Vosberg v. A.Y. McDonald Mfg. Co.
| Decision Date | 26 April 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-1527,92-1527 |
| Citation | 519 N.W.2d 405 |
| Parties | Terrance D. VOSBERG, Claimant, Appellant, v. A.Y. McDONALD MANUFACTURING CO., Employer, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Mark J. Sullivan of Reynolds & Kenline, Dubuque, for appellant.
Les V. Reddick of O'Connor & Thomas, P.C., Dubuque, for appellee.
Considered en banc.
Terrance D. Vosberg first began working for A.Y. McDonald in October 1978 as an entry level mechanic. Vosberg served in the Navy from 1979 through 1982 where he was an electrical systems maintainer. In 1982, after his Navy stint, Vosberg returned to A.Y. McDonald. Vosberg eventually was promoted to a position as millwright earning approximately $10.45 per hour.
Vosberg injured his back on January 8, 1989, while lifting and repairing a machine weighing approximately 100 pounds. Vosberg sought immediate medical attention. The company physician, Dr. Faber, prescribed medicine and physical therapy. Dr. Faber eventually referred Vosberg to Dr. Cairns. A bone scan performed by Dr. Cairns revealed that Vosberg sustained a herniated disc in his lower back. Dr. Cairns determined surgery was not warranted and prescribed conservative treatment. Dr. Cairns placed restrictions on Vosberg's employment and opined Vosberg sustained a ten percent impairment to his body as a whole because of the back injury. No further treatment has been prescribed.
Vosberg was unable to return to work with A.Y. McDonald. The company asserts restrictions in its union contract prohibit it from rehiring Vosberg in another position. The contract was not entered in evidence at the hearing before the Deputy Industrial Commissioner. Vosberg currently is self-employed selling Amway and selling and installing satellite television systems.
Vosberg filed an original notice and petition with the Industrial Commissioner seeking workers' compensation benefits. At the time of the arbitration hearing, Vosberg was thirty years old. Following a hearing, a Deputy Industrial Commissioner filed a proposed agency decision. The deputy concluded Vosberg proved entitlement to sixty percent industrial disability benefits. The deputy found Vosberg sustained a substantial loss of income as a result of his back injury. In addition, the deputy found Vosberg proved entitlement to healing period benefits from January 8, 1989 to September 22, 1989.
A.Y. McDonald appealed. The Industrial Commissioner found Vosberg's condition had stabilized and further improvement was not expected after November 7, 1989. Therefore, the Industrial Commissioner concluded Vosberg proved entitlement to healing period benefits from January 8, 1989 to November 7, 1989. The Industrial Commissioner found the employer's refusal to rehire Vosberg was not the employer's decision but mandated rather by the union contract. Therefore, the Industrial Commissioner concluded that Vosberg's industrial disability was not increased by the employer's refusal to rehire. See McSpadden v. Big Ben Coal Co., 288 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1980). The Industrial Commissioner concluded Vosberg proved entitlement to thirty-five percent industrial disability benefits.
Vosberg filed a petition for judicial review. The district court affirmed the decision of the Industrial Commissioner. The district court concluded substantial evidence supported the Industrial Commissioner's determination of healing period benefits and industrial disability benefits.
Vosberg appeals. We reverse the district court's review of the Industrial Commissioner's decision and remand this case to the Industrial Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In its review of the Industrial Commissioner's decision, the district court functions in an appellate capacity to correct errors of law. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8) (1993). Section 17A.19 circumscribes the district court's review to a determination whether the agency committed any errors of law specified in subsection 17A.19(8). King v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 474 N.W.2d 564, 565 (Iowa 1991). The agency's findings of fact have the effect of a jury verdict and are to be broadly and liberally applied to uphold the agency decision. Id.; Beier Glass Co. v. Brundige, 329 N.W.2d 280, 282 (Iowa 1983). The district court gives careful consideration of the Commissioner's conclusions of law, but is not bound by them. Briar Cliff College v. Campolo, 360 N.W.2d 91, 93 (Iowa 1984). The district court must reverse, modify, or grant other appropriate relief from agency action affected by errors of law. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(e).
We review the decision of the district court pursuant to Iowa Code section 17A.20. We apply the standards of section 17A.19(8) to the agency action to determine whether our conclusions are the same as the district court's. King, 474 N.W.2d at 565. If our conclusions are the same, we affirm the district court. If they are not, we reverse. Henry v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 426 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Iowa 1988). Section 17A.19(8) requires relief "if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced." The agency action may not be:
a. In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
b. In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
c. In violation of an agency rule;
d. Made upon unlawful procedure;
e. Affected by other errors of law;
f. In a contested case, unsupported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when that record is viewed as a whole; or
g. Unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Iowa Code § 17A.19(8). Evidence is substantial if a reasonable person would find it adequate for reaching a decision. Peoples Memorial Hosp. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n., 322 N.W.2d 87, 91 (Iowa 1982); Eaton v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 376 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Iowa App.1985). The question is not whether the evidence might support a different finding but whether the evidence supports the findings actually made. Henry v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 391 N.W.2d 731, 734 (Iowa App.1986). The fact that two inconsistent conclusions can be drawn from the evidence does not mean that one of those conclusions is unsupported by substantial evidence. Id.
The Deputy Industrial Commissioner made extensive findings of fact in his decision. The Industrial Commissioner adopted those findings without modification as final agency action. The district court, in its review of the agency's decision, made its own findings which do not coincide with the agency's findings in several details. The agency found "claimant is never to lift over 10 pounds." and Dr. Cairns "testified he agreed [with the restriction]." The district court found Dr. Cairns "limited Claimant's weight lifting to somewhere between 20 and 30 pounds." The district court's conclusion of law is claimant has "a 30-pound lifting restriction." The agency also found:
Claimant's hope is that since he is unable to work in jobs requiring the type of physical work he was doing at the time of his injury, his work with his Amway business can hopefully earn him as much money as he earned at defendant employer. This is a highly motivated goal, but obviously from the record he is...
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...was arbitrary.... The industrial commissioner did not provide any basis for the reduction of the award. In Vosberg v. A.Y. McDonald Mfg. Co., 519 N.W.2d 405 (Iowa App.1994), the court of appeals held that the industrial commissioner cannot, without explaining the basis for his decision, rea......