. The commissioner's findings have the effect of a jury verdict, and we broadly and liberally apply those findings in order to uphold rather than defeat the commissioner's decision. Beier Glass Co. v. Brundige, 329 N.W.2d 280, 282 (Iowa 1983); Ward v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 304 N.W.2d 236, 237 (Iowa 1981). The commissioner's determination of a question of law is given careful consideration, but is subject to our review. Beier, 329 N.W.2d at 282.

A. Course of his employment. The employer first asserts that decedent's participation in the basketball game was not in the course of employment within the meaning of the workers' compensation law, but was a purely recreational activity which was not a part of decedent's expressed or implied duties as a professor. An employer is liable "for any and all personal injuries sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of the employment...." Iowa Code § 85.3(1) (1983). The word "injury" includes death resulting from personal injury. Iowa Code § 85.61(5)(a) (1983). "The words 'personal injury arising out of and in the course of the employment ' ... include injuries to employees whose services are being performed on, in, or about the premises which are occupied, used, or controlled by the employer...." § 85.61(6) (emphasis in original).

The industrial commissioner considered whether the decedent's participation in the faculty-student basketball game was in the course of his employment. In analyzing the applicable law, the commissioner referred to our statement that:

An injury in the course of employment embraces all injuries received while employed in furthering the employer's business and injuries received on the employer's premises, provided that the employee's presence must ordinarily be required at the place of the injury, or, if not so required, employee's departure from the usual place of employment must not amount to an abandonment of employment or be an act wholly foreign to his usual work. An employee does not cease to be in the course of his employment merely because he is not actually engaged in doing some specifically prescribed task, if, in the course of employment, he does some act which he deems necessary for the benefit or interest of his employer.

Bushing v. Iowa Railway & Light Co., 208 Iowa 1010, 1018, 226 N.W. 719, 723 (1929) (citations omitted). The commissioner also relied upon Larson's business-related benefit test which states that recreational or social activities are in the course of employment when "[t]he employer derives substantial direct benefit from the activity beyond the intangible value of improvement in employee health and morale that is common to all kinds of recreation and social life." 1A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 22.00, at 5-71 (8th ed. 1982). Stating that it was the "degree of employer benefit which heavily tips the scale in the claimant's favor" and "[a]nother factor weighing in claimant's favor is the special nature of a teacher's job," the deputy commissioner found claimant had established that the death had occurred in the course of decedent's employment. The commissioner affirmed on appeal.

We conclude that the commissioner applied the correct principles of law. Whether decedent's acts benefited his employer is a question of fact. Thus, we must consider the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the commissioner's findings.

Decedent had been employed by Briar Cliff College for approximately nine years. The college is a four-year institution with an enrollment of 1350 students. Tuition provides 73 percent of the college's revenue; thus, student recruitment and retention are major concerns of the college to insure adequate enrollment and revenues. To improve student retention and recruitment of new students, the college seeks to distinguish itself by the quantity and quality of attention students receive from faculty members, including time spent with students outside class. The intramural basketball program gives students an opportunity to have personal contact with faculty members and makes a contribution to student retention.

The question to be considered on appeal is not whether the evidence supports a different conclusion, but whether the evidence supports the commissioner's findings. Ward v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 304 N.W.2d 236, 237-38 (Iowa 1981). Our review of the evidence indicates there was substantial evidence that the employer derived a substantial direct benefit from faculty participation in the intramural basketball program. Since a contrary result is not demanded as a matter of law, the commissioner's findings on this question are binding. Id. at 238.

B. Causation. The employer next asserts that claimants have not shown that decedent's injury, if any, arose out of his employment. The employer correctly states that the test to determine whether an employee's injury arose out of his employment is based on a causal connection between the conditions under which work was performed and the resulting injury. The employer argues that decedent had a preexisting, latent disease and that claimants made no showing the employment materially aggravated or accelerated the disease.

It is undisputed that the 40-year-old decedent had a heart condition before his participation in the basketball game. In reviewing the applicable law concerning an employee's preexisting heart condition, the commissioner relied upon our ruling in Sondag v. Ferris Hardware, 220 N.W.2d 903 (Iowa 1974). In Sondag we stated that a compensable injury may result when heavy exertions ordinarily required by work are superimposed on a defective heart, aggravating or accelerating the preexisting condition or "when the medical testimony shows an instance of unusually strenuous employment...