Bronson v. Swinney

• Decision Date: 05 December 1986
• Docket Number: No. CV-R-86-130-ECR.,CV-R-86-130-ECR.
• Citation: 648 F. Supp. 1094
• Parties: Brent R. BRONSON, Petitioner, v. Vincent SWINNEY, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

648 F. Supp. 1094

Brent R. BRONSON, Petitioner, v. Vincent SWINNEY, et al., Respondents.

No. CV-R-86-130-ECR.

United States District Court, D. Nevada.

September 29, 1986.

On Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment December 5, 1986.

Dennis E. Widdis, Washoe County Public Defender's Office, Reno, Nev., for petitioner.

Office of Atty. Gen. by James J. Rankl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Carson City, Nev., for respondents.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

EDWARD C. REED, Jr., Chief Judge.

Brent R. Bronson petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He asserts that he was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial.

On December 29, 1984, petitioner was stopped on Interstate Route 80 by a Nevada Highway Patrol officer for speeding and weaving. Petitioner failed a field sobriety test and was transported to the county jail for a chemical test, which he refused.

Petitioner was charged with three misdemeanors: driving while intoxicated, failure to drive within one traffic lane, and unnecessary waste of a resource currently in short supply. Under Nevada law a first offense of driving while intoxicated is punishable by payment of tuition for and attendance of an educational course on the abuse of alcohol and controlled substances, imprisonment for not less than two days nor more than six months in jail (or performance of forty-eight hours of work for the community while dressed in distinctive garb), and a fine of not less than $200 nor more than $1,000.¹ NRS § 484.3792. In addition, there are collateral consequences of a conviction for driving while intoxicated that will be discussed below. Failure to drive within one traffic lane is punishable under Nevada law by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months, or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both. NRS §§ 484.305, 484.251, 193.150. The offense of wasting a resource in short supply, committed by driving between the speeds of fifty-five and seventy miles per hour, is punishable under Nevada law by a fine of $5. NRS § 484.362.

The criminal complaint was filed in Reno Justice Court. Petitioner filed a demand for a jury trial, which was denied.

A bench trial ensued. Petitioner was convicted on all three counts; he was sentenced to four days in jail, fined $430, ordered to pay a $30 administrative assessment, and ordered to attend an educational course on the abuse of alcohol and controlled substances. On appeal the district court affirmed the convictions, but held that petitioner could not receive separate sentences for driving while intoxicated and for failing to drive within one traffic lane since those offenses arose from identical circumstances and merged for purposes of sentencing. The court remanded for resentencing with the requirement that the sentence not exceed the maximum penalty for commission of a single misdemeanor. Upon remand, the justice court sentenced petitioner to four days imprisonment in the county jail and imposed a fine of $460. Petitioner appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, but that court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

While in custody, petitioner applied for habeas corpus relief contending that the Nevada court's refusal to allow him a jury trial violated his constitutional rights.

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury...." The United States Supreme Court, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), held that the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is a fundamental right and is one guaranteed as against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Explaining why the right to trial by jury is fundamental, Justice White wrote:

The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government. Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The framers of the constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary action. Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it. Beyond this, the jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power — a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges.

Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-156, 88 S.Ct. at 1451.

Despite the broad language of the Constitution, and despite the importance of the right to trial by jury, courts have consistently held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a jury trial only to defendants charged with "serious" offenses; defendants charged with "petty" offenses are not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159, 88 S.Ct. at 1452.

The determination whether an offense is petty or serious is made on the basis of objective criteria reflecting the seriousness with which society regards the offense. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1887, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970) (plurality opinion); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628, 57 S.Ct. 660, 663, 81 L.Ed. 843 (1937).

The most important criterion in determining the seriousness with which society regards an offense is the maximum authorized penalty (i.e., the maximum imprisonment and fine authorized as punishment for the offense). Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1887, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148, 89 S.Ct. 1503, 1505, 23 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-161, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1452-1454, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); U.S. v. Jenkins, 734 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276 (9th Cir.1977). Generally, petty offenses are those with a maximum penalty of up to six months imprisonment and a $500 fine. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 71, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1889, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1452, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); United States v. Arbo, 691 F.2d 862, 863 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276 (9th Cir.1977).

On the other hand, the maximum authorized penalty is not the only relevant factor in determining whether an offense is serious or petty. United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23 (9th Cir.1981); United States v. Sanchez-Meza, 547 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1976). In Craner, the court said:

"Although Congress has established the sanctions of six months' imprisonment or $500 in fines as the bright line between serious and petty offenses, see 18 U.S.C. § 1(3), the Supreme Court has not found `talismanic significance' in this formula when determining whether a constitutional right to a jury trial exists."

Craner, 652 F.2d at 25, citing Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 477, 95 S.Ct. 2178, 2190, 45 L.Ed.2d 319 (1975). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also said:

Justice White, writing for three members of the Court in Baldwin, stated that "a potential sentence of more than six months' imprisonment is sufficiently severe by itself to take the offense out of the category of `petty'." No member of the Court expressed the view that a lesser potential sentence requires classification of an offense as petty.

Craner, 652 F.2d at 25.

Some factors other than the maximum authorized penalty that reflect the seriousness with which society regards an offense are the collateral consequences of a conviction, United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23 (9th Cir.1981); the nature of the offense, United States v. Sanchez-Meza, 547 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.1976); and the treatment of the offense at common law, Id.

In United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23 (9th Cir.1981), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol in Yosemite National Park is a serious offense. See also, U.S. v. Woods, 450 F.Supp. 1335 (D.Md.1978). The defendant in Craner was found to have a constitutional right to a jury trial. In holding that the offense is serious the court looked at factors other than the maximum authorized penalty for the offense, which was six months' imprisonment and a $500 fine.

The court primarily looked to the fact that if convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol in Yosemite National Park, Craner could have lost his California driver's license. Craner, 652 F.2d at 25. The court said that "although a license revocation is itself a regulatory, not a punitive action, United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir.1978), the threat of loss of a license as important as a driver's license, a deprivation added to penal sanctions, is another sign that the DUI defendant's community does not view DUI as a petty offense." Craner, 652 F.2d at 26.

The court also looked to District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 51 S.Ct. 52, 75 L.Ed. 177 (1930) in which the Supreme Court held that reckless driving was both indictable at common law and malum in se, and hence, serious. Craner, 652 F.2d at 26.

Finally the court looked to the relevant state and federal practice, pointing out that "at least seven of the states in this Circuit guarantee the D.U.I. defendant the right to a jury trial."² Craner, 652 F.2d at 27.

Driving under the influence of alcohol in Yosemite National Park is a violation of...