Briggs v. City of Raleigh
| Decision Date | 22 February 1928 |
| Docket Number | 254. |
| Parties | BRIGGS v. CITY OF RALEIGH et al. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Wake County; Clayton Moore, Special Judge.
Controversy without action between Willis G. Briggs as plaintiff and the City of Raleigh and others, as defendants, submitted on agreed statement of facts to determine validity of certain proposed bonds of city. From a judgment holding the bonds in question to be valid obligations of the City and denying the prayer for injunctive relief, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
There can be no lawful tax which is not laid for public purpose.
There is no power to tax for an object not within purposes for which governments are established.
Controversy without action, submitted on an agreed statement of facts, to determine the validity of certain proposed bonds of the city of Raleigh.
The Legislature at its last session (chapter 209, Public Laws 1927) dedicated and set apart 200 acres of the state's land, situate within five miles of the state capitol, the particular acreage to be selected by the Governor and Council of state, for the purpose of holding annually a state fair and exposition, such as will properly represent the agricultural, manufacturing, industrial, and other interests of the state; provided, the city or citizens of Raleigh and the North Carolina Agricultural Society (C. S. § 4936) donate not less than $200,000 to be used in the erection of buildings, or proper development of the fairgrounds, and the conducting of a fair thereon.
It is further provided in said act that the state fair or exposition, so authorized, shall be managed, operated, and conducted by a board of directors consisting of one representative from each congressional district in the state and three representatives from the state at large, such representatives to be appointed by the Governor, together with the following ex officio members of such board of directors: The Governor of North Carolina, ex officio chairman, commissioner of agriculture, president of the North Carolina State College of Agriculture and Engineering, the director of the state department of conservation and development, and the mayor of the city of Raleigh.
At the same session of the Legislature (chapter 210, Private Laws 1927), the commissioners of the city of Raleigh were authorized and empowered, with the approval of a majority of the qualified voters of said city, to issue municipal bonds in a sum not to exceed $75,000, "and donate and contribute the proceeds of the same to the state for the purpose of assisting in the establishment and maintenance of a state fair in the vicinity of Raleigh, under the conditions and provisions" contained in chapter 209, Pub. Laws 1927.
A special election was duly called and held in the city of Raleigh on July 26, 1927, at which said election a majority of the qualified voters, newly registered for said election (C. S. § 2948), voted in favor of the issuance of the bonds to the amount of $75,000.
From a judgment holding the bonds in question to be valid obligations of the city of Raleigh and denying the prayer for injunctive relief, the plaintiff appeals, assigning errors.
Barwick & Leach, of Raleigh, for appellant.
Clifton W. Beckwith and Albert L. Cox, both of Raleigh, for appellees.
The primary role of municipal government is that of a protector of rights and not a giver of gifts, but, if the end in view be a public municipal one, it is the general holding that a city may aid by donation, in proper instances, as well as by other means of assistance. Cox v. Com'rs, 146 N.C. 584, 60 S.E. 516, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 253; Wood v Oxford, 97 N.C. 227, 2 S.E. 653. Albeit there can be no lawful tax which is not laid for a public purpose ( Citizens' Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. [87 U. S.] 655, 22 L.Ed. 455; Com'rs v. State Treasurer, 174 N.C. 141, 93 S.E. 482, 2 A. L. R. 726) "It is well settled that moneys for other than public purposes cannot be raised by taxation, and that exertion of the taxing power for merely private purposes is beyond the authority of the state" (Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217, 38 S.Ct. 112, 62 L.Ed. 252, L. R. A. 1918C, 765, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 660). And, in case of a city or municipality, the tax, to be valid, must be for a city or municipal purpose, in a legal sense, as well as for a public one (Cooley on Taxation [4th Ed.] vol. 1, § 126); that is, the objects to be attained must affect the people as a community and not merely as individuals (Cooley's Const. Limit. 531).
