O'Brien v. O'Brien

• Decision Date: 15 June 1982
• Citation: 114 Misc.2d 233,452 N.Y.S.2d 801
• Parties: Michael O'BRIEN, Plaintiff, v. Loretta O'BRIEN, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 801

452 N.Y.S.2d 801

114 Misc.2d 233

Michael O'BRIEN, Plaintiff, v. Loretta O'BRIEN, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Westchester County.

June 15, 1982.

Andrew Yankwitt, Carle Place, for plaintiff.

Albert J. Emanuelli, White Plains, for defendant.

RICHARD J. DARONCO, Justice.

This matrimonial action is brought by plaintiff husband, now a medical doctor under § 236, Part B of the Domestic Relations Law referred to as the "Marital Equitable Distribution Law" effective July 19, 1980 (L.1980 c. 281). The question to be determined is whether or not contributions to a spouse's medical education are subject to equitable distribution upon dissolution of the marriage which occurs shortly after receipt of a medical degree and license.

The essential facts are undisputed.

The parties were married on April 3, 1971 and lived together for approximately nine years. There are no children of this marriage. Plaintiff (Dr. O'Brien) left the marital residence during 1980. Both parties enjoy relatively good health.

At the beginning of the marriage, defendant (Mrs. O'Brien) had a temporary teacher's certificate and was employed as a grammar school teacher in a parochial school. In order to obtain a permanent teacher's certificate from the State of New York, defendant would have been required to attend post-graduate studies for a period of eighteen months at a cost of approximately $3,000 excluding living expenses. Defendant wife relinquished this opportunity so that plaintiff husband could obtain his educational goals. At the time of marriage, the plaintiff was a college dropout, and except for a brief period of employment plaintiff attended school throughout the vast majority of his married life. Plaintiff devoted his primary energies to obtaining a college degree, successfully completed pre-medical studies and ultimately attended medical school in Guadalajara, Mexico, as well as post medical school internship during the marriage. Plaintiff is presently employed as a resident general surgeon in Cleveland, Ohio, earning approximately $17,000 per annum, and is under contract there until 1985. He currently resides with his intended new wife and her son by a former union and their infant daughter. Defendant has not remarried.

It is not controverted that defendant wife was both homemaker, and gainfully employed throughout the marriage, and that her entire earnings went for the parties joint support. During the period when the parties resided in Mexico, defendant was employed at two, and at times three positions, as a kindergarten teacher, English tutor and English teacher.

Financial deficiencies in income coupled with educational expenses resulting from plaintiff's full time studies during the marriage required several student loans. Additional financial needs were provided by financial assistance, initially from defendant's parents and thereafter from plaintiff's parents.

From the inception of the marriage to the trial of this action, neither party has accumulated any substantial assets. A property settlement of their modest accumulated personal property was agreed upon by the parties before this action reached trial and the court will not disturb said division.

Plaintiff husband sought a divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment and constructive abandonment. Defendant answered and counterclaimed for a judgment of divorce on the grounds of cruelty, seeking equitable distribution of marital property and additional related financial relief, including, inter alia, expert witness fees and counsel fees. Plaintiff submitted a reply to defendant's answer.

By consent of the parties, in the presence of counsel, plaintiff withdrew his complaint and reply to defendant's counterclaim and defendant wife was granted an uncontested divorce on the grounds of constructive abandonment.

This case was bifurcated and a divorce entered in favor of defendant. All other issues pending were reserved.

The case at bar presents the not uncommon situation where one spouse foregoes immediate personal benefits of income in order to support the marriage, thus enabling the other spouse to continue his or her education with its concomitant future financial rewards. In such case, as here, with a divorce shortly after obtaining a degree, there is usually little or no accumulated marital property to be divided upon dissolution of the marriage.

