Brinkley v. State

• Citation: 320 Ga.App. 275,739 S.E.2d 703
• Decision Date: 11 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. A12A2322.,A12A2322.
• Parties: BRINKLEY v. The STATE.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

320 Ga.App. 275

739 S.E.2d 703

BRINKLEY

v.The STATE.

No. A12A2322.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 11, 2013.

Stephen Michael Reba, for Appellant.

Clifford Paul Bowden, Dist. Atty., for Appellee.

Sandra L. Michaels, amicus curiae.

ANDREWS, Presiding Judge.

Jonas A. Brinkley was found guilty by a jury of kidnapping with bodily injury (by rape) against a female victim; rape of the female victim; kidnapping against a male victim; and armed robbery against the male victim. The rape conviction was vacated by operation of law by merger into the conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury. Brinkley was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of life imprisonment (with the possibility of parole) for kidnapping with bodily injury ( OCGA § 16–5–40(d)(4) ); 20 years to serve consecutive for kidnapping; and 20 years to serve concurrent for armed robbery. Brinkley appealed his convictions and sentences to the Georgia Supreme Court claiming his constitutional rights were violated in a variety of ways. Among other claims, Brinkley contended that the life sentence violated the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because he was only 14 years old at the time of the offenses, and that his due process rights were violated because his competency to stand trial was not assessed before he stood trial in the superior court at only 15 years of age.¹ The Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this Court on the basis that the cruel and unusual punishment constitutional claim was not timely raised and was waived, and that, because the other constitutional claims "all involve the application of well-established constitutional law to the particular facts of this case ... jurisdiction over those issues is also properly in the Court of Appeals." Brinkley v. State, 291 Ga. 195, 195–196, 199–200, 728 S.E.2d 598 (2012). For the following reasons, we affirm.

1. The evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.

The female victim identified Brinkley as the person who pointed a pistol at her and her boyfriend as they sat on the front porch of her house, forced them to go inside the house, robbed her boyfriend of cash at gunpoint, forced her into another room of the house, forced her to disrobe and lie on the kitchen floor, and then raped her. The victim testified that she was crying and pleading with Brinkley to stop, but he threatened to kill her. She testified:

He was just telling me to f––k him back, that I knowed I liked it. And that he wanted me to make noise to show him that I liked what he was doing. He said, what do you want me to do, f––k you in your ass, suck your titties. And I told him no, I just wanted him to stop.

Evidence also showed that Brinkley had an accomplice during the commission of these offenses, Lakendrick D. Carter, age 19 at the time of the trial, who was co-indicted along with Brinkley. Carter testified for the State and identified Brinkley as the person who held the pistol on both victims and forced them to move about the house, who demanded and took the cash at gunpoint from the male victim, and who raped the female victim. A DNA analysis of semen found on the floor at the scene of the rape and a blood sample taken from Brinkley revealed that the semen came from Brinkley or his identical twin.

Brinkley testified in his defense that the female victim invited him over to her house and that they had consensual sex. Brinkley testified:

So she had started feeling on my penis; right. And so I had told her that I was young and plus she had said age ... don't matter.... [S]o she was like well ... we really need to go inside of my room. And I was like, naw, because ... your boyfriend might have came back. You know what I'm saying, didn't want to start nothing. She had said ... [s]o we can go inside of the kitchen. So we had done went inside the kitchen and we had sex. And I had done been and came up out of her and she—it was ejaculation. And so when I had seen it on the floor I heard the door knob pop so I had ran out of the back door and somehow she had convinced the boyfriend that, you know, that I had raped her and robbed her and kidnapped her. And so, you know what I'm saying, because she had got caught and she was in the shock I guess.

Brinkley also said that he was alone and that he did not know Carter.

The testimony of the female victim and the accomplice, along with the DNA evidence, was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Brinkley was guilty of the charged offenses. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. Brinkley contends that, even though he did not pursue a claim that he was incompetent to stand trial, the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte assess whether he was competent, and that this failure violated his constitutional right to due process.

A trial court is to conduct, sua sponte, a competency hearing when there is information which becomes known to it, prior to or at the time of the trial, sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt regarding the defendant's competence. The salient question is whether the trial court received information which, objectively considered, should reasonably have raised a doubt about the defendant's competency and alerted the trial court to the possibility that the defendant could neither understand the proceedings, appreciate their significance, nor rationally aid his attorney in his defense.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lytle v. State, 290 Ga. 177, 179, 718 S.E.2d 296 (2011). To answer this question, the focus is on "any evidence of the defendant's irrational behavior, the defendant's demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion regarding the defendant's competence to stand trial." Traylor v. State, 280 Ga. 400, 404, 627 S.E.2d 594 (2006).

Brinkley claims that a written statement he gave to police prior to trial and a remark he made to the Court at the sentencing hearing raised bona fide doubts regarding his competency. Prior to trial, Brinkley gave a written statement denying guilt that was grammatically incorrect and contained numerous misspellings. At the sentencing hearing, Brinkley told the Court that the evidence did not prove his guilt; that he was not that type of person because he had respect for other people; that all he used to do was go to school and stay home with his family and "[j]ust do what a child supposed to do." He claimed that the rape victim lied; that he had no reason to lie about anything; and added that "I was going to ask about probably 10 to 15 years on probation."

According to Brinkley, a bona fide doubt as to his competency was raised because the pre-trial statement showed a "severe literacy impairment" and raised doubts about his education level and intelligence, and the request at the sentencing hearing for "10 to 15 years on probation" showed that he did not understand the nature of the proceedings. We find that the statements raised no reasonable doubt as to whether Brinkley was competent—they did not alert the trial court to the possibility that he could neither understand the proceedings, appreciate their significance, nor rationally aid his attorney in his defense. The record shows no irrational behavior at trial and no prior medical opinion regarding competency that would have caused the trial court to have reasonable doubts about Brinkley's competency to stand trial. The statements themselves were not evidence of irrational or other behavior that would have raised reasonable doubts about Brinkley's competency. What the statements did show, in conjunction with Brinkley's trial testimony, is that he understood the charges and maintained his innocence before, during, and after the trial. The trial court did not err by failing to hold a hearing sua sponte regarding Brinkley's competency.

Brinkley also claims that, because his age alone—15 years at the time of trial—showed his "developmental immaturity," due process mandated that the trial court sua sponte conduct a hearing to assess his competency to stand trial on criminal charges in superior court. This claim has been previously raised on appeal and rejected. In Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 69, 70–71, 608 S.E.2d 602 (2005), the Supreme Court rejected a similar claim made on the basis of age alone by a 14–year–old defendant tried on criminal charges in superior court. Lewis held that, "we decline appellant's request that we adopt a rule mandating competency hearings for children under 17 who face trial in superior court under OCGA § 15–11–28(b)(2)(B)." Id. at 71, 608 S.E.2d 602.

3. Brinkley contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial made on the basis that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

To obtain reversal of a conviction based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant has the burden of proving that counsel's performance was deficient, and that, but for the deficiency, there was a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; Terry v. Jenkins, 280 Ga. 341, 342, 627 S.E.2d 7 (2006). To establish deficient performance, a defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under the circumstances confronting counsel at the time without resorting to hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–690, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Franks v. State, 278 Ga. 246, 250, 599 S.E.2d 134 (2004). In considering adequacy of performance, trial counsel "is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact: we accept the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts." Franks, 278 Ga. at 250, 599 S.E.2d 134.

Connelly v. State, 295...