The appeal therefore presents two questions not heretofore decided in this jurisdiction: (1) Is a state fair, such as described in the two statutes above mentioned, to be held annually under the supervision of the state, a public undertaking? (2) If so, is its location or retention within the vicinity of Raleigh, not more than five miles from the state capitol, a public municipal purpose for which a donation of $75,000 and more of public funds may be authorized by a favorable vote of a majority of the qualified voters of the city of Raleigh?
A negative answer to either one of these questions would require a reversal of the judgment, but, if both are answered in the affirmative, it is conceded that the judgment should be upheld.
If we are to follow the clear weight of authority in other jurisdictions, where similar matters have been considered by the courts, the first question may readily be answered in the affirmative. Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) vol. 1, § 203, and authorities there cited.
Speaking to the subject in Kentucky Live Stock Breeders' Association v. Hager, 120 Ky. 125, 85 S.W. 738, 9 Ann. Cas. 50, where a legislative appropriation for a state fair was upheld, Hobson, C.J., delivering the opinion of the court, said:
"It is also insisted that a state fair is not a public purpose for which the money of the state may be appropriated by the Legislature, and that the act merely gives a bounty of $15,000 to appellant. The appropriation to the World's Fair was sustained by this court (Norman v. Board of Managers, 93 Ky. 537, 20 S.W. 901, 18 L. R. A. 556, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 529; and, if the Legislature may appropriate money in aid of a fair held in another state, to properly represent the state in such a fair, it is hard to see how a fair held within the state, to make an exhibit of the products of the state, is not equally a public purpose. Such legislation has been sustained by the current of authority in the other states of the Union having Constitutions substantially the same as ours. Daggett v. Colgan, 92 Cal. 53, 28 P. 51, 14 L. R. A. 474, 27 Am. St. Rep. 95; State v. Cornell, 53 Neb. 556, 74 N.W. 59, 39 L. R. A. 513, 68 Am. St. Rep. 629; Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 59 Am. Dec. 759; City of Minneapolis v. Janney, 86 Minn. 111, 90 N.W. 312; Downing v. Indiana State Board of Agriculture, 129 Ind. 443, 28 N.E. 123, 614, 12 L. R. A. 664; Shelby County v. Tennessee Centennial Exposition, 96 Tenn. 653, 36 S.W. 694, 33 L. R. A. 717; Bennington v. Park, 50 Vt. 178."
The purpose and design of a state fair is to promote the general welfare of the people, advance their education in matters pertaining to agriculture and industry, increase their appreciation for the arts and the sciences, and bring them in closer touch with many things which otherwise might remain in reserve or "caviare to the general," to borrow an expressive phrase from Shakespeare's Hamlet.
The second question may likewise be answered in the affirmative, if we are to follow the general current of authority on the subject, though it is conceded that the decisions, in this respect, are variant. Note L. R. A. 1917E, 845.
Some diversity of opinion may well be expected in a matter of this kind, where the question presented, as it is here, is susceptible to more than one view. Indeed, the line which separates community interests from those that are nonmunicipal, especially where the latter result in benefit to the local public, is not always easy to plot. Quite the reverse. On this subject, Judge Cooley says:
Cooley on Taxation, vol. 1 (4th Ed.) § 175.
Many objects may be public in the general sense that their attainment will confer a public benefit or promote the public convenience, but not be public in the sense that the taxing power of the state may be used to accomplish them. Waples v. Marrast, 108 Tex. 5, 184 S.W. 180, L. R. A. 1917A. 253. However, the term "public purpose" is not to be construed too narrowly. Weismer v. Village of Douglas, 64 N.Y. 91, 21 Am. Rep. 586. It is not necessary, in order that a use may be regarded as public, that it should be for the use and benefit of every citizen in the community. It may be for the inhabitants of a restricted locality, but the use and benefit must be in common, and not for particular persons, interests, or estates. Ross v. Davis, 97 Ind. 83; Coster v. Tide Water Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 68; Soens v. City of Racine, 10 Wis. 271.
Animadverting on the subject in Town of Bennington v. Park et al., 50 Vt. 178, Powers, J., delivering the opinion of the court, well says:
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