Courts in other jurisdictions have considered the issue presented in this case. In the reported cases it is apparent that there exists divergent opinions on this point throughout the country. In some jurisdictions a property interest is recognized in cases of this type. See ex., In Re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa, 1978) (law degree) that increased future earnings is a marital asset and is subject to equitable distribution; Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky.App.1979) (dental license); Lynn v. Lynn, No. M-9842-8 (N.J.Super.Ct., Ch.Div., filed December 5, 1981) (medical license); also Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich.App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978) (medical license); Daniels v. Daniels, 185 N.E.2d 773, (Ohio App.1961) (medical license) the professional degree or license was treated as marital property; Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Oklahoma 1979) (medical License) an equitable claim exists for the working spouse's investment. See also Sullivan v. Sullivan, No. D-147767, Ct.App., Fourth District, Second Division, filed January 8, 1982 (California) (medical License); cf. Hill v. Hill, 182 N.J.Super. 616, 442 A.2d 1072 (dental License) where a spouse had financially contributed to the other spouse's obtaining a professional license an award by way of rehabilitative alimony was made.

Other courts have refused to recognize a property interest in cases of this type. See ex. In Re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75 (Colo.1978) (M.B.A. degree) lacks traditional property attributes; see also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J.Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (1982) revg. 175 N.J.Super. 443, 419 A.2d 1149 (Chan.Div.1980) (M.B.A. degree); professional license is not separate property for equitable distribution; also a wife is not entitled to reimbursement for contributions made to support husband in achieving his educational goals on termination of marriage; Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind.App. 661, 365 N.E.2d 792 (1977) (Phd. degree) increased earning capacity is not property although enhanced by working spouse; Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975) (law partnership) earning capacity enhanced and developed by other spouse, no entitlement for reimbursement on termination by other spouse.

The court is also aware of the recent decision of Lesman v. Lesman, 110 Misc.2d 815, 442 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1981) in considering the issue presented in this case. In Lesman, the court concluded that a license to practice medicine is not property for purposes of equitable distribution of marital property in actions under Part B of Section 236, Domestic Relations Law. The court in determining an appropriate remedy stated that the nonlicensed spouse "(P)layed no significant monetary role in said medical education" of the husband.

The case at bar is totally distinguishable since the non-licensed spouse played a significant monetary role in the medical education of the husband. The breakdown of this marriage relationship occurred shortly after completion of the plaintiff's professional schooling. The only valuable surviving asset acquired by either spouse during their nine year marriage is the professional license of the plaintiff. Defendant subordinated her own educational goals to that of the plaintiff. Defendant contributed to the marriage her full time, interest, energies and all her finances over this nine year period. Defendant's financial input was substantial; she contributed approximately 76% of the couple's total income and assumed the dominant role of breadwinner so that plaintiff could achieve his ambition to obtain a medical license.

When a spouse finances another's education, and thus high earning capacity, it is unfair to deny her a share of this asset which would not exist but for her efforts. It is not reasonable to state that she can be compensated by higher maintenance since her ability to continue receiving it depends on her finding a new life in a second marriage. She should not be faced with this dilemma. Also, if the divorce follows close upon the licensing as in this case, the professional's income may not yet be high enough for substantial maintenance. Indeed, her own earning capacity may preclude a large maintenance award.

One cannot ignore the question as to valuation if the professional does not practice or, perhaps, if he is employed. This, however, is no basis for denying that a license is divisible property since these factual situations really relate only to the processes of valuation and distribution. As always, includibility, valuation, and the percentage of equitable distribution of the asset are separate questions.

With the passage of the Equitable Distribution Law a profound change has been made in the standards which govern the division of property upon the dissolution of marriage. It is apparent that the legislature envisioned an open property doctrine in the field of matrimonial law by introducing a new concept denominated "Equitable Distribution". It speaks in terms of contribution of the parties, efforts of the parties and recognizes that "marital partners" are "economic partners". The statute is expressed in comprehensive and general terms. It sets forth specific guidelines and new concepts of what constitutes "property", authorizing courts to seek out equitable remedies within the context of a particular case.

The definition of marital property includes all property (both real and personal) which was acquired by both spouses or either of them during the marriage and ... before the commencement of a matrimonial action. The court is further authorized to distribute such property equitably...